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Chapter 1
Introdution
The life expetany has seen a steady inrease in most of the western world overthe past one and a half entury. For example, the expeted remaining lifetimeof a Duth male aged 65 inreased from 11 years in 1875 to 12 years in 1900 to12.5 years in 1925 to 14 years in 1950 and then dereased to 13.5 years in 1975and thereafter again inreased to almost 17.5 years in 2009.1 The potential eetsof trends in life expetany on the value of pension liabilities present signianthallenges for governments as well as individual pension funds and life insurers. Notin the trend itself, but in the fat that the future development of the life expetanyis unertain is the major hallenge. Indeed, although the past trends suggest thatfurther inrease in life expetany is to be expeted, there is onsiderable unertaintyregarding the future development of life expetany. We refer to longevity risk asthe unertainty regarding the future development of mortality. Nowadays pensionexpets also reognize that longevity risk is an important risk fator. In the GlobalPension Survey many pension experts in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, andSwitzerland mention longevity risk as one of their top external onerns, whih anbe observed from Table 1.1.
1Soure: Statistis Netherlands, http://statline.bs.nl/.1
2 Chapter 1. IntrodutionTable 1.1: Top external onernsConern NL UK DE SZ CZ HR BEInterest rate risk 73% 83% 67% 50% 50% 0% 100%Stability of the nanial system 53% 17% 67% 60% 50% 100% 33%Market volatility 33% 50% 67% 70% 50% 100% 0%Longevity risks 67% 67% 33% 60% 0% 0% 0%Performane of investment managers 20% 17% 0% 30% 0% 0% 0%International regulation framework 0% 0% 67% 20% 50% 0% 67%Domesti regulation 13% 17% 0% 10% 100% 50% 33%Counterparty risk 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 33%Ination risk 33% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33%This table displays the perentage of respondents who plae this item in thetop 3 to the question: What are the top three external onerns faing yourpension fund?. The results are given for the Netherlands (NL), United King-dom (UK), Germany (DE), Switzerland (SZ), Cheh Republi (CZ), Croatia(HR), and Belgium (BE). Global Pension Survey (GPS) polls high-level pen-sion experts of pension funds around the world to gauge reent developments,trend data, investment plans, and the prospets of individual pension fundsand the eonomy at large. Soure: GPS, third quarter 2010.In the Netherlands, pension funds are required to value their assets and liabilitiesusing market values sine 2007. Pension funds typially have long term obligationsto their partiipants. The funding ratio, i.e., the value of the assets divided by thevalue of the liabilities, is an indiation whether a pension fund has enough wealthto meet its future obligations. The unertainty in the funding ratio of pensionfunds beame visible after the nanial risis in 2008. In 2008, pension funds in theNetherlands faed large losses of 36.7% on their equity portfolio. The equity marketreovered from the dip in 2008, with a return of 31.8% on equity in 2009.2 Aftera reovery in the equity market, the pension funds were faed with low interestrates, for example the 10 years interest rate has dereased from 5.027% on June30, 2008 to 2.377% on August 31, 2010.3 Beause the regulator requires pensionfunds to alulate the value of the liabilities using the swap rate to disount futurepayments, this is the main reason of the derease in the funding ratio of pensionfunds in the Netherlands. In the rst quarter of 2010 in the Netherlands 122 pensionfunds (2,436,730 partiipants) had a funding ratio of less than 105%, 211 pension2Soure: Duth Central Bank (DNB), Table T8.5.3Soure: Duth Central Bank (DNB), Table T1.3.
3funds (2,973,562 partiipants) had a funding ratio of between 105% and 130% andonly 28 pension funds (72,847 partiipants) had a funding ratio of more than 130%.4In August 2010, while many pension funds already having a low funding ratio,the atuarial soiety in the Netherlands (Atuarieel Genootshap) published arevised version of the future best estimates of the mortality probabilities. Usingthis revised projeted mortality table instead of the previous version (of 2005) leadsto an inrease in life expetany, and hene, it leads to an inrease in the value ofpension fund's liabilities. This further redues the funding ratio of pension funds.An example of the dierenes between the projeted mortality table in 2005 and2010 is given in Table 1.2 whih displays the (remaining) life expetany in 2050 ofboth males and females at birth and at age 65.Table 1.2: Life expetany in 2050 for the Netherlands, using projeted lifetables from the AG. model 2005 model 2010 hange0 year-old male 82.5 85.5 +3.00 year-old female 84.3 87.3 +3.065 year-old male 19.6 22.0 +2.465 year-old female 21.3 23.8 +2.5The table displays the period life expetany in 2050, using projeted life tablesfrom the atuarial soiety (AG) in 2005 (model 2005) and in 2010 (model2010) in the Netherlands. The period life expetany in 2050 is alulatedusing the projeted survival probabilities in the year 2050. Soure: Atuarialsoiety, http://www.ag-ai.nl/.The dierene in life expetany between the two sueeding projeted life tablesdetermined by the atuarial soiety is large. The inrease in projeted life expetanyis partly due to a hange in the method to determine the future survival probabilitiesand partly due to a larger than expeted inrease in realized survival probabilitiesbetween the two foreasts. In the UK, where the atuarial soiety projeted thelife expetany from 1971 onwards, the realization of the life expetany at birth istypially higher than the projeted ones. This indiates that in the UK the inreasein survival probabilities have been onsistently underestimated. Unfortunately, the4Soure: Duth Central Bank (DNB), Table T8.8. These numbers only inlude pension fundswith liabilities, exluding funds whih fully reinsured their liabilities. In September 2010 the totalnumber of pension funds in the Netherlands was 602.
4 Chapter 1. Introdutionatuarial soiety only projeted life tables in 2005 and 2010, so we have too fewdata to determine whether the underestimation in 2005 is due to the stohastiityin the evolution of the survival probabilities or whether it is due to a onsistentunderestimation of the inrease in future survival probabilities.In the Netherlands the life tables are also projeted by Statistis Netherlandsand by the Duth Assoiation of Insurers. Foreasts of the mortality probabilitieswere provided by the Group Referene Rate Commission, whih in 2005 beame theCommissie Pensioen- en Lijfrentetafels, a ommission of the Duth Assoiation ofInsurers, of Duth males aged 65 are displayed in Figure 1.1. Statistis Netherlandsprovided ve onseutive projeted life tables. Table 1.3 displays the life expetanyin 2049 using projeted life tables from Statisti Netherlands.
Figure 1.1: Observed and foreasted mortality probability for a male in theNetherlands aged 65


















































The gure displays the observed and foreasted one year mortality probabilityof Duth males aged 65. The mortality probabilities are provided by theGroup Referene Rate Commission (in Duth: Commissie ReferentietariefColletief, CRC) and PLT (Commissie Pensioen- en Lijfrentetafels). Theprojeted tables are CRC-2 published in 1992, CRC-5 published in 1999,CRC-6 published in 2003, CRC-7 published in 2005, GP-2006 publishedin 2005, GP-2008 published in 2008, GP-2010 published in 2010.
5Table 1.3: Life expetany in the Netherlands using projeted life tables fromStatistis Netherlands. CBS CBS CBS CBS CBS2000- 2002- 2004- 2006- 2008-2049 2049 2050 2050 20500 year-old male 79.51 79.51 79.52 81.43 83.080 year-old female 82.60 82.51 82.61 84.13 85.4765 year-old male 17.96 18.08 17.86 19.20 20.5665 year-old female 20.56 20.50 20.44 21.52 22.63The table displays the period life expetany in 2049, using projeted life ta-bles from Statisti Netherlands in 2000 (CBS 2000-2049), 2002 (CBS 2002-2049), 2004 (CBS 2004-2050), 2006 (CBS 2006-2050), and 2008 (CBS2008-2050). The period life expetany in 2049 is alulated using the pro-jeted survival probabilities in the year 2049. Soure: Statistis Netherlands,http://statline.bs.nl/.From Figure 1.1 and Table 1.3 we observe that the unertainty in the projetedmortality tables is signiant. For pension funds and insurer this poses a problemfor the valuation of life insurane produts. The unertainty in future mortalityprobabilities has signiant eonomi onsequene for insurers and pension funds.This thesis investigates various aspets of longevity risk and in the remainder of thishapter we provide an overview of the hapters in this thesis.Chapter 2 (Longevity risk ) reviews the urrent state of the literature onern-ing longevity risk. First, we disuss the modeling of future mortality, inluding theLee and Carter (1992)-approah, as well as other approahes. Seond, we disussthe importane of longevity risk for the solveny of portfolios of pension and lifeinsurane produts. Finally, we investigate possibilities for longevity risk manage-ment. In partiular, we onsider longevity risk management through seuritizationand/or pension and insurane (re)design.In order to have a good risk management for life insurers, who may be faed withsigniant longevity risk, a good valuation of life insurane produts is neessary. InChapter 3 (Calulating Capital Requirements) we quantify the valuation and thereserve requirements for life insurane produts using the ost of apital method.The goal of the hapter is twofold. First, using an internal model whih is in line withthe Solveny II proposal for life insurers, we derive a losed form approximation forthe apital requirements for dierent portfolios of life insurane produts, in ase
6 Chapter 1. Introdutionmortality rates are foreasted based on the Lee and Carter (1992) model. Thenumber of simulation required to be suiently aurate would be exponential inthe number of years to maturity of the life insurane ontrat. The approximateddistribution allows us to alulate solveny requirements with good auray, butwithout simulations for several life insurane produts. Using a market-to-modelmodel, we alulate the market value of the liabilities and the apital reserve that isneeded in order to limit the probability of shortfall within a year to 0.5%. Seond,using the internal model we quantify the eets of dierent simpliations made inthe Solveny II proposal on the apital requirements.Given a good quantiation of longevity risk, a pension fund or insurer may tryto redue the risk in its portfolio. In this thesis we propose two methods, namelythrough pension plan design and hedge eets of ombining dierent life insuraneproduts. In Chapter 4 (The eet of produt design) we investigate the eetof a dened benet pension plan design on the longevity risk of a portfolio of lifeinsurane produts. We onsider dened benet pension plans that, at retirementage, allow the partiipant to hoose between a single life annuity and a joint andsurvivor annuity. We ompare two plans that dier in terms of how pension rightsare arued. In one plan, the partiipant arues the right to reeive a single lifeannuity, and an exhange that annuity for an atuarially equivalent joint and sur-vivor annuity at retirement date. The opposite holds in the other plan. We showthat both plans are aeted by longevity risk in two ways. First, the partiipants'hoies at retirement age aet the ratio of survivor benets over single life benets,and, therefore, aet the natural hedge potential that arises from ombining singlelife and survivor annuities. Seond, unertainty in the rate at whih the partiipantwill be allowed to exhange one type of annuity for the other at retirement dateindues unertainty in the level of the nominal rights for single life and survivorannuities, respetively. We ompare the two plans, and show that longevity riskis substantially lower in ase rights are arued in the form of a joint and survivorannuity.In Chapter 5 (Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with in-vestment risk ) we investigate the hedge eet of ombining dierent life insuraneproduts on longevity risk of a portfolio of life insurane produts. Existing litera-ture shows that the eet of longevity risk on single life annuities an be substantial,and that there exists a (natural) hedge potential from ombining single life annuitieswith death benets or from investing in survivor swaps. The eet of unhedgeable
7nanial risk on these hedge eets is typially ignored. The aim of this hapteris to quantify longevity risk in portfolios of mortality-linked assets and liabilities,taking into aount the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk. We nd that unhedge-able investment risk signiantly aets the impat of longevity risk in life insuraneproduts. It also signiantly aets the hedge potential that arises from ombininglife insurane produts, or from investing in longevity-linked assets. For example,our results suggest that ignoring the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk an leadto severe overestimation of the natural hedge potential from death benets, andunderestimation of the hedge eets of survivor swaps.Finally, we onsider the eet of longevity risk on the investment and onsump-tion deisions for individuals, in partiular we fous on the optimal annuitizationdeision. In Chapter 6 (Annuity deisions with systemati longevity risk ) weinvestigate the eet of systemati longevity risk on the attrativeness of dierenttypes of annuities. We onsider a life-yle framework with expeted utility wherean individual faes both investment and longevity risk. In ontrast to existing lit-erature we allow not only for idiosynrati, but also for systemati longevity risk.When omparing the expeted lifetime utility, onditional on the type of annuitywhih is purhased, we nd for a 65-year old male that (i) systemati longevity riskredues the attrativeness of annuities, (ii) when an immediate annuity is purhased,the expeted lifetime utility is dereasing in the postponement period, (iii) when inthe future purhasing an immediate annuities, the eet of the evolution of the sur-vival probabilities on the optimal fration of annuitized wealth is large, and (iv) theoptimal annuity to purhase at retirement is a deferred annuity whih starts to payafter only a short deferral period. However, when the purhase of an annuity withthe optimal deferral period is ompared to the purhase of an immediate annuity atretirement date, the utility gain is negligibly small.This thesis provides ndings for quantifying and managing longevity risk in port-folios of life insurane produts for life insurers, pension funds, and individuals.Quantifying longevity risk, whih an be done using dierent methods as desribedin this thesis, is the rst step. The next step is to redue longevity risk by the plandesign and by apital market solutions. In the deision whether to hedge longevityrisk or not, both the prie and the hedge eetiveness of the produts will playan important role. The prie of longevity risk will also play a role for individuals,sine retirement produts, suh as a single life annuity, will inlude a risk marginfor longevity risk in their prie. This implies that longevity risk also impats the
8 Chapter 1. Introdutiondeisions of individuals. To sum up, with the help of new (innovative) nanialproduts to hedge longevity risk and ndings disussed in this thesis, pension funds,life insurers, and individuals should be aware of their longevity risk and manage itoptimally.
Chapter 2Longevity Risk
This hapter is based on De Waegenaere, Melenberg and Stevens (2010).
2.1 IntrodutionMost of the western world has seen a steady inrease in the average lifetime of itsinhabitants over the past entury. For example, the expeted remaining lifetime of aDuth male aged 65 inreased from 13.5 years in 1975 to almost 17.5 years in 2009.1The potential eets of trends in mortality on pension osts present signiant hal-lenges for governments as well as individual pension funds and life insurers. Bisand Blake (2009) report that every additional year of life expetany at age 65 isestimated to add at least 3% to the present value of UK pension liabilities and alu-lations from Eurostat indiate that an inrease in the life expetany at birth of oneyear leads to an inrease of, an average, 0.3% of the GDP of the publi pension ex-penditure in the EU, see European Commission and the Eonomi Poliy Committee(2009). This learly illustrates the need to onsider interventions that an mitigatethe adverse eets on pension and insurane providers, while still guaranteeing anadequate level of retirement and insurane benets to poliyholders. Identifyingappropriate interventions is hallenging. The major hallenge, however, is not inthe trend itself, but in the fat that the future development of life expetany isunertain. Indeed, although the past trends suggest that further hanges in mortal-ity rates are to be expeted, there is onsiderable unertainty regarding the futuredevelopment of mortality. Deisions regarding redesign of pension and insurane1Soure: Statistis Netherlands, http://statline.bs.nl/.9
10 Chapter 2. Longevity Risksystems should therefore appropriately aount for the eets of this partiular un-ertainty on the osts of pensions. In addition, sine interventions in the design ofpension and insurane ontrats an mitigate, but not eliminate, the eets of mor-tality risk, there will be residual risk. Whereas the fous of regulators has long beenon the risk in nanial investments, there is now inreasing awareness that au-rate quantiation and management of the risk in pension and insurane liabilities isequally important. For example, the Solveny II projet (Group Consultatif Atuar-iel Europeen, 2006), the goal of whih is to redesign nanial regulation of insuraneompanies in the EU, has put inreased emphasis on the valuation and managementof pension and insurane liabilities. Common approahes taken in pratie to dealwith the eet of hanges in life expetany have inluded regularly re-estimatingthe value of the liabilities on the basis of newly estimated death probabilities, ordetermining the value of the liabilities on the basis of a projeted trend in mortality.These approahes, however, are either retrospetive, or do not properly aount forthe unertainty in the future development of mortality. Risk management pratiesmay need to be adjusted in order to aount properly for unertainty in the futuredevelopment of mortality.This hapter reviews the literature on longevity risk (i.e., the unertainty infuture hanges in mortality rates). The fous is on models to foreast the probabilitydistribution of future mortality rates, approahes to quantify the eet of longevityrisk on pension and insurane liabilities, and possibilities for risk management.The hapter is organized as follows. In the next setion, we formally denelongevity risk, and disuss the distintion to individual mortality risk. We alsoshow that, in ontrast to individual mortality risk, longevity risk does not beomenegligible when portfolio size beomes large. Next, in Setion 2.3 we review theliterature on mortality modeling, inluding the Lee and Carter-approah, whih isnowadays used extensively to model the unertainty in the probability distribution offuture mortality. In addition to the original Lee and Carter (1992)-model, we disussseveral alternative approahes. Moreover, we deompose longevity risk into proessrisk and model risk, where the latter inludes as speial ase parameter risk. Modelrisk arises due to a lak of knowledge regarding the orret probability distributionof future mortality rates, and proess risk is the unertainty in the mortality trendsthat remains, even in ase we exatly would know the orret probability distributionof future mortality rates. Parameter risk is model risk that arises due to samplinginauray, given a seleted model (lass), like the Lee and Carter-model.
2.2. Longevity Risk 11In Setion 2.4 we disuss approahes to quantify the importane of longevityrisk for portfolios of (pension) annuities. First, we use the disounted present valueof liabilities to demonstrate the relative importane of individual mortality riskand longevity risk, and the eet of portfolio size, whih is an extension of Olivieri(2001). Seond, we briey disuss the funding ratio approah to determine longevityrisk in portfolio of life insurane produts. Third, we disuss the probability ofruin approah, i.e., quantifying longevity risk by the apital required to redue theprobability that, for a given (re)investment strategy, the urrent value of the assetswill not be suient to meet all future liabilities to a ertain perentage.2Finally, in Setion 2.5 we investigate possibilities for longevity risk managementfor life insurers and pension funds, following Cairns et al. (2008a). We illustratesome aspets of longevity risk management, in partiular, the determination of sol-veny buers, and the eet of the produt mix as a natural approah to diversifylongevity risk. We also briey disuss the attempts to set up a life market, atrading plae for mortality-based produts, that ould be used to hedge or to reduethe longevity risk. Setion 2.6 onludes.2.2 Longevity RiskIn this setion, we rst demonstrate the importane of longevity trends for annuityproviders. Then, we disuss the distintion between longevity risk and mortalityrisk, and provide evidene that longevity risk is substantial. Finally, we disuss theimpliations of longevity risks for priing annuities (or other longevity related assetsand liabilities), as well as for risk management praties.2.2.1 Mortality TrendsWe rst introdue some basi terminology and results related to mortality. Forthe sake of argument, rst assume that future death probabilities are known withertainty. An important quantity is the one-year death probability, denoted by
q
(g)
x,t , whih quanties the probability that a person of age x at year t and belongingto group g will not survive another year. The probability that the same individual2We would like to emphasize that these studies not only use dierent approahes to quantifylongevity risk, but also use dierent models to foreast future mortality. Any dierene in themagnitude of longevity risk between these studies an be due to either the hoie of method or thehoie of foreast model.
12 Chapter 2. Longevity Risksurvives at least another year is then given by
p
(g)
x,t =P (Tx,t ≥ 1|Tx,t ≥ 0)
=1− q(g)x,t , (2.1)where Tx,t denotes the random remaining lifetime of an individual aged x at time t.If, for example, group g (Duth males or Duth females) is understood, we suppressthe superindex (g). Moreover, if the probabilities would be independent of time t, wean simplify even further, by writing qx and px. Assuming this for the moment, theprobability that the same individual (of age x and belonging to group g, suppressed)survives at least τ more years is then given by












τpx. (2.3)Thus, seen from year t this individual is expeted to die in year t+ ex, at age x+ ex.The above, however, assumes that one-year death probabilities are onstant overtime. There is ample evidene that death probabilities hange over time. In Figure2.2.1 we plot the one-year death probability q(g)x,t for a number of dierent ages x andtwo groups g, namely the group of Duth males and the group of Duth females,for the years t = 1950 to t = 2006, where we normalize by the one-year deathprobabilities of year t = 1950. These one-year death probabilities are obtained fromthe Human Mortality Database.33See www.mortality.org.




































This gure plots the observed one-year death probabilities for Duth males(left panel) and Duth females (right panel), for dierent ages and for dierenttime periods, normalized to one for the year 1950. The data originates fromthe Human Mortality Database.
This gure learly illustrates that, at least over longer periods, the one-year deathprobabilities derease over time, reeting the inrease in longevity over time. Butthen the assumption that the one-year death probabilities are onstant over time isnot valid. Following Cairns, Blake and Dowd (2006), we dene the realized one-yearsurvival probabilities of the ohort aged x at date t as follows:
px+s,t+s = 1− qx+s,t+s = P (Tx,t > s + 1|Tx,t > s,F∞) , (2.4)where qx+s,t+s is the realized one-year death probability in year t + s of the ohortaged x at date t, F∞ denotes the set that ontains all information regarding mortalityrates at all (future) dates, and where Tx,t denotes the random remaining lifetime ofan individual aged x in year t. Moreover, we denote
τpx,t = P (Tx,t > τ |F∞) .
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px+s,t+s. (2.5)For the models used in this thesis, it holds true that onditional on given death ratesup to time t + s, whether the individual survives until time t + s is independent ofdeath rates in years beyond that date. Therefore, τpx,t is realized at date t+ τ , andis a random variable prior to that date (see, e.g., Cairns, Blake and Dowd, 2006).Conditional on F∞, the expeted number of years that a person of age x at year








x,t , (2.6)instead of (2.3). Thus, to alulate (2.6), we need future projetions of the one-yeardeath probabilities q(g)x,t′ , for t′ ≥ t. Let us rst onsider deterministi projetions.Suh projeted one-year death probabilities might result in a serious underestimationof the expeted number of years an individual will survive and of the expeteddisounted value of the annuity. Indeed, the projeted life table from the atuarialsoiety4 show that the expeted remaining lifetime hanges substantially when futurehanges in mortality rates are taken into aount. For the age x = 65, they reportan (period) expeted remaining lifetime for males of 17.4 years and for females 19.2years in 2011 using equation (2.3) and an (ohort) expeted remaining lifetime in2011 for males of 20.6 years and for females of 22.10 years when using using equation(2.6).Suh trends obviously have important impliations for the value of pension annu-ities. As reported in, for instane, Bis and Blake (2009), every additional year oflife expetany at age 65 is estimated to add at least 3% to the present value of UKpension liabilities. Assuming that suh numbers apply more generally, the eonomiimpliations of longevity beome obvious.This is onrmed by results from Hári et al. (2008b), who illustrate the eetof longevity trends on the expeted present value of annuity payments. Speially,they onsider a (deferred) annuity that pays o one Euro (in arrears) every year4Soure: projeted life table in 2010 by the atuarial soiety, http://www.ag-ai.nl/.








x,t · P (τ)t , (2.7)where P (τ)t denotes the market value, at time t, of a zero-oupon bond maturing attime t+τ (i.e., the date-t value of one Euro to be paid in period t+τ). They nd thatthe present value of annuity payments based on period life tables underestimates5the value based on foreasted death probabilities by 7.7% for a 25-year-old man and8.8% for a 25-year-old woman. For the 65-year-old, the orresponding numbers are0.4% and 1.7%, respetively.2.2.2 Soures of Mortality RiskWhile the above illustrates the importane of mortality trends for pension providers,there is at hand a more hallenging issue. Indeed, Figure 2.2.1 shows not only thatthe one-year death probabilities (on average) derease over time, but also that thisderease is dierent for various ages and dierent for males and for females in an(at least to some extent) unpreditable way. When extrapolating this nding toforeasting future one-year death probabilities, it seems quite implausible to assumethat we would be able to know these future one-year death probabilities in a de-terministi way, without any unertainty. Instead, it would seem more realisti todeal with this unertainty, by assuming that the one-year death probabilities q(g)x,t′are stohasti at time t, for t′ > t. If so, we are onfronted with longevity risk : theprobability at year t that an individual of age x and belonging to group g survivesat least τ other years (see (2.5)) is not known deterministially, but is random. Theliterature therefore distinguishes two soures of mortality risk:6
• Individual mortality risk refers to the risk due to the fat that, for given deathprobabilities, an individual's remaining lifetime is a random variable;
• Longevity risk refers to the risk as a onsequene of longer term deviationsfrom deterministi mortality projetions.5There are some exeptions for elderly men, due to the spei foreasted mortality ratesemployed by Hári et al. (2008b).6The literature also distinguishes so-alled mortality atastrophe risk , whih relates to the riskof higher than expeted mortality (for example due to an epidemi). The fous in this hapter ison individual mortality risk, and, more importantly, longevity risk.
16 Chapter 2. Longevity RiskAs a onsequene of longevity risk, the expetation of the number of years that aperson of age x at date t will survive (as well as all other quantities that depend onfuture one-year death probabilities), onditional on F∞, beomes a random variableat date t (see (2.6)).Figure 2.2.2: Expeted Remaining Lifetimes
























In this gure we plot quantiles (10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%) of the distributionof the expeted remaining lifetime e(g)x,t for the group g of Duth males (leftpanel) and Duth females (right panel) of age x = 65, for the years t = 2007to 2050. The quantiation of the longevity risk is desribed in the Appendixof Chapter 5.Figure 2.2.2 illustrates the evolution of the probability distribution of the ex-peted remaining lifetimes e(g)x,t for the groups g of Duth males and Duth femalesof age x = 65, for the years t = 2010 to 2050, when the future death probabilitiesare assumed to be random, as will be desribed in the next setion.7 The graphshows a number of quantiles (ranging from the 0.10- to the 0.90-quantile). The g-ure shows that there is already substantial longevity risk in the earliest projetionsorresponding to t = 2010.8 The quantile intervals for the remaining lifetime of a7We use the quantiation desribed in the Appendix of Chapter 5, whih allows for bothproess and model risk, to be explained in the next setion.8It is a piture similar to that in Dowd, Blake, and Cairns (2008), see also Bis and Blake(2009), who onsider the UK population. The gure learly illustrates that the expeted remaininglifetimes of 65-years old are projeted to inrease in the future.
























. (2.9)Then, using a pooling argument, this expeted disounted value is also the fair prieof the annuity. The fair prie of Yi will be equal to the fair prie of 1N ∑Ni=1 Yi.Assume that the Yi are independent, with expeted value µ = E (Yi) and variane







18 Chapter 2. Longevity RiskIn ase N beomes very large, 1
N
∑N
i=1 Yi beomes risk free, and its fair prie (likethe fair prie of Yi) equals its expeted disounted value, i.e., there is no risk pre-mium.9 Thus, the one-year death probabilities q(g)x,t , and the orresponding survivalprobabilities as dened in (2.1) and (2.2), represent mortality risk at the individuallevel, whih, however, an be eliminated by an insurane ompany or pension fundby means of pooling. As a onsequene, this individual mortality risk should not bepried.With longevity risk, however, the fair prie of the annuity (and other produtswith a payo that depends on future survival outomes) typially will inlude a(longevity) risk premium. To illustrate this, we return to the annuity portfolio (see(2.8)). Conditional upon the future death rates at time t, given by the set F∞ it stillmakes sense to assume that the payos Yi are independent, with now mean µ (F∞)and variane σ2 (F∞), both depending on F∞. However, when alulating the (un-onditional) variane of 1
N
∑N
i=1 Yi we have to take into aount that onditional on































/N + Var (µ (F∞)) . (2.11)The rst term on the right hand side (orresponding to the pooling eet) still van-ishes with inreasing N . However, the seond term (reeting the eet of longevityrisk) is independent of N . Thus, with longevity risk, even when N beomes verylarge, 1
N
∑N
i=1 Yi does not beome risk free anymore. As a onsequene, the poolingargument no longer results in an elimination of mortality risk: longevity risk re-mains, and produts whose payos depend on future mortality typially will inlude9A no arbitrage argument goes as follows. Let Yi,τ denote the payo of the annuity at time
τ = t′ − t, and let p denote the no arbitrage prie of Yi,τ . Suppose Mτ is the relevant StohastiDisount Fator, suh that p = E (MτYi,τ ). Then, assuming that the MτYi,τ are identiallydistributed for dierent i, we have




























2.2. Longevity Risk 19a (longevity) risk premium. Thus, the expeted value E (Yi) = E (µ (F∞)) may nolonger be the fair value of the annuity. We shall refer to this expetation as the bestestimate. From the point of view of an insurer or pension fund, this best estimatemight be seen as a lower bound of the value of the annuity (as a liability).The result that longevity risk annot be diversied away using pooling hasimportant impliations for both priing and risk management. First, this non-diversiability implies that the prie of a longevity linked asset or liability is likelyto inlude a (longevity) risk premium. However, annuity payos (as well as thepayos of other produts depending on future survival outomes) typially annotbe hedged by urrently traded nanial produts.10 As a onsequene of this marketinompleteness, arbitrage arguments are insuient to obtain unique market priesof annuities and related produts. This seriously ompliates the fair valuation ofliabilities depending on future survival outomes due to the presene of a (longevity)risk premium. The urrent literature devotes onsiderable attention to this priingproblem. Speially, traditional nane approahes (risk-neutral priing theories,see, for example, Cairns et al., 2006a) as well as atuarial priing approahes (Wang'spremium priniple, see, for example, Lin and Cox, 2005) reeive onsiderable atten-tion. However, market inompleteness implies that alibrating these priing modelsremains diult. For a reent and thorough overview of the literature on priinglongevity risk, we refer to Bauer, Boerger, and Russ (2009).Seond, non-diversiability has important impliations for risk management. In-deed, the traditional approah used in ase of individual mortality risk is to reduethe risk by inreasing portfolio size, for example, by mutual reinsurane. As dis-ussed above, however, inreasing the portfolio size does not redue the impat oflongevity risk, so that other risk management tools need to be applied. In orderto investigate this further, a rst important step is the modeling of the probabilitydistribution of future mortality, whih we will disuss in the next setion. In Setion2.4, we then illustrate how mortality models an be used to quantify the eet oflongevity risk, and evaluate the eetiveness of risk management praties in thepresene of longevity risk.10Sometimes, there are natural hedge possibilities, see, for example, Milevsky and Promislow(2001) or Cox and Lin (2007). See also Chapter 5.
20 Chapter 2. Longevity Risk2.3 Modeling Future MortalityIn this setion we disuss the quantiation of the unertainty in the probabilitydistribution of future mortality. Reviews of suh a quantiation inlude Booth(2006), Pitao (2004), Tabeau (2001), and the reent monographs by Girosi andKing (2008) and Pitao, Denuit, Haberman, and Olivieri (2009). See also Benjaminand Soliman (1993), Delwarde and Denuit (2006), Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2008a)and Hári (2007).The starting point of the analysis is the (raw) entral death rate11 or observedper apita number of deaths, dened by m(g)x,t = D(g)x,t/E(g)x,t , where D(g)x,t denotes thenumber of people with age x in group g that died in year t, and where E(g)x,t denotesthe so-alled exposure, being the number of person years in group g with age x in year












. (2.12)Alternatively, one makes assumptions suh that the entral death rate equals theso-alled fore of mortality,13 in whih ase one obtains
q
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. (2.13)When quantifying longevity risk, one typially models the evolution of the rawentral death rate m(g)x,t or the one year death probabilities q(g)x,t over time for a given11Raw refers to as observed in the data.12For more details, see, for instane, Gerber (1997) or the tehnial report orresponding to theHuman Mortality Database.13The fore of mortality is dened as µ(g)x,t = lim∆t→0 P (0 ≤ T (g)x,t ≤ ∆t) /∆t, where T (g)x,t denotesthe remaining lifetime at time t of an individual of age x belonging to group g. When the foreof mortality is onstant within bands of time, i.e., µx,t+τ = µx,t, for 0 ≤ τ < 0, then the fore ofmortality equals the entral death rate. See, for instane, Gerber (1997) for further details.









, (2.14)where A-H are (unknown) parameters. This law onsists of three omponents, therst of whih aims to apture infant and hildhood mortality, the seond one adultmortality,14 and the third one the mortality of the elderly.An obvious way to obtain dynami mortality models, is to t some given mortal-ity law eah period t for whih data is available, with some or all parameters timedependent. The resulting time series of time-dependent parameter values an thenbe quantied using appropriate statistial or eonometri models. Using suh mod-els makes foreasting future mortality trends as well as quantifying longevity risk astraightforward exerise, at least, theoretially. However, as argued by, for instane,Tabeau (2001), tting mortality laws per period with time dependent parameters,14More preisely, the so-alled aident hump, see Figure 2.3.1.
22 Chapter 2. Longevity Risktypially generates rather unstable results, making foreasting mortality trends us-ing this approah from a pratial point of view quite diult, if not impossible.One way to avoid the instability is to ombine a mortality law with age and timedependent polynomials, see, for instane, Renshaw, Haberman, and Hatzopoulos(1996). Using polynomials of suient order allows quite an aurate in-sample t.However, using higher order polynomials to make out-of-sample foreasts typiallydoes not work well, see, for example, Bell (1984) for further lariation.2.3.2 The Lee and Carter ApproahLee and Carter (1992) propose a parsimonious dynami mortality model that turnedout to perform quite well. The model postulates
ln (mx,t) = αx + βxκt + ǫx,t, (2.15)with time-independent parameters αx and βx, and a (white noise) error term ǫx,t,where {κt} is a one-dimensional underlying time-dependent latent proess that quan-ties the evolution of mortality over time. The parameter αx quanties the levelof the log entral death rate of age x, while the parameter βx quanties the age
x-spei sensitivity of the log entral death rate to hanges in the group-wide evo-lution (improvement) as represented by κt. The error term ǫx,t aptures the age andtime spei variations around the systemati trend. Due to lak of identiation,Lee and Carter (1992) normalize by setting ∑x βx = 1 and ∑t κt = 0, where therst sum is over all available ages and the seond sum over all time periods availablein the sample.Lee and Carter (1992) proposed estimating the model in three steps. In the rststep, Singular Value Deomposition (SVD) is applied to nd the unique least squaressolution (given the normalizations) yielding {κ̂t}, {α̂x}, and {β̂x}. The estimated











, (2.16)with Dx,t the number of deaths and Ex,t the exposure, introdued at the beginningof this setion. This readjustment is done in order to avoid sizeable dierenesbetween the number of observed deaths and the model-implied number of deaths.The systemati part, dened as m̃x,t = exp (αx + βxκt), is estimated by ̂̃mx,t =




). Finally, the Box-Jenkins method is used to identify and estimatethe dynamis of the latent fator κ̃t. Lee and Carter (1992) nd as a proess for thedynamis of the latent fator a random walk with drift, i.e.,
κt = c+ κt−1 + δt, (2.17)with c the drift term, and with {δt} a white noise proess, assumed to follow anormal distribution with mean zero and variane equal to σ2δ . The parameters cand σ2δ an be estimated applying standard statistial or eonometri time-seriestehniques.To avoid the seond step of this three-step proedure, Wilmoth (1993) proposeda weighted Singular Value Deomposition. In addition, Lee and Miller (2001) pro-posed replaing the mathing aording to equation (2.16) by a mathing on thebasis of observed and modeled life expetany. Moreover, these authors suggestrestriting the sample period to a reent time period, in order to avoid a poten-tial misspeiation due to a violation of the assumption of onstant αx and βx.Booth, Maindonald, and Smith (2002a) suggest using statistial tehniques to seletan appropriate sample period, in line with the assumption of onstant αx and βx.The Lee and Carter (1992)-model an easily be extended to inlude more time fa-tors (in addition to κt) (see Renshaw and Haberman, 2003a). However, Tuljapurkar,Li, and Boe (2000), investigating the G7 ountries (Canada, Frane, Germany, Italy,Japan, UK, and US),15 nd that a single fator (as in the original Lee and Carter(1992) speiation) already sues to explain over 94% of the variane in the log-spei raw entral death rates. Nevertheless, to improve the foreast performane,it might be better to inlude an additional ohort-spei fator (see Renshaw andHaberman, 2006).Mortality projetions an be obtained by rst prediting future values κ̃T+t (with





, (2.18)and, nally, alulating the orresponding projeted future one-year death proba-bilities qx,T+t, using equation (2.12) or (2.13). Alternatively, Lee and Miller (2001)15For a more reent multi-ountry omparison of various stohasti mortality models, see, forexample, Booth, Hyndman, Tikle, and De Jong (2006).
24 Chapter 2. Longevity Risksuggest prediting the future entral death rates m̃x,T+t using the observed (raw)entral deathmx,T of the nal year in the sample as a jump-o value, i.e., to alulate
̂̃mx,T+t = mx,T exp
(
β̂x (κ̃T+t − κ̃T )
)







 , (2.20)with ma the maximum age onsidered; similarly, let α = (α1, ..., αma)′, β =
(β1, ..., βma)
′, and ǫt = (ǫ1,t, ..., ǫma,t)′. Then, using (2.17),
ℓt = α + βκt + ǫt
= βc+ (α + βκt−1 + ǫt−1) + (βδt + ǫt − ǫt−1)
= θ + ℓt−1 + ζt (2.21)16There are other soures of model risk as well. For instane, the Lee and Carter (1992) modellass might be too small, not ontaining the atual distribution of κ̃T+t. This is also a soure ofmodel risk: we might require a more extensive or an other model lass than the Lee and Carter(1992)-model lass if we want to inlude the atual distribution of κ̃T+t. Possible other modellasses, orresponding to muh more (model) longevity risk, are disussed in the next setion.However, the limited availability of mortality data makes it quite hard to determine whether theLee and Carter (1992) model lass is large enough or not. In this hapter, we fous on model riskwithin the Lee and Carter (1992)-model lass.
2.3. Modeling Future Mortality 25with
θ = βc, ζt = βδt + ǫt − ǫt−1.The Lee and Carter (1992)-model rewritten in this way an easily be estimated andused to make preditions and to quantify the longevity risk. For instane, with























































left panel shows the logarithm of the raw entral death rates of Duth males for ages0 to 99 years and age lass 100-110 years (indiated as age 100), over the sampleperiod 1977 to 2006. This graph shows for eah year the typial pattern of mortalityas a funtion of age, starting rather high at age zero, revealing the level of infantmortality, then going down rather steeply to around age 10, and then inreasingslowly, with a hump around age 20. This hump is typial for Duth males, absentin the similar graph for Duth females.17 The right panel of Figure 2.3.1 shows the17In ase of other ountries, this hump is typially observed for both males and females.
26 Chapter 2. Longevity Risktted values of the Girosi and King (2006)-variant of the Lee and Carter (1992)model, showing that this parsimonious model seems to be able to t the mortalitypatterns observed in the data quite well.Figure 2.3.2: Prediting log mortality (using Girosi and King (2006)-variant ofLee-Carter).











































Upper bound (Process risk)
Lower bound (Process risk)
Upper bound (Process & Parameter risk)
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Estimated & PredictedNext, we illustrate in Figure 2.3.2 the 30 year ahead predition of the logarithmof the entral death rates for 65 year old Duth males and females, using the Girosiand King (2006)-variant of the Lee and Carter (1992) model. The predition startsat the year 2007, the rst year after the available sample period. In this gurewe also inlude longevity risk, distinguishing between only proess risk and theombination of proess and parameter risk (in both ases 95% ondene intervals).The graphs show a lear estimated downward trend, both in-sample and preditedout-of-sample. In ase of 65 year old males this trend orresponds to a dereaseof the one-year death probability18 of 0.0269 at the beginning of the sample (1977)down to 0.0141, predited 30 years ahead, a derease of almost 50%. In ase offemales, the one year death probability in 1977 equals 0.0120 and is predited togo down to 0.0084, predited 30 years ahead, a derease of around 30%. However,these preditions are surrounded with substantial longevity risk (onsisting of bothproess and parameter risk), inluding (with 95% ondene aording to the model)no further derease in mortality as well as a muh more steeper derease than duringthe sample period.18Calulated using equation (2.13).
2.3. Modeling Future Mortality 272.3.3 Reent Dynami Mortality ModelsThe number of deaths is an integer-valued variable. Therefore, a Poisson proessmight be a more plausible way to model the number of deaths. Brouhns, Denuit,and Vermunt (2002a) model the integer-valued number of deaths Dx,t as a Poissondistributed random variable,
Dx,t ∼ Poisson (Ex,tm̃x,t) , (2.23)with the systemati part of the entral death rate m̃x,t modeled as m̃x,t =
exp (αx + βxκt), omparable to the Lee and Carter (1992)-model. The model an beestimated following the same steps as in the original Lee and Carter (1992)-approah,but with the rst step replaed by maximum likelihood using, for instane, the it-erative method proposed in Goodman (1979). Brouhns, Denuit, and Van Keilegom(2005) disuss bootstrapping the Brouhns et al. (2002a)-model in order to quantifythe longevity risk.Cosette et al. (2007) propose as adjustment of the Lee and Carter (1992)-modelto model the number of deaths as a Binomial proess
Dx,t ∼ Bin (Ex,t, qx,t) , (2.24)with qx,t modeled as qx,t = 1 − exp (−m̃x,t), aording to equation (2.13). Thesystemati part of the entral death rate (or fore of mortality) is again modeledin line with Lee and Carter (1992) as m̃x,t = exp (αx + βxκt). This model an beestimated like the Brouhns et al. (2002a)-model, and the longevity risk an bequantied by means of bootstrapping.The Lee and Carter (1992)-model impliitly assumes that there is no hetero-geneity in the measurement error terms ǫx,t, see (2.15). Li, Hardy, and Tan (2006)propose a way to inorporate heterogeneity into the Brouhns et al. (2000a)-variantof the Lee and Carter (1992)-model. Alternatively, Delwarde, Denuit, and Partrat(2007) suggest to use the Negative Binomial distribution to allow for more hetero-geneity.The Lee and Carter (1992)-model results in estimates for the parameters αx and
βx for eah given age x. Using αx and βx for eah year of age might result in loalizedage indued anomalies. Lee and Carter (1992) proposed to have age groups ([0, 1),[1, 5), [5, 9) ..., [80, 85)), and in addition the age group [85, 109). Suh age groupsavoid loalized age indued anomalies. However, this method leads to mortality
28 Chapter 2. Longevity Riskrates that are equal for age groups of ve years. Suh an approximation might bequite rude, espeially for valuating pension ontrats. Renshaw and Haberman(2003b) propose to rst estimate the parameters of the model using the one-yearage groups and then to smooth using, for instane, a ubi spline. More reently,Delwarde, Denuit, and Eilers (2007) propose to smooth the βx parameters as partof the rst step, using a penalized log-likelihood approah in the Brouhns et al.(2002a)-variant of the Lee and Carter (1992)-model.The Lee and Carter (1992)-approah also has some drawbaks. An importantdrawbak follows from the reformulation by Girosi and King (2006). As follows fromthe estimator (2.22), see also Figure 2.3.2, the drift term of the random walk anbe estimated by tting a line for eah age x through the rst and nal observationof the ln (mx,t) in the sample. Extrapolating these lines yields the age spei mid-points of the mortality projetions (the point estimates). However, as long as thelines orresponding to dierent ages are not parallel, this implies that (very) longterm mortality projetions might beome quite implausible, as is learly illustratedin Girosi and King (2006), see also Girosi and King (2008). Their solution is to workwith appropriate priors.The problem of deviating long term foreasts might beome even worse when theLee and Carter (1992) methodology is applied to dierent groups g, eah with its ownspei proess {κ(g)t }, representing the evolution of mortality over time. However,Wilson (2001) douments a global onvergene in mortality levels. Li and Lee (2005)propose to adapt the Lee and Carter (1992)-approah by rst identifying the entraltendeny, resulting in a ommon random walk with drift proess {κt}, representingthe joint evolution over time, and then to nd the group spei stationary timeproesses {κ(g)t }, that represent the short term group g deviations from the ommontime trend.Finally, the Lee and Carter (1992)-model an only be used for groups for whihsuient data on mortality of dierent ages is available. Typially, this is an entirepopulation of males and/or females of a ountry or a large region. However, therelevant population for an insurane ompany or a pension fund might deviate fromthe population for whih data is available. For instane, Brouhns and Denuit (2001)and Denuit (2008) nd that there is a signiantly lower mortality rate for thegroup of insured individuals that were investigated ompared with the whole maleand female Belgian population. This might limit the appliability of the Lee andCarter (1992)-approah. Plat (2008) proposes a way to onstrut a portfolio-spei
2.3. Modeling Future Mortality 29stohasti mortality model.Next to the Lee and Carter (1992)-time series based stohasti mortality mod-els, there are also other lasses of time series based stohasti mortality models, forinstane, imposing extra smoothness. Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006b) proposea model that builds in smoothness in mortality rates aross adjaent ages in thesame year, whih is referred to as the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) model. Cairnset al. (2009) propose generalizations of the CBD model to inlude a ohort eet, aquadrati term to the age eet, and a ohort whih diminishes over time. Sweeting(2009) extends the original CBD model by allowing for a trend hange in the parame-ters. Using England and Wales mortality data from 1841 till 2003 he observe 9 trendhanges in the parameters. In the reent deades the trend hanges are in the years1945, 1973, 1988, and 1998. The impat of inluding a trend hange on longevityrisk is large, illustrated by a 90% ondene interval of the life expetany for 60year old males in 2056 of 18.7 years with trend hange, parameter, and proess un-ertainty, only 7.6 years without trend hange unertainty but inluding parameterunertainty and 3.6 years with only proess unertainty.Currie, Durbin, and Eilers (2004) propose a model assuming smoothness arossboth ages and years. Cairns et al. (2008-d, 2009) provide an extensive omparisonof these various time series based stohasti mortality models.To illustrate the eet of smoothing we present in Figure 2.3.3 an appliationof the Currie, Durbin, and Eilers (2004)-method in terms of the logarithm of theentral death rate, using the same data as in ase of Figures 2.3.12.3.2. The upperpanels ontain the in-sample results for 65 year old males (left) and females (right).These graphs show that the evolution of mortality over time has some urvature,whih is aptured quite well and in a smooth way by the Currie, Durbin, and Eilers(2004)-method (whih employs so-alled B-splines). Suh a urvature will not beaptured by the Lee and Carter (1992) model. In ase of males there seems to besome aeleration in the derease of mortality, while for females there is at rst someslowing down and then again a slight aeleration in the derease of mortality. Thelower panels show the 30 years ahead preditions inluding 95% ondene intervalsreeting the longevity risk. The aeleration with regard to the males is translatedinto foreasts that are muh lower than those derived from the Girosi and King(2006)-variant of the Lee and Carter (1992) model. In fat, 65 year old males andfemales are predited to have more or less the same mortality harateristis 30 yearsfrom now. However, the longevity risk is quite substantial, leaving the possibility
30 Chapter 2. Longevity RiskFigure 2.3.3: Smooth log mortality estimation and predition (using Currie,Durbin, and Eilers, 2004).




































































































(with 95% ondene aording to the model) of a wide variety of possible futuremortality trends. The result of muh wider predition intervals, when hanging themodel from Lee and Carter (1992) to Currie, Durbin, and Eilers (2004), shows theimportane of taking into aount model risk.2.4 Quantifying Longevity RiskThere are several studies that illustrate the importane of longevity risk for pen-sion funds and insurane ompanies. The approahes dier both in terms of howlongevity risk is quantied, and in terms of how the probability distribution of futuremortality is modeled. For the former, we distinguish three approahes. First, anoften used approah to quantify longevity risk in annuity portfolios is to determineits eet on the probability distribution of the present value of all future payments,for a given, deterministi, and onstant term struture of interest rates (see, for








· P (s)τ , (2.25)where L̃τ+s denotes the liability payment at time τ + s, P (s)τ denotes the date-τmarket value of a zero-oupon bond maturing at time τ + s, and Eτ [·] denotes theexpetation, onditional on death rates up to time τ .2.4.1 Disounted Present Value of LiabilitiesIn this setion we disuss the analysis in Olivieri (2001), who fousses on the relativeimportane of individual mortality risk and longevity risk. She quanties longevityrisk in annuity portfolios by determining its eet on the probability distribution





x,t+τ | τ > 0
} the Yi are distributed independently. Table 2.4.1 presentsour results.The rst row reports the best estimates of the annuity portfolio, for both malesand females for dierent sizes N . For N = 1 it yields the best estimate for the19For a detailed desription we refer to the Appendix of Chapter 5.
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Figure 2.4.1: Distribution Annuity Portfolio
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(f)This gure presents the distribution of the annuity portfolio at time t = 0(orresponding to the year 2006) due to longevity risk only (i.e., after pooling).For all annuitants the age is x = 65. The left panel applies to a portfolio ofmales, the right panel to a portfolio of females.
Table 2.4.1: Desriptive Statistis Annuity PortfolioMales Females
N = 1 N = 100 N = 1000 N = 1 N = 100 N = 1000
E (Y) 11.024 1102.365 11023.654 12.897 1289.737 12897.374
E (Var (Y|F∞)) 19.604 1960.397 19603.968 17.963 1796.332 17963.316Var (E (Y|F∞)) 0.031 312.609 31260.878 0.057 567.703 56770.266Var (Y) 19.635 2273.006 50864.845 18.020 2364.034 74733.582
γ 0.40197 0.04325 0.02046 0.32914 0.0377 0.0212
34 Chapter 2. Longevity Riskannuity. The next three rows present the varianes of these portfolios, together witha deomposition as in equation (2.11):Var (Y) = E (Var (Y | F∞)) + Var (E (Y | F∞)) . (2.26)The rst term on the right hand side of this equation orresponds to the portfoliorisk if there would be no longevity risk. This risk inreases linearly in N , sine
E (Var (Y | F∞)) = NE (Var (Yi | F∞)). The seond term on the right hand sideof (2.26) is due to the presene of longevity risk. This term inreases by N2 withinreasing portfolio size N , sine Var (E (Y | F∞)) = N2Var (E (Yi | F∞)). Thus, forlarger portfolios this term will dominate the total portfolio risk. This an also beseen from the results presented in the table.The nal row of the table presents the oeient of variation of Y , dened by
γ =





E (Var (Yi | F∞))
E (Yi)
+
Var (E (Yi | F∞))
E2 (Yi)
)1/2
, (2.27)showing that for large portfolio sizes N indeed the longevity risk dominates thetotal risk, and also does not disappear. In our example, the limiting value of theoeient of variation equals γ = 0.0160 for males and γ = 0.0185 for females.Olivieri (2001) also alulates the boundary portfolio sizeN suh that for portfoliosizes larger than this bound longevity risk dominates the total risk. She alulatesthis bound as
N =
E (Var (Y | F∞))Var (E (Y | F∞)) . (2.28)In our ase (i.e., with survival probabilities foreasted with the Lee and Carter-methodology), the boundary value is N = 628 for males and N = 317 for females.Although substantially larger than the N = 12 reported by Olivieri (2001), thesenumbers are quite low, indiating that also for smaller portfolio sizes longevity riskis an important risk that should be taken into aount in a risk management frame-work.
2.4. Quantifying Longevity Risk 352.4.2 Funding Ratio VolatilityA drawbak of the approah desribed in Setion 2.4.1 is that it is a liability onlyapproah: it ignores the potential impat of nanial risk on the importane oflongevity risk. Therefore, in this setion we disuss an alternative approah inwhih the importane of longevity risk is quantied by determining its eet onthe probability distribution of the funding ratio at a future date (see, for example,Olivieri and Pitao, 2003, and Hári et al., 2008b). The funding ratio is dened asthe value of the assets divided by the value of the liabilities. Determining the valueof longevity-linked liabilities, however, is still a ontentious issue. There is extensiveliterature on the priing of longevity-linked liabilities (see, e.g., Bauer, Boerger, andRuss, 2010), but due to the high degree of illiquidity and market inompleteness, itremains diult to alibrate these priing models. Therefore, the regulator requiresthat the liabilities should be valued at their fair value.Hári et al. (2008b) use a simulation analysis to determine the distributionalharateristis of the funding ratio at the beginning of year t + T , for maturities
T = 1 and T = 5, respetively, given that the funding ratio in year t equals 1. Theyonsider a pension fund with N annuitants at the beginning of year t = 2004, andquantify the unertainty in future funding ratios for various investment strategies.In order to illustrate the eet of portfolio size, they onsider portfolios of dierentsizes. In eah ase, the age and gender omposition of the pension fund is theportrayal of the Duth population at the beginning of 2004. They use a run-oapproah (i.e., they onsider a setting where there are no new entrants into the fund,and no rights are built up or premiums are paid after time t), and let the fair valueof the liabilities be given by the best estimate value, as dened in (2.25).20 Theyquantify the funding ratio volatility using ve investment strategies: i) liabilities areperfetly hedged: expeted liabilities are hedged with ash-ow mathing initially;ii) liabilities are duration hedged, based on the MCauley duration; iii) assets areinvested exlusively in 5-year bonds; iv) 50% of the assets is invested into 5-yearand 50% in 10-year bonds; v) 37.5% is invested into 5-year, 37.5% in 10-year bonds,and the rest is invested into stoks; vi) 25% is invested in 5-year, 25% in 10-yearbonds, while the rest is invested in stoks. Their main ndings are as follows:
• As the fund size inreases, individual mortality risk in relative terms dereasesto zero, due to the pooling eet. In ontrast, longevity risk does not beome20This is in line with Duth solveny regulations at the time the researh was performed.
36 Chapter 2. Longevity Risknegligible; it is almost independent of portfolio size.
• If nanial market risk is perfetly hedged (so that unertainty in future life-time is the only soure of risk), then pension funds are exposed to a substantialamount of unertainty. For instane, for a large fund (10,000 partiipants),the standard deviation of the funding ratio in a 5-year horizon is then 5.3% ofthe expeted value.
• If nanial market risk is also onsidered, the ontribution of longevity riskto the overall risk beomes less important. However, whenever the investmentstrategy is not too risky, longevity risk is likely to remain signiant.2.4.3 The Ruin ProbabilityThe approahes disussed in the previous two setions eah have their drawbaks.First, as argued before, quantifying the unertainty in the disounted present valueof liability payments for a given and deterministi interest rate, as in Setion 2.4.1,is a liability only approah that ignores the eet of a pension fund's investmentstrategy on the impat of longevity risk. In ontrast, a funding ratio approahtakes into aount both assets and liabilities. However, quantifying the unertaintyin the funding ratio, as disussed in Setion 2.4.2, requires making assumptionsregarding the fair value of longevity-linked liabilities. As disussed in Setion 2.2.3,it is unlikely that the prie of longevity-linked liabilities equals the best estimatevalue. The best estimate is likely to be an underestimate of the prie at whihthe pension fund ould sell its liabilities. One might argue that this problem ouldbe mitigated by adding a market value margin to the best estimate value of theliabilities, as suggested by Solveny II. However, when the market value margindoes not aurately reet the risk premium that a third party would require inorder to be willing to take over the liabilities, it remains unlear to what extent thefunding ratio approah aurately quanties longevity risk.In this setion we disuss an alternative approah to quantify longevity risk,namely by determining its eet on the probability of ruin (see, for example, Olivieriand Pitao 2003, and Chapter 4). We also disuss how this approah relates to,and diers from, the approahes desribed in the previous two setions.The ruin probability approah, in a run-o approah in whih there are no newentrants into the fund, and no rights are built up or premiums are paid after time t,is extensively desribed in Chapter 4. In this approah longevity risk is be quantied









, (2.29)where r(s)t denotes the annualized portfolio return over the period [t, t+ s] and t+Tdenotes the last period in whih liabilities needs to be paid. This allows for thefollowing omparison:
• when the asset portfolio onsists of one-year bonds and there is no interest rateunertainty, then r(τ)t = r, and Lt =∑Ts=1 L̃t+s(1+r)s . Thus, under the assumptionthat the pension fund will earn a minimal return of r on its investments, the
(1 − ǫ)-quantile of the disounted present value of liability payments for aonstant and deterministi interest rate r, as desribed in Setion 2.4.1, anbe interpreted as the level of assets that is suient to guarantee that theprobability of ruin is below ǫ.
• Whereas the funding ratio approah desribed in the previous setion amountsto omparing, at a given time t + T , the value of the assets to the fair valueof the liabilities, the ruin probability approah is equivalent to requiring thatthe asset value at time t ombined with any future returns on these assets issuient to over the atual liabilities in eah future year.2.5 Illustrating Longevity Risk Management2.5.1 Longevity Risk ManagementAs illustrated in the previous setion, longevity risk an be substantial for life insur-ers or pension funds. Likely, this risk fator is not the most important one faed bya life insurer or pension fund, but, given its signiane, it annot be ignored. Thetypial approah to deal with the eets of hanges in mortality rates on pensionand insurane liabilities has long been to re-estimate these rates on a regular basis,and to realulate the value of the liabilities aordingly. Although this aounts tosome extent for hanges in survival, it is a retrospetive approah. It does not takeinto aount future hanges in mortality, and thus ignores longevity risk. Instead, a
38 Chapter 2. Longevity Riskmodern risk management approah requires to manage longevity risk, just like otherrisk fators, in an eetive way, see, for instane, Pitao (2007) or Cairns, Blake,and Dowd (2008a). Following Cairns et al. (2008a), there is a range of possibilitiesto deal with longevity risk.
• Life insurers and pension funds might retain longevity risk as part of theirbusiness risk. This would require an appropriate asset liability management(ALM) to guarantee that the assets sue to meet the liabilities. As anillustration, we disuss in Chapter 3 the determination of solveny buersneeded to redue the probability of underfunding of a pension fund or insuraneompany to an aeptable level.
• Life insurers and pension funds might enter into a variety of forms of reinsur-ane, or they might arrange a (full or partial) buyout of their liabilities by aspeialist insurer. Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2008b) disuss this traditionalpossibility in some detail. See also Bis and Blake (2010).
• Life insurers and pension funds might try to diversify longevity risk, in par-tiular, using dierent produts. Sometimes, natural hedges exist, see, for ex-ample, Milevsky and Promislow (2001) or Cox and Lin (2007). We illustratethe diversiation possibilities through produt mix in Chapter 5. Related tothis, in order to share the longevity losses or benets, life insurers and pensionfunds might develop new produts with adjustable starting dates or paymentsdepending on realized life expetany.
• Life insurers and pension plans might try to seuritize part of their business,or they might try to manage their longevity risk using mortality-linked deriva-tives. In Setion 2.5.2 we disuss these possibilities further.2.5.2 Seuritization and Mortality-Linked DerivativesWhile redesign of pension and insurane deals as illustrated in the previous setionan mitigate the eets of mortality risk to some extent, this risk will never beeliminated ompletely. Therefore, unertainty regarding future survival rates willontinue to impose risk on any pension fund or life insurane ompany.The introdution of nanial instruments for whih the payo is linked, to someextent, to the development of mortality rates ould help insurers and pension funds
2.5. Illustrating Longevity Risk Management 39manage their risk. Loeys, Panigirtzoglou, and Ribeiro (2007) investigate whethera life market, where suh produts might be traded, ould be suessful. Theyexplain that for a new apital market to be established and to sueed, it (1) mustprovide eetive exposure, or hedging to a state of the world that is (2) eonomiallyimportant and that (3) annot be hedged through existing market instruments, and(4) it must use a homogeneous and transparent ontrat to permit exhange betweenagents. They argue that longevity meets the basi onditions for a suessfulmarket innovation. Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2008b) investigate the onditionssuggested by Loeys et al. (2007) in more detail. These authors maintain that thereis insuient reinsurane apaity to deal with global longevity risk, while apitalmarkets are more eient than the insurane industry in reduing informationalasymmetries and in failitating prie disovery. This makes them ondent that afully developed apital market will emerge soon.One of the rst attempts to set up suh a market is a standard oupon-plus-prinipal bond for whih the oupon is determined by the term struture of interestrates, but the prinipal of the bond depends on the extent to whih the atualobserved survival in a predened population, measured by a survival index, exeedsa given threshold level (see Blake and Burrows, 2001, and Blake et al., 2006). Byinvesting in suh longevity bonds, the risk of higher than expeted survival an bepartially transferred to the issuer of the bond. The European Investment Bank(EIB) together with BNP Paribas issued a longevity bond in 2004, but there wastoo little demand to reah a level adequate enough to sustain in a market.21 Thehigh degree of market inompleteness implies that priing this produt is nontrivial.This might explain why longevity bonds have not yet been suessfully introduedin the market. See Blake et al. (2008b) for an extensive investigation of this failure.Indeed, the potentially severe onsequenes of underpriing the risk may hamperthe introdution of longevity linked seurities. For example, inaurate priing of therisk in guaranteed annuity options indued by unertain hanges in interest rates,led to the downfall of the large British insurane ompany Equitable in 2000 (seePelsser, 2003). The urrent literature devotes onsiderable attention to this priingproblem. Speially, traditional nane approahes (risk-neutral priing theories,see, for example, Cairns et al., 2006a) as well as atuarial priing approahes (Wang's21On the other hand, the issue of short-dated mortality bonds, whih are similar to atastrophibonds, has been suessful. However, suh bonds hedge against atastrophi mortality risk, notlongevity risk.
40 Chapter 2. Longevity Riskpremium priniple, see, for example, Lin and Cox, 2005) have reeived onsiderableattention. However, market inompleteness implies that alibrating these priingmodels remains diult.Another explanation for the failure of the longevity bond is the eet of basis risk,i.e., the dierene in the survival probabilities between the insured population of theannuity provider and the national population whih is used for the payouts of thelongevity bond. This basis risk eets the hedge eetiveness of standard longevityrisk transfer produts. Coughlan et al. (2010) show that the eet of basis risk issmall, when hedging the value of a 10-year deferred annuity for a 55 years old maleinsured with insured mortality using a 10-year deferred annuity swap that pays outon the basis of the survival index for the national population for 55-years old males.In Chapter 5 we show that basis risk an be substantial when hedging longevity riskin a portfolio of life insurane produts for insured aged 65, using a longevity swapthat yearly pays out on the basis of the survival index for the national populationfor 65-years old males and/or females.Blake, Boardman, and Cairns (2010) propose that governments should issue a de-ferred tail longevity bond with payments, for a urrently 65-year old, starting fromage 90. Capital markets should deal with longevity risk overing the age ranges65-90. By letting the apital markets only overing longevity risk between ages 65and 90 it an overome some of the problems in the longevity risk transfer market,suh as the long duration of the bond and the toxi tail, i.e., the large unertaintyin survival probabilities at advaned ages in the long run. There is growing sup-port for the government to issue longevity bonds, for example the IMF (Groomeet al., 2006), OECD (Antolin and Blommestein, 2007 and Antolin, 2008), and theWorld Eonomi Forum (Hayashi et al., 2010) all reognize that the government animprove the longevity risk market by issuing longevity indexed bonds.An alternative and more suessful attempt to deal with longevity risk is seu-ritization.22 In this ase, a pool of assets or liabilities is sold to a so-alled SpeialPurpose Vehile. These assets or liabilities are then repakaged as new seurities,and as suh traded in the apital market. Blake et al. (2008b) disuss the dierenttypes of seuritization with longevity-linked assets or liabilities, known as insurane-linked seurities (see Krutov, 2006). Cowley and Cummins (2005) disuss the earliertypes of seuritization.In order to enourage the development of a life market JPMorgan introdued22We follow Blake et al. (2008b).
2.5. Illustrating Longevity Risk Management 41in Marh 2007 so-alled longevity indies. The idea of introduing suh indiesis that this objetive information provided by the indies might stimulate the in-trodution and subsequent trade of mortality-linked seurities. In Deember 2008Deutshe Börse introdued longevity indies alled Xpet Indies, whih are twodierent index types, providing information on life expetany and mortality risksin Germany, the Netherlands and later also England and Wales, broken down a-ording to region, year of birth and gender. The Xpet Age Indies represent theaverage remaining life expetany of a dened age and gender group and the XpetCohort Indies represents the number of survivors starting from a dened date withan initial value of 100,000. In February 2010 the Life and Longevity Market Asso-iation (LLMA), a ross-industry, non-prot assoiation was launhed. The LLMApromotes the development of a liquid traded market in longevity and mortality re-lated risk by development of onsistent standards, methodologies, benhmarks andbest pratie. In addition, in August 2010 the LLMA published a draft LongevityIndex Framework.23The mixed suess thus far of initiating a life market has generated several pro-posals to set up suh a market using mortality-linked derivatives. Mortality andsurvivor swaps are an example of suh derivatives. In ase of suh a swap one partypays xed payments to the other party in exhange for payments that depend onthe number of people in a given ohort that die in a given period (mortality swap)or that survive during that period (survivor swap). See Dowd, Blake, Cairns, andDawson (2006) or Dawson, Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2007). Another example anbe found in mortality and longevity forwards. In this ase the ontrat involves theexhange of a payment depending on the realized mortality or survival rate at thematurity of the ontrat in return for a payment depending on a xed mortality orsurvival rate agreed upon at the initiation of the ontrat. See Blake et al. (2008b)for a further disussion and illustration.One a market for mortalitylinked instruments arises, individual pension fundsand insurers an use these instruments to hedge or redue their risk. The assetportfolio should be designed in order to yield an optimal risk-return trade-o. See,for instane, Haberman and Vigna (2002) or Gerrard, Haberman, and Vigna (2004).A onern here is that optimization of risk-return trade-os is known to be highlysensitive to parameter estimation if parameter unertainty is ignored (for example,23The 10 members in September 2010 are: AXA, Deutshe Bank, J.P. Morgan, Legal & General,Morgan Stanley, Pension Corporation, Prudential, RBS, Swiss Re, UBS.
42 Chapter 2. Longevity RiskBest and Grauer, 1991, or Chopra and Ziemba, 1993). This is learly undesirableif the optimal portfolios with respet to the estimated parameter values lead tosigniantly suboptimal values of the objetive funtion ompared to the optimalportfolios for the true parameter values. In partiular, this is a major onern in asetting in whih mortality-linked assets and liabilities are involved, sine the proba-bility distribution of their value depends on very long-term foreasts. This requiresthe development of robust portfolio optimization tehniques for Asset Liability Man-agement of an individual pension fund or insurer in the presene of mortality risk.2.6 ConlusionsThis hapter provides an overview of the literature on longevity risk, i.e., the uner-tainty in future hanges in mortality rates. The hapter fous on the urrent modelsto foreast the distribution of future mortality probabilities, the dierent methodsto quantify longevity risk and possibilities to deal with longevity risk as an insureror pension fund.We briey desribe three lasses of models to foreast the distribution of futuremortality probabilities, namely the Lee-Carter (1992)-model with extensions andmodiations, the Cairns-Blake-Dowd model with extensions and modiations, andthe P-Splines model. We illustrate the importane of taking various soures ofrisk, namely proess, parameter, trend-hange, and model risk, into aount whenforeasting the distribution of future survival probabilities.We illustrate the importane of longevity risk for pension funds and life insurers,using three dierent methods. We disuss the method using disounted present valueof liabilities. Using this method we show that the systemati longevity risk is moreimportant than the non-systemati longevity risk even for portfolios with relativelyfew insureds. We further disuss the quantiation of longevity risk in portfoliosof life insurane produts through the funding ratio volatility and through the ruinprobability and we disuss the advantages and disadvantages of eah method.Finally, we illustrate some aspets of longevity risk management, for example,the determination of solveny buers, and the eet of the produt mix as a naturalapproah to diversifying longevity risk. Another approah is to seuritize longevityrisk or to use mortality linked derivatives. Although there have been attempts toset up a life market, a trading plae for mortality-based produts, these initiativeshave thus far been only partially suessful. However, Loeys et al. (2007) argues
2.6. Conlusions 43that longevity meets the basi onditions for a suessful market innovation. Asdisussed by, among other, Cairns et al. (2008b) the government might assist byenouraging and failitating the development of this market. In partiular, thegovernment ould issue longevity bonds in order to establish a default-free termstruture for longevity risk, similar to its ativity in the xed-inome market.
Chapter 3Calulating Capital Requirements
This hapter is based on Stevens, De Waegenaere and Melenberg (2010).
3.1 IntrodutionOver the last deades, signiant improvements in the duration of life have beenobserved in most ountries. For example, over the past three deades, the remaininglife expetany of a male Duth retiree aged 65 has inreased by on average oneyear per deade. However, there is onsiderable unertainty regarding the futuredevelopment of life expetany, referred to as (systemati) longevity risk. Whereasthe fous of regulators has long been on the risk in nanial investments, there isnow inreasing awareness that aurate quantiation and management of the riskin pension and insurane liabilities (inluding longevity risk) is equally important.For example, the goal of the Swiss Solveny Test and the Solveny II projet (GroupConsultatif Atuariel Europeen, 2006) is to redesign nanial regulation of insuraneompanies in Switzerland and the EU, respetively, putting inreased emphasis onthe valuation and management of pension and insurane liabilities. Speially, inSolveny II the regulator will require that an insurer holds a reserve in order tolimit its probability of underfunding within one year to 0.5%, where an insurer isunderfunded in ase the value of the assets is less than the value of the liabilities.In this hapter we develop a methodology in line with the Solveny II proposal todetermine reserve requirements for systemati longevity risk in life insurane prod-uts. A ompliating fator of reserve requirements for systemati longevity riskis that there is no liquid market for longevity-linked assets or liabilities, and so no45
46 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirementsmarket prie is observed. Hene, the value of the liabilities needs to be alulatedusing a mark-to-model approah. In Solveny II the (fair) value of the liabilities isdened as the sum of the best estimate value of the liability (BEL), and a marketvalue margin (MVM). The latter omponent an be interpreted as a risk premium,and should be determined following a Cost of Capital (CoC) approah. The idea isthat the risk premium for a risky liability is determined by the amount of apital(the solveny apital requirement, SCR) the holder of the risk should hold in order tobe able to pay the liabilities with a high degree of ertainty. Our goal in this hapteris twofold. First, it has been argued extensively (see, Ulm, 2009, and Olivieri andPitao, 2008a) that determining apital requirements in line with the Solveny IIproposal as desribed above is tehnially omplex. The main ompliation is thatthe value of the liabilities in any given period depends on the required solvenyapital, whih, in turn, depends on the value of the liabilities as well as the proba-bility distribution of the value of the liabilities in the next period. This implies thatbakward indution is needed to determine the urrent value of the liabilities. Inaddition, the value of the liabilities in a future period t + s depends on the prob-ability distribution of realized death probabilities as dened in (2.4), onditionalon information available at time t. There is a wide variety of mortality foreastmodels that an be used to simulate the probability distribution of realized survivalrates, see, for example, Lee and Carter (1992), Renshaw and Haberman (2006),Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006), Currie, Durban, and Eilers (2004). However, whenapplying suh models the number of simulations needed in a bakward indutionalgorithm to ahieve a suiently aurate solution inreases exponentially in thelength of the run-o period, whih an typially be very long for life insurane prod-uts. This makes a simulation approah omputationally intratable. To deal withthis problem, we develop a losed form approximation for the probability distri-bution of future mortality rates, onditional on information available at that time,starting from the widely used Lee-Carter (1992)-model. This losed form approxi-mation enables us to determine the solveny apital requirements, with a possiblynon-zero risk margin when alulating these requirements, within reasonable timewith only a small approximation error.Seond, the regulator allows the use of simplied approahes that avoid reur-sive evaluations, by setting the risk margin equal to zero, when determining thesolveny apital requirements. The value of the required solveny apital at futuredates is then typially approximated by some urrent estimate. For instane, in the
3.2. Diret approah of Solveny II 47Solveny II standard model the solveny requirement for longevity risk is omputedusing a longevity shok onsisting of a 25% (QIS 4) or 20% (QIS 5) permanent re-dution in all one year best estimate death probabilities. By omparing our resultsto those that follow from the simplied approahes of the regulator, we quantify theimpat of simplifying assumptions on the apital requirements. In partiular, wend that the 20% longevity shok leads to substantially higher apital reserves thanour Lee-Carter based internal model. Other simplifying assumptions to determinethe apital requirements generally tend to underestimate the apital requirementsfor the investigated portfolios. For example, the market value margin for a singlelife annuity in the UK for females is 2.04% of the best estimate of the liabilities inthe internal model, but this value drops to only 0.77% of the best estimate of theliabilities when using the proposed simplifying assumption of a onstant fration ofsolveny apital requirements relative to the best estimate of the market value ofthe liabilities to determine the market value margin.A losely related hapter is Börger (2010). This hapter also determines themarket value margin and the solveny apital requirement for various life insuraneproduts using the Cost of Capital method. However, the fous of our hapter is dif-ferent from Börger (2010). Our aim is to alulate the solveny apital requirements,inluding a possibly nonzero market value margin as risk premiumwhen alulatingthe requirements. We are able to do so by using an (reasonably lose) approxima-tion, whih we are able to obtain starting from the Lee and Carter (1992) modelingapproah.The remainder of the hapter is organized as follows. In Setion 3.2 we disuss theSolveny II proposal for minimum apital requirements. In Setion 3.3 we disussthe proposed simpliations to alulate the apital requirements in the SolvenyII proposal. In Setion 3.4 we shortly disuss the Lee-Carter (1992)-model and wepresent the losed form approximation of the distribution of the liabilities (withthe details presented in the appendix). In Setion 3.5 we alulate the apital re-quirements for dierent portfolios of life insurane produts, using both the internalmodel as well as the simpliations. Setion 3.6 onludes.3.2 Diret approah of Solveny IIIn this setion we desribe the method to determine the value and reserve require-ment for a liability in the Cost of Capital approah. The Cost of Capital approah
48 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirementsis based on the net asset value, whih is desribed in Subsetion 3.2.1. Using thenet asset value we determine the value of the liabilities and the apital requirementsfor the single-period ase in Subsetion 3.2.2. In Subsetion 3.2.3 we generalize theresults to a multi-period setting.3.2.1 Net asset value approahThe underlying idea of the Solveny II diretive proposal is that insurers should holdan amount of apital that enables them to absorb unexpeted losses and meet theobligations towards poliy-holders at a high level of equitableness. The alulationof this requirement is to be made on the basis of the Value at Risk (VaR) alulationat the 1 − α perentile (in Solveny II α is set at 0.5%) for the time period of oneyear. Speially, the regulator requires that the apital held by an insurer is suhthat the probability that the net asset value (NAV ) falls below 0 within a year islower than α, where the NAV is dened as the dierene between the value of theassets (At+1) and the value of the liabilities (Lt+1), i.e., the NAV in year t + 1 isgiven by:
NAVt+1 = At+1 − Lt+1.The NAV in year t + 1 is a random variable at time t, beause both the marketvalue of the assets at time t+ 1 and the market value of the liabilities at time t+ 1are random variables at time t. The Solveny II requirements imply that an insurershould hold at least initial assets with value A⋆t , dened as:
A⋆t ≡ min {At|Pt [NAVt+1 < 0] ≤ α} , (3.1)where Pt (·) denotes the time-t probability distribution whih represents all possiblesoures of risk, onditional upon the information available at time t. The requiredapital in exess of the value of the liabilities is referred to as the Solveny CapitalRequirement1 (SCR), i.e.,
SCRt ≡ A⋆t − Lt. (3.2)The minimum required apital A⋆t and the buer SCRt depend on the evolution ofthe assets over time. Let rt be the (stohasti) asset portfolio return between time1In Solveny II the SCR for life underwriting risk is deomposed into seven dierent risk fators,inluding longevity risk. The seven dierent risk fators are: revision risk, mortality risk, longevityrisk, disability risk, lapse risk, expense risk, and atastrophe risk. In this hapter we fous on theeet of longevity risk.
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t and t + 1 and L̃t be the time-t spei (aggregate) payment of the life insuraneproduts at the end of year t, then the value of the assets next year is given by:
At+1 = At · (1 + rt)− L̃t,whih implies that:
Pt (NAVt+1 < 0) = Pt
(
(1 + rt) ·At − L̃t < Lt+1
)






− Lt, (3.4)where Q1−α,t [X ] is the 1−α perentile of the random variableX , whose distributionis indued by Pt.In order to be able to determine the required solveny apital in year t, we need thevalue of the liabilities in year t, as well as the probability distribution of the valueof the liabilities in year t + 1. In absene of a liquid market, there is no obviousunique way to determine the market values of the liabilities. Solveny II proposesto determine liability values on the basis of a mark-to-model approah, in whih thevalue onsists of the Best Estimate of the Liabilities (BEL) plus a Market ValueMargin (MVM), where the latter is seen as a risk premium, i.e., for every t we have








· P (s)t , (3.6)where Et [·] is the expetation with respet to Pt, and P (s)t denotes the time t prieof a zero oupon bond that matures at time t + s.The market value margin is intended to reet the ost assoiated with holdingthe required solveny apital in the urrent and any future period.2 The idea is thatbeause the return on assets that needs to be kept as a reserve is generally lower2See QIS 4, TS.II.A.29 and QIS 5, V.10.ii.
50 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirementsthan the return on free assets, the holder of a risky liability requires a prie oftaking the risk as a ompensation for not being able to invest the reserve as a freeasset. For the alulation of the value of the liabilities with a non-tradeable risk,suh as longevity risk, the return on the assets in Solveny II is set equal to therisk-free return. Hene, the stohasti asset portfolio return rt in equation (3.3) isreplaed by the risk-free return of appropriate maturity. We shall proeed under theassumption of a at term struture, where the one-period risk free rate is denote by
rrf . The intention of the regulator is then that the market value margin equals theost, i.e., CoC × 100%, harged to the present value of the urrent and all futurevalues of SCRt, i.e.,





. (3.7)However, this way of dening the market value margin is not feasible, sine it leadsto an unknown value at time t: the future values SCRt+s of the required solvenyapital are unknown at time t.3.2.2 Single-period liabilitiesFor the sake of intuition, let us rst desribe the determination of the requiredsolveny apital under the Cost of Capital approah in a given year t, in a settingwhere the last payment ours at the end of year t, so that Lt+1 = 0. Then themarket value margin (MVMt is dened aording to (3.7) as the ost of apital of
CoC% in exess of the risk-free rate, harged on the required solveny apital SCRt(there are no future SCRt+τ -s).Equations (3.4)(3.6), together with Lt+1 = 0, imply:















































3.2. Diret approah of Solveny II 51Thus, in a single-period setting, we obtain losed form expressions for the value ofthe liabilities, and the required solveny apital.3.2.3 Multi-period liabilitiesIn the previous subsetion we determined the value of the liabilities and the or-responding apital reserve in the Cost of Capital approah for liabilities with onlya single payout. However, the run-o time for liabilities of life insurane produtsis generally muh longer. The intention of the regulator is that the market valuemargin equals the ost (i.e., CoC×100%) harged to the present value of the urrentand all future values of SCRt+s as given in equation (3.7). However, a problem withthis alulation is that the SCRt+s depends on the distribution of the all SCR-safter time t + s. To solve this problem, the liabilities are treated as if the run-operiod has length one, and the value of the liabilities at the end of time t is givenby L̃t + Lt+1. The interpretation is that the insurer an sell the liabilities at theend of the year at a prie equal to Lt+1. This eetively transforms the problemto a single-period problem as desribed in the previous subsetion. Speially, let
BEL1 periodt denote the urrent best estimate value of the liabilities, given that atthe end of year t they will be sold at prie Lt+1, i.e.,
BEL1 periodt = Et [L̃t + Lt+11 + rrf ] . (3.10)Then it follows from (3.8), and BEL1 periodt dened in this way, that the urrentmarket value of the liabilities is given by:
Lt =BEL
1 period

















. (3.11)Even though only the apital harge for the rst period appears expliitly in theexpression for the value of the liabilities, apital harges for holding the risk in lateryears are inluded through their eet on the distribution of the market value of theliabilities next year. Indeed, reursive evaluation of the rst equality of equation
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− Lt+s. (3.13)Thus, the value of the liabilities equals the urrent best estimate, plus a marketvalue margin MVMt that equals the present value of the expeted ost of apital,
Et [SCRt+s], assoiated with holding the liability in future periods.To determine suiently aurately the value of MVMt in the CoC approahusing a simulation approah might require many simulations. The reason is that wehave to determine:









, (3.14)where the future SCRt+s itself depends on the onditional expetation of SCRt+s+s1-s even further in the future. Solveny II allows to make simpliations when thesewould not lead to a result whih is materially dierent from the result whih wouldresult from a more aurate valuation proess.3 We onsider these in the next se-tion. Another approah to determine the value of the liabilities, without time on-suming simulations, is to make use of losed form approximations of the distributionof the variables of interest. We onsider this possibility in Setion 3.4.3.3 Simpliations in the CoC-approahIn this setion we disuss some simpliations to alulate the apital requirementsin the internal model, based on proposals in Solveny II. In these simpliation themarket values of the liabilities is set equal their best estimate, i.e., at this stageone sets MVMt+s = 0, resulting in solveny apital requirements that are known attime t. To indiate this, we denote the simpliation of SCRt+s by SCR(s)t . Given3Aording to setion TS.II.C.16 in QIS 4, and setion TP.5.32 in QIS 5 the SCR an be alu-lated using either a diret appliation of SCR formulae or using the proposed simpliations.(seeQIS 4, setion TS.II.A.35, QIS 5, setion TP.5.30)
3.3. Simpliations in the CoC-approah 53these simpliations, we an alulate the orresponding simpliation of MVMt,using (3.7), with SCRt+s replaed by SCR(s)t .Longevity shok approah. In order to alulate the apital requirements forlongevity risk in the Solveny II proposal, QIS 4 (setions TS.XI.C and TS.XII.D.28)and QIS 5 (setions SCR 7.3 and SCR 7.28) proposes a simplied approah andreferred to as the standard model. In this simplied approah, the required solvenyapital in any future period t+ s, SCR(s)t , is dened as the hange in the net assetvalue at time t+ s+1 due to a (permanent) 20% derease in mortality probabilitiesfor eah age, ompared to their urrent best estimates.4 The net asset value in year
t+ s+ 1, i.e., the value of assets minus the value of the liabilities, is given by:





































. (3.15)4See QIS 5, setion SCR 7.28. The permanent derease of 20% is a revision of the earlierderease of 25% in QIS 4 (see QIS 4, setions TS.II.A.10 and TS.II.B), whih was based on ICASsubmission in the UK. The average stress test for longevity risk an insurer in the UK used was18%, with a range of between 5% and 35% in 2004.















, (3.17)with SCR(0)t as dened by (3.16). The idea behind this simpliation is that thefuture SCR as fration of the best estimate of the liabilities is equal to the urrent

































=CoC ·Durt · SCR(0)t , (3.18)where Durt denotes the (Maaulay) duration of the best estimate of the liabilities.This simpliation is often used, see, for example, the Swiss Solveny Test (SST).See also QIS 4, setion TS.II.C.28 and QIS 5 setion SCR 7.32.Simpliation (3.18) an easily be adapted by using the modied duration, in-stead of the Maaulay duration, i.e.,
MVMt = CoC ·MDt · SCRt, (3.19)
3.4. Model for longevity risk 55where MDt denotes the modied duration (i.e., the Maaulay duration divided byone plus the yield to maturity). This simpliation is proposed in Solveny II, seeQIS 4, setion TS.II.C.26 and QIS 5 setion SCR 7.32. In our ase the modiedduration is the Maaulay duration divided by one plus the risk free interest rate











, (3.20)where the ǫgx,t+s represent the measurement errors. Introdue
ǫgt+s =
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56 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital RequirementsFollowing typial ndings in the empirial literature, see, among others, Lee andCarter (1992), Renshaw and Haberman (2006), and Booth, Hyndman, Tikle, andde Jong (2006), we postulate that the evolution over time of kgt+s, g ∈ {M,F},











































































, (3.25)independent of ǫt+s and et+s. We inlude parameter unertainty in the drift terms,
c, to take into aount unertainty in the expeted trend in future mortality.Introdue now the index set
I = {(x, s, g) | x ∈ X , s ∈ Tx, g ∈ {M,F}}with x ∈ X ≡ {0, 1, . . . ,MA} representing the age lass, s ∈ Tx ≡ {1, . . . ,MA− x}the time period relative to the base year, and g the gender. Dene the vetor ℓt,ontaining the hange in the log mortality rates over time, with omponents ℓt (i),for i = (x, s, g) ∈ I, where x is the age in the base year t, by,




































3.4. Model for longevity risk 57Straightforward alulations result in the following lemma, desribing Pt in terms ofthese log mortality rates. In this lemma we denote by Ft the sigma eld representingthe information up to and inluding time t.Lemma 3.4.1
ℓt | Ft ∼ N (µℓ,Σℓ) (3.27)with µℓ the mean vetor with omponents




c ,for i = (x, s, g) ∈ I, and with Σℓ the ovariane matrix, with omponents




y+Sf (i, j) + 2Σ
g,h
ǫ (x+ s, y + S),for i = (x, s, g) , j = (y, S, h) ∈ I, where Σg,hǫ (x + s, y + S) is the (x + s, y + S)-omponent of Σg,hǫ dened in Equation (3.21), and where
f (i, j) =
(
1(g=h) + 1(g 6=h)ρe
)
× σgeσhe min(s, S) +
(
1(g=h) + 1(g 6=h)ρc
)
× σgcσhc sS.Using the omponents of the vetor ℓt, we introdue the vetor of Redution Fators
rft, with omponents rft (i), for i ∈ I, as follows
rft (i) = exp (ℓt (i)) . (3.28)Let X ∼ N (µ,Σ), and Y = exp (X). Then (by denition) Y ∼ logN (µ,Σ). Thus,using Lemma 1, we have rft | Ft ∼ logN (µℓ,Σℓ). We dene the vetor µ̃t, withomponents µ̃t (i), for i = (x, s, g) ∈ I, by
µ̃t (i) = rft (i)× µ̂gx+s,t, (3.29)with µ̂gx+s,t the atually observed value of µgx+s,t, used as starting value to avoid ajump-o bias. We dene the vetor ℓ̃t, with omponents ℓ̃t (i), for i = (x, s, g) ∈ I,by ℓ̃t (i) = log (µ̂gx+s,t). Then we have




. (3.30)Given µ̃t, we an dene the survival probabilities. For instane, for i = (x, s, g) ∈ Ithe realized one year survival probability of an individual with gender g and age
x+ s at time t+ s is given by pgx+s,t+s = exp (−µ̃ (x, s, g)), while the realized s yearsurvival probability for an individual of gender g and age x at time t is then givenby spx,t =∏sτ=1 px+τ,t+τ .
58 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirements3.4.2 ApproximationThe distribution Pt in terms of log mortality rates is rather simple. However, weneed the far more ompliated indued probability distribution of the value of theliabilities Lt+s, s ≥ 0, as dened by bakward reursion by equation (3.11). Inthis subsetion we present the time-spei liability payments L̃t+s, s ≥ 0, thatwe investigate in this hapter, and our approximation for their (indued) probabil-ity distribution. Then we disuss our approximation for the (indued) probabilitydistribution for the value of the liabilities Lt+s.We onsider the following two types of life insurane produts:1. A single life annuity onsisting of a nominal yearly payment of 1 with a rstpayment in the year in whih the partiipant reahes the age of 65, with a lastpayment in the year (s)he dies;2. A survivor annuity onsisting of a nominal yearly payment of 1 with a rstpayment in the year in whih the partiipant dies, with a last payment in theyear his (her) partner dies.Introdue the index set
J =
{
(a, x, g, p, yp, gp, s) | a ∈ A, x, yp ∈ X0 ⊂ X , s ∈ Tmin{x,yp}
g, gp ∈ {M,F}, p ∈ {0, 1}} ,with a representing the life insurane produt from the produt lassA, with p = 1 inase a partner is present, and p = 0 otherwise, with x representing the age lass of theinsured, with yp the age lass of the partner of the insured, where X0 ⊂ X representsthe set of ages of the insureds inluded in the portfolio under onsideration, and with
gp representing the gender of the partner, where we set y0 = x and g0 = g in asethe insured does not have a partner (p = 0).In this hapter we onsider four portfolios, whih are dened in Setion 3.5.Sine these portfolios onsist of single life annuities (a = sl) and survivor annuities(a = sa), we have A = {sl, sa}. Moreover, we shall onsider portfolios with insureds(and their possible partners) having age 65 at time t, so that X0 = {65}.We introdue the vetor L̃, ontaining the possible time- and produt speiliability payments, with omponents L̃ (j), j ∈ J , where eah L̃ (j) represents theliability payment orresponding to produt j ∈ J . We have
L̃ (sl, x, g, p, yp, gp, s) = 1[rj,∞)(s)× spgx,t
3.4. Model for longevity risk 59for a single-life annuity at time t + s, in ase of an insured of gender g and age xat the base year t, where rj = max{65 − x, 1}, the number of years until the rstsingle life annuity payment, and5




× spgpyp,tfor a survivor annuity at time t + s, in ase of an insured of gender g and age x atthe base year t, and a partner of gender gp and age yp, also at the base year t.In the appendix we derive as approximation for the distribution of the vetor L̃,onditional on the information set Ft, a log normal distribution, with appropriatelyhosen mean vetor and ovariane matrix, starting from the distribution of µ̃t |
Ft, see (3.30). We motivate this approximation as follows. First, we approximatethe lognormal distribution of the mortality rates by a normal distribution, wherethe parameters are set suh that the rst two moments of the two distributionsmath. We show that this approximation is rather lose, also beause longevityrisk, although systemati, is not too large a risk fator. Next, we apply an extensionof the Fenton-Wilkinson approximation for a linear transformation of lognormallydistributed random variables to arrive at the approximate probability distributionof L̃. This approximation is also quite aurate, again beause longevity risk is nottoo large a risk fator.6 For a more detailed desription of the approximations and aquantiation of the auray of the approximations, we refer to Appendix 3.A.1.7Given the approximate distribution of the vetor L̃, ontaining the time- andprodut-spei liability payments, our approximation of the distribution of thetime-spei liability payments L̃t+s follows by an appliation of the Fenton-5Existing literature shows that there exists dependene between the remaining lifetimes of apartiipant and his (her) partner at miro-level, e.g., due to the fat that partners have similarlifestyles, or that the passing away of a partner aets the surviving relative's quality of life.Beause our fous in this hapter is on systemati longevity risk, we ignore this dependene andassume that the remaining lifetimes of the spouses, onditional on the survival probabilities, areindependent.6Indeed, in the limit, when the variane goes to zero, one an show that a sum of lognormaldistributed variables is lognormally distributed, see Dufresne (2004). We illustrate that we alsohave a good approximation in ase of the linear transformations relevant for our approximation.7Our approah to obtain the distribution of the future ash ows of life insurane produtsis dierent from the omonotoni quantile-additivity approah developed in Denuit and Dhaene(2007) and Denuit (2008), sine it does not require the assumption of omonotoni random variables(i.e., the mortality rates) and monotoni funtion of these variables. Moreover, in our model we donot need the restrition that all the age spei parameters βx should have the same sign, whihmay not be the ase, see, for example, Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002a), where the sign ofthe βx swith from positive to negative at the age of 95 for males and 97 for females in ase ofBelgian mortality data.
60 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital RequirementsWilkinson approximation for sums of lognormal distributions, sine the time-speiliability payment L̃t+s is just a linear transformation of the vetor L̃ of time- andprodut-spei liability payments.Next, the distribution of the value of the liabilities Lt+s an be obtained by ap-plying (3.11) in a bakward reursion, starting from some Lt+τ . In ase of a run-oapproah, as we onsider in Setion 3.5, we an take τ = T+1 for whih we will have
Lt+T+1 = 0. Our approximation is suh that the time-spei liability payments
L̃t+T simultaneously with the vetor ontaining the realized survival probabilitiesis (approximately) lognormally distributed. Motivated by the Markov-property ofthese realized survival probabilities, in ase of the Lee-Carter model, we assumethat Ft+T an be approximated by the sigma eld generated by the realized survivalprobabilities orresponding to period t+T . Using the harateristis of a lognormaldistribution, we are then able to alulate the reursion (3.11) for the time stepfrom T + 1 to T , yielding as approximation for Lt+T a lognormal distribution, withappropriate mean vetor and ovariane matrix. The Fenton-Wilkinson approxi-mation then yields that the sum of Lt+T and L̃t+T−1 is (approximately) lognormal.Using bakward indution we are then able to obtain in a similar way approximatelognormal distributions for the earlier Lt+s, s ≤ T − 1. For a more detailed desrip-tion we refer to Appendix 3.A.1. In this appendix we also ompare the aggregateddisounted dierenes in the best estimate senarios between the SCR, using Pt-based simulations of the mortality probabilities and using our approximation. Wend for dierent portfolios of life insurane produts that the aggregated disounteddierenes are small, up to approximately 1.8%. The disounted sum of SCR-s,multiplied with the ost of apital rate, gives MVMt, hene, the results indiatethat the error using the model for alulating the market value of liabilities is small.3.5 Solveny apital requirementsIn this setion we onsider apital requirements for a portfolio of life insuraneproduts and ompare the results to the simplied approah in the Solveny IIproposal. We will onsider the following four portfolios:
1: 100% male, aged 65, with a single life annuity;
2: 100% female, aged 65, with a single life annuity;
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3: 50% male, aged 65, with a single life annuity and 50% female, aged 65, with asingle life annuity;
4: 50% male, aged 65, with a single life annuity and a survivor annuity, and 50%female, aged 65, with a single life annuity and a survivor annuity. The partneris of the opposite gender with age 65 and the survivor annuity payments are70% of the single life annuity payments.We assume that the risk free one year return is equal to 4%, resulting in P (s)t =
1
1.04s
for all t and s. To estimate the parameters of the distribution of the futuremortality rates we use US, UK, and Duth age and gender spei mortality datafrom 1970 to 2006, representing a large, a medium, and a small population size,respetively.8 A detailed desription of the method to estimate the parameters of theLee-Carter model and the resulting parameter estimates are presented in Appendix3.A.2.In Subsetion 3.5.1 we rst report the apital requirements resulting from thelosed form approximation in the internal model. In Subsetion 3.5.2 we onsider theapital requirements using the Solveny II simpliations and the simpliations tothe internal model as desribed in Setion 3.3 and we disuss the dierenes betweenthe approximation and the simpliations.3.5.1 The apital requirements using the approximationIn this subsetion we present the apital requirement for the US, UK, and theNetherlands for four dierent portfolios of 65 years old insureds, desribed in theprevious setion, using our approximation, as desribed in the previous setion. InQIS 4 and 5 the CoC-rate is set at 6%, whih is interpreted as the ost of apitalin exess of the risk free interest rate. To deal with the reation of the industryto the Solveny proposal that this CoC-perentage is set too high, we also use theCoC-perentage of 4%, instead of only the proposed 6%.9 The results are displayedin Table 3.5.1.8We use a relatively short time period for the estimation of the parameters, beause otherwisethe assumption of time-invariant parameter bx might not be valid, see Tuljapurkar et al. (2000),Lee and Miller (2001), and Booth et al. (2002b).9See the FSA UK ountry report (2008) and CEA (the European insurane and reinsuranefederation) (2009).
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ulating Capital RequirementsTable 3.5.1: Table with apital requirements using the internal model
A⋆t - BELtBELt MVMtBELt SCRtBELt A⋆t - BELtBELt MVMtBELt SCRtBELtUS, CoC=6% US, CoC=4%
1 1.47% 1.04% 0.44% 1.16% 0.71% 0.45%
2 1.17% 0.77% 0.41% 0.93% 0.52% 0.41%
3 1.17% 0.80% 0.38% 0.92% 0.55% 0.38%
4 0.97% 0.74% 0.24% 0.74% 0.51% 0.24%UK, CoC=6% UK, CoC=4%
1 2.59% 1.73% 0.89% 2.06% 1.17% 0.91%
2 2.47% 2.04% 0.47% 1.87% 1.42% 0.47%
3 2.22% 1.70% 0.55% 1.70% 1.16% 0.55%
4 2.00% 1.63% 0.39% 1.49% 1.11% 0.39%NL, CoC=6% NL, CoC=4%
1 1.74% 0.97% 0.78% 1.45% 0.66% 0.80%
2 2.92% 2.38% 0.60% 2.19% 1.60% 0.61%
3 2.01% 1.54% 0.50% 1.53% 1.04% 0.50%
4 1.82% 1.50% 0.34% 1.34% 1.00% 0.35%This table displays MVM and SCR in the internal model, as perentage ofthe best estimate of the liabilities, for four dierent portfolios of life insuraneproduts for the US, UK, and the Netherlands. The market value of theliabilities is set aording the internal model with a Cost of Capital rate of 6%in olumns 2 till 4 and a Cost of Capital rate of 4% in olumns 5 till 7.As expeted, we observe that the MVMt, using a Cost of Capital rate of 4%,is lower than the MVMt using a Cost of Capital rate of 6%. We also observethat the apital reserves (A⋆t , MVMt, and SCRt) for the dierent portfolios dependsigniantly on the underlying population. For example, the apital reserves in theUK are higher than in the US for all four investigated portfolios. Moreover, a singlelife annuity for males ompared to a single life annuity for females has a lower apitalrequirement in the Netherlands, but a higher apital requirement in the US and UK.Hene, a simple rules of thumb for all underlying populations by setting the MVMtand SCRt for an insured aged 65 equal to a given perentage might not be auratefor valuing the liabilities of all investigated populations.3.5.2 The apital requirements using simpliationsIn this setion we report the apital requirements for the four portfolios orrespond-ing to the simpliations disussed in Setion 3.3. We rst onsider the standard
3.5. Solveny apital requirements 63model with the 20% longevity shok. Table 3.5.2 displays the resulting apital re-serves for the four portfolios, i.e., the market value margin (MVMt), the solvenyapital requirement (SCR(0)t ),10 and the total apital requirement (A⋆t ).Table 3.5.2: Table with apital requirements using the longevity shokapproah Longevity shok approah
A⋆t - BELtBELt MVMtBELt SCRtBELt A⋆t - BELtBELt MVMtBELt SCRtBELtCoC = 6% CoC = 4%US
1 15.98% 8.23% 7.75% 13.24% 5.49% 7.75%
2 13.35% 7.21% 6.14% 10.95% 4.81% 6.14%
3 14.59% 7.69% 6.90% 12.02% 5.13% 6.90%
4 12.87% 7.27% 5.60% 10.45% 4.85% 5.60%UK
1 16.15% 8.26% 7.89% 13.40% 5.51% 7.89%
2 13.34% 7.20% 6.14% 10.94% 4.80% 6.14%
3 14.65% 7.69% 6.96% 12.09% 5.13% 6.96%
4 13.14% 7.39% 5.75% 10.67% 4.93% 5.75%NL
1 15.72% 7.88% 7.83% 13.09% 5.26% 7.83%
2 12.24% 6.65% 5.59% 10.02% 4.43% 5.59%
3 13.81% 7.21% 6.61% 11.41% 4.80% 6.61%
4 12.37% 6.93% 5.44% 10.06% 4.62% 5.44%This table displays the apital reserves (MVMt and SCRt), as perentage ofthe best estimate of the liabilities (BELt), for four dierent portfolios of lifeinsurane produts for the US, UK, and the Netherlands for t = 2006. Themarket value of the liabilities is set aording to the longevity shok approahproposed in Solveny II, using a Cost of Capital rate of 6% and 4%.The apital requirements in the standard model are signiantly larger than inase of the internal model, using our approximation. Aording to the simpliedapproah of the standard model, for an insured aged 65 years, depending on theportfolio omposition and the CoC perentage, an insurer should hold between 10%and just more than 16% of the best estimate value of the liabilities in exess of the10This SCR(0)t is independent of the CoC-rate. This is due to the denition of the SCR inSolveny II. The urrent SCR is only aeted by a hange in the best estimate value of theliabilities and not by the market value of the liabilities. This is dierent from the internal model,where SCRt does depend on the CoC-rate (see Table 3.5.2)
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− 1, (3.31)where qx,t is the time-t and age-x (population) one year mortality probability, ob-tained form the Human Mortality Database. The resulting standard deviations turnout to be 1.32%, 1.18%, and 1.01% for the age bands [6070℄, [7080℄, and [8090℄,respetively. Comparing these numbers to the size of the longevity shok equal to20% suggests that the longevity shok might be quite onservative.However, whereas these standard deviations are useful to ompare the longevityshok in the standard model of Solveny II with the observed shoks in the past, theymight not apture possible redutions in future survival probabilities. Espeially forontrats with a long maturity, the eet of a hange in the trend of future mortalitymight be substantial.To indiate how large the shoks to the mortality probabilities are in the in-ternal model, we determined the 99.5% quantiles of the expeted future survivalprobabilities within a year. Figure 3.5.1 displays the relative shok fator in mor-tality probabilities in the 99.5% senario relative to the best estimate senario foran individual with age 65 years (solid urve), 75 years (dashed urve), and 85 years(dashed-dotted urve). More preisely, Figure 3.5.1 displays:









x+s,t+swhere Qt,0.005 [qg,BE(t+1)x+s,t+s ] is the time-t 0.5% quantile of the11These annualized 5 year improvement fator are used instead of the annual mortality improve-ment fators in order to smooth the mortality improvement fators over time, reduing the eetof idiosynrati longevity risk.
3.5. Solveny apital requirements 65Figure 3.5.1: Longevity shok senario in the Lee-Carter model





































































































The gure displaysRSFt(x, g, τ) for x = 65, 75, and 85 and for τ = 1, . . . , 100−
x, i.e., the shok in mortality probabilities whih ours in the 99.5% perentileof the mortality table within a year for base year t = 2006. The upper panelsdisplay the shok for the US, the middle panels for the UK, and the lowerpanels for the Netherlands, the left panels for males (i.e., g = M) and theright panels for females (i.e., g = F ). The solid lines orrespond with anindividual urrently aged 65 (i.e., x = 65), the dashed lines orrespond withan individual urrently aged 75 (i.e., x = 75), and the dashed-dotted linesorrespond with an individual urrently aged 85 (i.e., x = 85).
66 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirementstime-(t + 1) best estimate of the mortality probability, with x (=65, 75, or 85)the age of the insured at the base year t, g ∈ {M,F} the gender of the insured, and
x+ s the age to whih the relative shok fator applies. The base year is t = 2006.Solveny II assumes that RSFt(g, x, s) = 0.80 for g =M,F , all x and s > 0. Figure3.5.1 illustrates that the shok in the Lee-Carter model is muh smaller than theshok in the simplied approah standard model of Solveny II, but generally ofthe same magnitude as the orresponding quantile of AMFx,t, using a normal dis-tribution with orresponding standard deviation as alulated inUNESPA longevityrisk investigation (2009). We also observe that, for example, RSFt(65, g, 11) isapproximately 30% higher than RSFt(75, g, 1). Thus, for ontrats with a longerduration the dierene between the internal model (using our approximation) andthe Solveny standard model beomes smaller.
Next, we present in Table 3.5.3 the market value margin (MVMt) and the ur-rent buer (SCR(0)t ), for the dierent portfolios, using the other simpliationsapplied to the internal model, see Table 3.5.3. The two simpliations are the BE-simpliation, as given in equation (3.16), and the FS-simpliation, as given inequation (3.18). For the sake of omparison, we also inlude the MVMt from Table3.5.1, alulated using our approximation.
From Table 3.5.3 we observe that the BE- and the FS-simpliation typiallyunderestimate the risk margin, when the internal model is taken as referene, withonly exeption the US females insureds in ase of the BE-simpliation. Whenomparing SCR(0)t from Table 3.5.3 and SCRt from Table 3.5.1, we observe that
SCR
(0)
t is higher. Nevertheless, MVMt relative to BELt is larger in the internalmodel than in ase of the two simpliations. This is possible, sine the MVMt isthe expeted disounted value of all future SCR-s multiplied with a Cost of Capitalrate, where the expeted values of the future SCR-s further away are larger in theinternal model than in the simpliation.






BELtinternal BE FS internal BE FSUS US, CoC = 6% US, CoC = 4%
1 1.25% 1.04% 0.85% 0.57% 0.71% 0.56% 0.38%
2 0.97% 0.77% 0.80% 0.54% 0.52% 0.46% 0.31%
3 1.01% 0.80% 0.72% 0.48% 0.55% 0.47% 0.31%
4 0.81% 0.74% 0.69% 0.46% 0.51% 0.40% 0.27%UK UK, CoC = 6% UK, CoC = 4%
1 1.62% 1.73% 1.06% 0.70% 1.17% 0.73% 0.49%
2 1.50% 2.04% 1.16% 0.77% 1.42% 0.71% 0.48%
3 1.41% 1.70% 0.97% 0.64% 1.16% 0.65% 0.43%
4 1.13% 1.63% 0.92% 0.61% 1.11% 0.56% 0.37%NL NL, CoC = 6% NL, CoC = 4%
1 1.51% 0.97% 0.95% 0.63% 0.66% 0.65% 0.43%
2 2.11% 2.38% 1.52% 1.01% 1.60% 1.00% 0.67%
3 1.48% 1.54% 0.99% 0.66% 1.04% 0.67% 0.45%
4 1.28% 1.50% 1.00% 0.67% 1.00% 0.62% 0.41%This table displays the urrent required buer (SCRt) and the marketvalue margin (MVMt) in the internal model and using the BE- and FS-simpliations, as perentage of the best estimate of the liabilities (BELt),for four dierent portfolios of life insurane produts for the US, UK, and theNetherlands for t = 2006. The seond olumn refers to the SCR as given in(3.16), for s = 0, whih is independent of the Cost of Capital perentage. Themarket value of the liabilities is set aording the internal model with a Costof Capital perentage of 6% in the third till fth olumn and with a Cost ofCapital perentage of 4% in the sixth till eighth olumn. The third and sixtholumns refer to the market value margin in the internal model using our ap-proximation, the fourth and the seventh olumn refer to the BE-simpliationas given in equation (3.16), and the fth and eighth olumn refer to the FS-simpliation as given in equation (3.18).
In the FE-simpliation (as given in equation (3.18)) MVMt is alulated usinga onstant fration of SCR-s relative to BEL over the run-o period. A goodapproximation would require that the SCR relative to BEL is indeed onstant overthe run-o period. Figure 3.5.2 displays the base year expeted SCR in the internalmodel, i.e., Et (SCRt+s), relative to the base year best estimate of the liabilities over
68 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirementsthe run-o period.12 This gure shows that the buer relative to the best estimate ofthe liabilities typially rst inreases when time elapses, and then dereases. The sizeof the buer relative to the best estimate in the run-o period is neither onstant,nor monotonially inreasing, or dereasing, whih does not seem to support theidea underlying this simpliation.Figure 3.5.2: Expeted solveny apital requirement in the internal modelas perentage of best estimate of the liabilities in the run-o period































































time (s)The gure displays the SCR as perentage of the best estimate of the liabilitiesover time for the run-o period for the US (solid urves), UK (dashed urves),and the Netherlands (dashed-dotted urves). The upper left panel displaysthe SCR as perentage of the best estimate of the liabilities for portfolio 1,the upper right panel for portfolio 2, the lower left panel displays for portfolio
3, and the lower right panel for portfolio 4.Figure 3.5.3 displays the solveny apital requirements SCR(s)t in the BE-simpliation as perentage of best estimate of the liabilities in the run-o period.12The urves are not smooth, sine we have not smoothed the mortality rates, nor the redutionfator, i.e., we did not smooth bx in the Lee-Carter model.
3.5. Solveny apital requirements 69Comparing this gure with Figure 3.5.2 we observe that Et (SCRt+s) at interme-diate times (for s is approximately 10 up to 25) are underestimated using the BE-simpliation, relative to the internal model. In pratie, the BE-simpliation isoften taken to represent the exat MVMt, see Börger (2010). However, our resultsindiate that this representation might not always be appropriate.Figure 3.5.3: Expeted solveny apital requirement in the BE simplia-tion as perentage of best estimate of the liabilities in the run-o period
































































The gure displays the SCR in the BE simpliation as perentage of the bestestimate of the liabilities over time for the run-o period for the US (solidurves), UK (dashed urves), and the Netherlands (dashed-dotted urves).The upper left panel displays the SCR as perentage of the best estimate ofthe liabilities for portfolio 1, the upper right panel for portfolio 2, the lowerleft panel displays for portfolio 3, and the lower right panel for portfolio 4.Finally, we ompare the resulting initial apital requirements A∗t (relative to
BELt), whih an be alulated by adding 1, SCR(0)t /BELt, and MVMt/BELt(with MVMt alulated aording to the orresponding simpliation). Relativeto the internal model, we nd that A∗t/BELt, alulated aording to the BE- or
70 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital RequirementsFS-simpliation is still somewhat onservative, but far less so than the standardmodel (based on the longevity shok). Thus, in terms of initial apital requirementsthese simpliations seem to work ne.3.6 ConlusionsThis hapter investigates the apital requirements for a portfolio of life insuraneproduts. The apital requirements are set aording to the ost of apital approah,in line with the QIS 5 Tehnial Speiation of the Solveny II proposal. The ost ofapital approah values non-tradeable risk, suh as systemati longevity risk, usingan easy to understand method.However, the ost of apital approah for life insurane produts, with typially along time to maturity, might be omputationally demanding when starting from thedistribution of mortality rates and using simulation based tehniques. We derive alosed form approximation of the indued distribution of the disounted ash owsand the market value of the liabilities of a portfolio of life insurane produts startingfrom the Lee and Carter (1992)-model for the log mortality rates.Using our approximation we alulate the apital requirements for dierent port-folios of life insurane produts and ompare them with the apital requirementsusing the Solveny II proposed standard formula. The portfolios onsist of 65-year-old male and female single life annuity and survivor annuity produts for insuredsin the US, UK, and the Netherlands.Our results suggest that the apital requirements using the longevity shok ap-proah in the Solveny II standard model might be quite onservative. On the otherhand, the two investigated simpliations turn out to be far less onservative interms of the initial apital requirements than, muh loser to the internal modelbased alulations, using our approximation. However, we do nd substantial dier-enes between these simpliation based solveny apital requirements (SCR) andmarket value margin (MVM) and the orresponding SCR and MVM alulatedusing the internal model.Although our approximation turns out to be quite aurate, it is based on theLee and Carter (1992) model whih itself is also an approximation. Thus, the riskquantied aording to our internal model is − by approximation − just the riskof the Lee-Carter model, thus, exluding, for example, model risk. It might beinteresting to investigate whether aurate approximations an be found for other
3.6. Conlusions 71models than the Lee-Carter model. In this way we might also be able to model riskas well.
72 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirements3.A Approximations for the Distribution of theCash Flows3.A.1 Approximations for the Distribution of the Cash FlowsWe start from µ̃t as dened in (3.30). We shall suppress the index t, unless neededfor lariation, sine the alulations are made for a given, base year t.First Approximation. We use as rst approximation µ̃ ∼ N (µµ,Σµ), with thevetor µµ, with omponents µµ (i), for i ∈ I, given by
µµ (i) ≡ exp
(





,and with the matrix Σµ, with omponents Σµ (i, j) for i = (x, s, g) , j = (y, S, h) ∈ I,given by
Σµ (i, j) = exp
(
ℓ̃ (i) + µℓ(i) + ℓ̃ (j) + µℓ(j) +
1
2





× (exp (Σℓ (i, j))− 1) .In this approximation µµ(i) and Σµ (i, j) are set suh that they exatly math theorresponding moments of the original distribution.Auray First Approximation. In Figure 3.A.1 and Table 3.A.1 the au-ray of the rst approximation is displayed. The upper left panel of Figure 3.A.1orresponds with the parameters of the distribution of the one-year probability ofsurviving of a male individual age 100 in 35 years from now (t = 2006) in theNetherlands, i.e., x = 65, s = 35, and g = M . The upper right panel orrespondswith the parameters of the distribution of the one-year probability of surviving ofa male individual individual age 100 in 75 years from now (t = 2006), i.e., x = 25,
s = 75, and g = M . These long time horizons imply that the unertainty in theone year survival probabilities is quite large, whih would lead to a less aurateapproximation than for shorter horizons. The lower left panel displays the eet ofan inrease in µ for the parameters of the upper right panel. The lower right paneldisplays the eet of an inrease in σ for the parameters of the upper right panel.From the gure and the table we observe that the approximation is aurate. In thetails, and when the variane is high, the approximation is less aurate.
3.A. Approximations for the Distribution of the Cash Flows 73Figure 3.A.1: Comparison Log Normal - Normal

















































































This gure displays the probability density funtion of X ∼ logN (µX , σ2X)and the probability density funtion of the approximation Y ∼ N (µY , σ2Y ) fordierent values of µ ≡ µX and σ ≡ σX . The parameters µY and σ2Y are setsuh that they math the rst two moments of those of X.
74 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital RequirementsTable 3.A.1: Comparison Log Normal-Normal
µX = -3.9553; µX = -1.9579; µX = -4.3077; µX = -2.0208;
σX = 0.14693 σX = 0.054624 σX = 0.23096 σX = 0.063193
Q X Y X Y X Y X Y0.01 0.014 0.013 0.124 0.123 0.008 0.006 0.114 0.1130.025 0.014 0.014 0.127 0.126 0.009 0.007 0.117 0.1160.05 0.015 0.015 0.129 0.129 0.009 0.009 0.119 0.1190.1 0.016 0.016 0.132 0.131 0.010 0.001 0.122 0.1220.25 0.017 0.017 0.136 0.136 0.012 0.012 0.127 0.1270.5 0.019 0.019 0.141 0.141 0.013 0.014 0.133 0.1330.75 0.021 0.021 0.146 0.147 0.016 0.016 0.138 0.1380.9 0.023 0.023 0.151 0.151 0.018 0.018 0.144 0.1440.95 0.024 0.024 0.154 0.154 0.020 0.019 0.147 0.1470.975 0.026 0.025 0.157 0.157 0.021 0.020 0.150 0.1490.99 0.027 0.026 0.160 0.159 0.023 0.021 0.154 0.152This table displays the quantiles of the funtion X ∼ logN (µX , σ2X) and theorresponding quantiles of the approximating distribution Y ∼ N (µY , σ2Y ).The parameters of Y are set suh that the rst two moments of Y math therst two moments of X. The olumn with heading Q displays the quantiles.The other olumns show the quantiles of X and Y for dierent values of µXand σX , where the subolumns with heading X present the quantiles of thedistribution of X, and the subolumns with heading Y the quantiles of theorresponding distribution of Y .
















≡ N (µℓC ,ΣℓC) .Let C denote the index set of the vetor C. We have, for i ∈ C,








3.A. Approximations for the Distribution of the Cash Flows 75and for i, j ∈ C,
ΣC (i, j) ≡ Cov (C (i) , C (j)) = (exp (ΣℓC (i, j))− 1)
× exp
(
µℓC (i) + µℓC (j) +
1
2





















µℓB (j) = log (µB (j))−
1
2
ΣB (j, j) , j ∈ B






, j1, j2 ∈ B,






, j1 ∈ B, j2 ∈ G,where B = {1, · · · ,M} and G = {1, · · · , K}.For general ∆ this approximation is not the Fenton-Wilkinson approximation forsums of lognormally distributed random varables. If we apply this approximation tosuh a ase, we shall refer to this approximation as the generalized Fenton-Wilkinsonapproximation, and we shall quantify the orresponding approximation error.Survival Probabilities. We dene the vetor p̃, with omponents p̃ (i), for i =
(x, s, g) ∈ I, by
p̃ (i) = exp (−µ̃ (i)) . (3.34)By onstrution, the omponent p̃ (i) is the realized one year survival probability ofan individual with age x+s and gender g at time-t+s as these are usually alulatedin ase of the Lee and Carter (1992)-model, inluding a orretion for the jump-obias. In terms of standard notation, p̃(i) is the Lee-Carter estimate of pgx+s,t+s =
1p
g




p̃ (x, τ, g) . (3.35)



















(−µµ (x, τ, g)) ,and for i = (x, s, g) , j = (y, S, h) ∈ I,





Σµ ((x, τ1, g) , (y, τ2, h))),and
ΣℓSp (j, i) = ΣℓpS (i, j) =
S∑
τ=1
Σµ ((x, s, g) , (y, τ, h))).
Seond Approximation. Introdue q̃ = 1 − p̃ and D̃ = 1 − S̃. The omponent
q̃(i) = q̃(x, s, g) estimates the one-year mortality probabilities of an x + s yearold individual in year t + s with gender g, and the omponent D̃(i) = D̃(x, s, g)estimates the probability that a urrently x year old with gender g will not surviveanother s years, onsidered from time t. We dene H , with omponents H (k, i), for
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and i ∈ I, by H (1, i) = p̃ (i), H (2, i) = q̃ (i), H (3, i) = S̃ (i), and
H (4, i) = D̃ (i). If we take A as a vetor with rst omponent 1, and with otheromponents p̃ (i) and S̃ (i) for i ∈ I, then H is a linear transformation of A, andwe an apply the generalized Fenton-Wilkinson approximation (without G), if weinterpret 1 as a lognormally distributed variable with zero mean and variane (i.e.,
1 ∼ logN (0, 0)), independent of the other omponents of A. Thus, as our seondapproximation, we take H | Ft ∼ logN (µℓH ,ΣℓH), with µℓH and ΣℓH following fromthe generalized Fenton-Wilkinson approximation.
3.A. Approximations for the Distribution of the Cash Flows 77Auray Seond Approximation. Figure 3.A.2 and Table 3.A.2 display theauray of the seond approximation. The upper left panel of Figure 3.A.2 or-responds with the parameters of the distribution of the probability of dying for aDuth male individual urrently aged 65 in 1 year from now. The upper right panelorresponds with the parameters of the distribution of the probability of dying for aDuth male individual urrently aged 65 in 32 year from now. The lower left panelorresponds with the parameters of the distribution of the probability of dying for aDuth male individual urrently aged 25 in 41 year from now. The lower right panelorresponds with the parameters of the distribution of the probability of dying fora Duth male individual urrently aged 25 in 72 year from now. From the gureand the table we observe that the approximation is aurate. The approximation isless aurate when µ is lose to zero or very small, σ is high, and in the tails of thedistribution.Figure 3.A.2: Comparison (1 − Log Normal) - Log Normal
























































This gure displays the probability density funtion of Y = 1 − X, with
X ∼ logN(µX , σ2X) and the probability density funtion of the approximation
Z ∼ logN(µZ , σ2Z) for dierent values of µ ≡ µX and σ ≡ σX . The parametersof Z are set suh that the rst two moments of Z math the rst two momentsof X.
78 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital RequirementsTable 3.A.2: Comparison (1 − Log Normal) - Log Normal
µX = -0.052786; µX = -0.31694; µX = -0.38612; µX = -3.5138;
σX = 0.0048811 σX = 0.022088 σX = 0.023094 σX = 0.064043
Q X Z X Z X Z X Z0.01 0.041 0.042 0.233 0.236 0.283 0.285 0.965 0.9660.025 0.042 0.043 0.239 0.241 0.289 0.290 0.966 0.9660.05 0.044 0.044 0.245 0.246 0.294 0.295 0.967 0.9670.1 0.045 0.046 0.251 0.251 0.300 0.300 0.968 0.9680.25 0.048 0.048 0.261 0.260 0.310 0.309 0.969 0.9690.5 0.051 0.051 0.272 0.271 0.320 0.320 0.970 0.9700.75 0.055 0.054 0.282 0.282 0.331 0.330 0.971 0.9710.9 0.057 0.057 0.292 0.292 0.340 0.340 0.973 0.9730.95 0.059 0.059 0.298 0.299 0.346 0.347 0.973 0.9730.975 0.060 0.061 0.302 0.304 0.350 0.352 0.974 0.9740.99 0.062 0.063 0.308 0.311 0.356 0.358 0.974 0.975This table displays the quantiles of the distribution Y = 1 − X, with
X ∼ logN(µX , σ2x) and the quantiles of the approximating distribution
Z ∼ logN(µZ , σ2Z). The parameters of Z are set suh that the rst twomoments of Z math the rst two moments of X. The rst olumn withheading Q displays the quantiles. The other olumns show the quantiles of Xand Z for dierent values of µX and σX , where the subolumns with heading
X present the quantiles of the distribution of X, and the subolumns withheading Z the quantiles of the orresponding distribution of Z.Payments. We proeed with the vetor of time-spei liability payments L̃, intro-dued in subsetion 3.4.2. In term of the notation of the appendix we have
L̃ (sl, x, g, p, yp, gp, s) = 1[rj,∞)(T )× S̃ (x, s, g)for a single-life annuity (with rj = max{65 − x, 1}, the number of years until therst single life annuity payment), and
L̃ (sa, x, g, p, yp, gp, s) = p× D̃ (x, s, g) S̃ (yps, gp)for a survivor annuity. Eah omponent L̃ (j), j ∈ J , is of the form






















,with for j ∈ J ,
µℓL(j) = log (cj) +
∑
u∈Uj
µℓH (u) ,and for j1, j2 ∈ J ,





ΣℓH (u1, u2) ,and
ΣℓHL (j1, j2) = ΣℓLH (j2, j1) =
∑
u2∈Uj2
ΣℓH (j1, u2) .Third approximation. The time (t + s)-spei disounted portfolio payments












 L̃ ≡ ∆L̃.We write L̃∆ = ∆L̃. As third approximation, we apply the Fenton-Wilkinson ap-proximation with A = L̃∆ and G = H , so that this joint vetor, by approximationand onditional upon Ft, follows a lognormal distribution, with parameters followingfrom the Fenton-Wilkinson approximation.Auray Approximation Liabilities. In order to indiate the approximationerror in the approximation steps so far, we present in Table 3.A.3 the 95% on-dene intervals of the simulation unertainty for three quantiles of the distributionof the disounted ash ows of appropriate omponents of L̃, orresponding to fourproduts, disounted with an interest rate of 4%.
80 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital RequirementsTable 3.A.3: 95 perent ondene intervals of quantiles of the distributionsN=10,000 N=100,000 ModelQ(0.75)sl m [ 11.6048 - 11.6126 ℄ [ 11.6066 - 11.6093 ℄ 11.6059sl f [ 13.2760 - 13.2872 ℄ [ 13.2826 - 13.2865 ℄ 13.2824sa m [ 3.3288 - 3.3373 ℄ [ 3.3293 - 3.3317 ℄ 3.3313sa f [ 1.6605 - 1.6658 ℄ [ 1.6642 - 1.6658 ℄ 1.6666Q(0.90)sl m [ 11.6959 - 11.7068 ℄ [ 11.7007 - 11.7039 ℄ 11.7038sl f [ 13.4047 - 13.4171 ℄ [ 13.4166 - 13.4212 ℄ 13.4256sa m [ 3.4154 - 3.4245 ℄ [ 3.4182 - 3.4216 ℄ 3.4245sa f [ 1.7197 - 1.7257 ℄ [ 1.7221 - 1.7241 ℄ 1.7254Q(0.995)sl m [ 11.8873 - 11.9240 ℄ [ 11.8918 - 11.9018 ℄ 11.9152sl f [ 13.6767 - 13.7078 ℄ [ 13.6861 - 13.6982 ℄ 13.7361sa m [ 3.5967 - 3.6266 ℄ [ 3.6084 - 3.6175 ℄ 3.6319sa f [ 1.8451 - 1.8636 ℄ [ 1.8543 - 1.8593 ℄ 1.8577This table displays the 95% ondene intervals of the simulation unertaintyfor three quantiles of the distribution of the disounted ash ows of L̃ basedon 10,000 (given in the olumn N=10,000) and 100,000 (given in the olumnN=100,000) simulations and the approximated value of the quantiles of thedierent produts using approximations 13 (given in the olumn Model).The three quantiles are the 75%, 90%, and the 99.5% quantile, the paymentsare disounted with an interest rate of 4%. The produts are sl m, a singlelife annuity for a Duth male aged 65, sl f, a single life annuity for a Duthfemale aged 65, sa m, a survivor annuity for a Duth male aged 65 witha Duth female partner aged 65, and sl m, a survivor annuity for a Duthfemale aged 65 with a Duth male partner aged 65, and the yearly disountrate is 4%.The four produts are a single life annuity for a Duth male aged 65, a singlelife annuity for a Duth female aged 65, a survivor annuity for a Duth male aged65 with a Duth female partner aged 65, and a survivor annuity for a Duth femaleaged 65 with a Duth male partner aged 65 The three quantiles are the 75%, 90%,and the 99.5% quantile, based on 10,000 and 100,000 simulations. We observe thatthe approximated value of the quantile of the dierent produts are lose to, or evenwithin, the 95% ondene intervals of the simulation unertainty. This even holdsfor the higher quantiles and for the produts with more unertainty (i.e., survival
3.A. Approximations for the Distribution of the Cash Flows 81annuities). In ontrast to the survival probabilities, we obtain a good approximationfor all produts, beause the produts are a sum of liability payments, where for mostpayments the unertainty is not too large.Cost of Capital. We start from L̃∆ = ∆L̃, together with Lt+T+1 ≡ 0. We shallnow present approximations for Lt+s, s ≤ T , as dened reursively by (3.11). Theseapproximations will be denoted by L̂t+s. We set L̂t+T+1 = Lt+T+1 = 0. In (3.11) wemake use of information sets Ft+s. Given our approximation that L̃∆ jointly with
H follows a lognormal distribution, this information set is the sigma-eld generatedby all the omponents of L̃∆ and H , realized before or at time t + s.Fourth approximation. As our fourth approximation we take
Ft+s = σ (Hs) ,where Hs is the vetor inluding as omponents p̃(x, s, g) and S̃(x, s, g), x ∈ X0 and















,where ΣℓG is invertible, then, with a and g the omponentwise log-s of A and G,respetively, we have
cE (A | G) + dQ1−α (A | G) =
c exp
(
E (a | g) + 1
2




E (a | g) + Φ−1(1− α)
√
V ar (a | g)
)
= F exp (E (a | g)) ,
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ulating Capital Requirementswhere
E (a | g) = µℓA + ΣℓAGΣ−1ℓG (g − µℓG) ,
V ar (a | g) = ΣℓA − ΣℓAGΣ−1ℓGΣℓGA,and










V ar (a | g)
)
.
We apply lemma 3.A.2 to the last period, i.e., we take A = L̃t+T , G = HT , c =
1/ (1 + CoC), and d = (1− c) / (1 + rrf). Then, based on the approximations usedso far, we obtain as approximation








f + µℓA + ΣℓAGΣ
−1
ℓG log (HT )
)
, (3.37)with f = log (F ). Given our approximations, L̂t+T−1 is also lognormal: startingfrom HT | Ft ∼ logN (µℓG,ΣℓG), we nd






,Using lemma 3.A.2 one again, but now with c = 0, d = 1/ (1 + rrf), A = L̃t+T , and
G = HT , we nd the approximate distribution of the rst term of the right hand sideof (3.13) for s = T . Taking the dierene between this approximation and (3.37), wend the approximation of SCRt+T , and then also the approximation ofMVMt+T ≡
CoC · SCRt+T . In addition, we an then easily alulate the approximations of
Et+s [SCRt+T ], needed to alulate MVMt+s, for eah s ≤ T . Finally, BELt+T anbe approximated using (3.12), for t = T .Fifth approximation. Next, we present the iteration step to nd the approxima-tions L̂t+s, for s = T − 1 down to s = 0, starting from the approximation L̂t+T . Weillustrate the iteration step for s = T to s = T − 1. Given our approximations andonditional upon Ft, the vetor (L̂t+T , L̃t+T−1, H ′T−1)′ is lognormal, with mean ve-tor and ovariane matrix that an easily be alulated using (3.37) and using thatthe vetor (L̃t+T−1, H ′T , H ′T−1)′ is a subvetor of the vetor (L̃′∆, H ′)′, whih (given





,so that by approximation and onditional upon Ft this vetor follows a lognor-mal distribution. Given this approximation, we an use lemma 3.A.2, with now
A = L̃t+T−1 + L̂t+T and G = HT−1, to obtain the approximation L̂t+T−1, just like(3.37) is obtained in the rst step. In addition, we an then alulate the approx-imation of SCRt+T−1, and the approximation of MVMt+T−1, using here also theapproximation of Et+T−1 [SCRt+T ] from the previous stage. Given the approxima-tion of SCRt+T−1, we an alulate the approximations of Et+s [SCRt+T−1] neededto alulate MVMt+s, for eah s ≤ T − 1. The iteration proedure an then berepeated to obtain the approximations L̂t+s, and approximations for SCRt+s and
MVMt+s, s ≤ T − 1. Finally, BELt+T−1 an be approximated using (3.12), for
t = T − 1.Auray Cost of Capital approah. In order to quantify the eet of the ap-proximations, ideally one should ompare the probability distribution of the original
Lt+s, s ≥ 1, as indued by the Lee-Carter based probability distribution Pt, withthe approximate distribution of L̂t+s, s ≥ 1. However, it would require too manysimulations from Pt to alulate the distribution of the original Lt+s, s ≥ 1, in a suf-iently aurate way. Instead, Table 3.A.4 displays the dierene in the disountedsum of the SCR-s multiplied with the ost of apital rate, i.e., the MVM , in thebest estimate senario, using the approximate distribution and using alternativesimulation-based approximations of Pt that are obtained in the following way:i) Given the median senario of the survival probabilities until time t+s (denotedby ωMEt+s ), we simulate N times the distribution of the survival probabilities attime t+ s+ 1 and the orresponding liability payments L̃t+s+1.ii) For eah of the simulated survival probabilities in step i), the market valueof the liabilities at time t+ s+ 1, L̂t+s+1|ωMEt+s , is approximated using the theversion of (3.37) appliable to period t+ s+ 1.iii) The time-(t + s) value Lt+s|ωMEt+s is obtained by means of (3.11), using
L̂t+s+1|ωMEt+s from ii) as approximation for Lt+s+1.
84 Chapter 3. Calulating Capital Requirementsiv) Finally, L̂t+s|ωMEt+s is obtained using the version of equation (3.37), appliableto time t + s.Table 3.A.4 displays the aggregated disounted sum of the dierenes between













3.A. Approximations for the Distribution of the Cash Flows 85Then we apply a Singular Value Deomposition (SVD) to Zg, the matrix withomponents Zg(x, τ) = log (µgx,τ) − agx the matrix of the logarithms of the ratesafter the averages over time of the log age-spei rates have been subtrated. TheSVD of Zg is given by
Zg = UgΣgV g, (3.40)













hene, bgx and kgτ are are obtained by he rst right and left vetors and leadingvalue of the SVD, after the normalization ∑ bgx = 1 and ∑ kgτ = 0, providing aunique solution. Figure 3.A.3 displays the parameter estimate of bx in the Lee-Carter model for the US, UK, and the Netherlands. The parameters of the randomwalk with drift, as given in equation (3.22), are estimated using OLS. Table 3.A.5displays the parameter estimates of random walk with drift in the Lee-Carter modelfor the US, UK, and the Netherlands.
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ulating Capital RequirementsFigure 3.A.3: Parameter bx in the Lee-Carter model



















age (x)The gure displays the estimate of bx in the Lee-Carter model for the US(solid urve), UK (dashed urve), and the Netherlands (dashed-dotted urve).The left panel is for males, the right panel is for females. The parameter isestimated using the mortality data from 1970 till 2006.
Table 3.A.5: Parameter estimates of the Lee-Carter modelparameter US M US F UK M UK F NL M NL F
cg -1.5875 -1.3652 -1.6429 -1.5975 -1.8741 -1.5525
σgc 0.2097 0.2320 0.2357 0.3568 0.3753 0.5344
σge 1.2583 1.3920 1.4141 2.1406 2.2520 3.2063
ρc 0.7991 0.7661 0.3448The table displays the estimates of the Lee-Carter model in the US, UK, andthe Netherlands. The parameters are estimated using the mortality data from1970 till 2006.
Chapter 4The eet of produt design
This hapter is based on Stevens, De Waegenaere and Melenberg (2010a).
4.1 IntrodutionLife expetany of both males and females has inreased substantially over the pastdeades. The inrease in life expetany imposes a burden on pension providers,sine it indues an inrease in the duration of pension payments. For example, overthe past three deades, the remaining life expetany of a male Duth retiree aged65 has inreased by on average one year per deade. More importantly, there isonsiderable unertainty regarding the future development of life expetany. Ex-isting literature shows that this unertainty, whih is referred to as longevity risk,potentially imposes signiant risk on pension funds and insurers. For example,Hári, De Waegenaere, Melenberg, and Nijman (2008b) show that the buer that isrequired to redue the probability of underfunding to an aeptable level inreasessigniantly when longevity risk is taken into aount. This unertainty is a majoronern to pension funds and regulators. At present, there is onsiderable interestin the development of longevity-linked nanial instruments suh as, for example,longevity bonds. Sine the payo of suh seurities is linked to the development ofsurvival rates, they ould be used to partially hedge longevity risk in pension and lifeinsurane portfolios. There is urrently a large body of literature that fousses onthe design and valuation of longevity-linked seurities (see, for example, Blake et al.2006, and referenes therein). However, until now, attempts to generate trade havenot been suessful. The fous in this hapter is on an alternative tool to manage87
88 Chapter 4. The eet of produt designlongevity risk in pension annuities, namely through produt design.Existing literature mainly fouses on the eet of longevity risk on single lifeannuities (see, e.g., Olivieri 2001, Olivieri and Pitao 2003, Cossette et al. 2007, andHári et al. 2008b). However, many dened benet pension funds oer both old-agepension insurane and partner pension insurane.1 The former onsists of a singlelife annuity for the life of the partiipant. The latter onsists of a survivor annuityfor the life of the partner, if the partner outlives the partiipant. The ombinationof a single life annuity and a survivor annuity is referred to as a joint and survivorannuity. Pension funds typially allow partiipants to hoose, at retirement date,between a single life annuity and a joint and survivor annuity. A ruial designaspet of suh plans is how pension rights are arued. Two alternatives exist. Ina JointLife plan, the partiipant builds up the right to reeive a joint and survivorannuity. At retirement date, the partiipant has the option to exhange this annuityfor a single life annuity with a higher annual payment. In a SingleLife plan, thepartiipant builds up the right to reeive a single life annuity. At retirement date,the partiipant has the option to exhange part of this annuity for a survivor annuity.In both types of plans, the onversion rate, i.e., the rate at whih the partiipantwill be able to exhange one type of annuity for the other type, has to be atuariallyneutral at the time of exhange. Atuarial neutrality requires that the expetedpresent value of the liabilities before exhange equals the expeted present value ofthe liabilities after exhange.Our goal in this hapter is to investigate the eet of longevity risk on theliabilities of these two types of pension plans, and how this eet depends on thedesign of the pension plan. In both types of pension plans, the sensitivity of theliabilities to longevity risk is driven by two eets. First, survivor annuities to someextent provide a natural hedge for single life annuities. Therefore, the sensitivity ofthe plan's liabilities to longevity risk is likely to depend strongly on produt mix,i.e., the ratio of survivor benets over single life benets. Beause the partiipants'hoies at retirement date aet produt mix, the exhange option aets the naturalhedge potential that arises from ombining single life and survivor annuities. Seond,for insureds who did not yet reah retirement age, the onversion rate is unertainbeause it depends on survival rates at the time of exhange. As a onsequene,the exhange option indues unertainty in the level of the payments, as well as1The Retirement Equity At of 1984 (REA) amended the Employee Retirement Inome SeurityAt of 1974 (ERISA) to introdue mandatory spousal rights in pension plans.
4.2. The model 89dependene between the level of payments and the duration of payments. We ndthat whereas produt mix eets are idential in both plans, dependene eets arefundamentally dierent. In ontrast to the SingleLife plan, in a JointLife plan ahigher than expeted duration of single life annuity payments is partly mitigated bya lower than expeted nominal level of the payment. Therefore, the JointLife planis signiantly less sensitive to longevity risk than the SingleLife plan.This hapter is organized as follows. In Setion 4.2, we formally dene thetwo types of pension plans, and introdue some basi onepts and notation. InSetion 4.3, we determine the atuarially neutral onversion rate for the exhangeof survivor annuity rights for additional single life annuity rights, or vie versa. InSetion 4.4, we show how onversion rate risk aets the nominal insured rightsfor the single life annuity and the survivor annuity, respetively, for both types ofpension plans. Setion 4.5 ombines the results of the previous two setions todetermine the liabilities in eah type of pension plan. Setion 4.6 investigates howthe sensitivity to longevity risk depends on the design of the plan. Setion 4.7onludes.4.2 The modelOur goal in this hapter is to investigate the eet of longevity risk on the liabilitiesof pension plans that oer both old-age pension protetion and partner pensionprotetion. In partiular, we investigate whether the adverse eets of longevity riskon portfolios of single life and survivor annuities an be mitigated through produtdesign. In Subsetion 4.2.1, we formally dene the pension plans. In Subsetion4.2.2, we introdue the model and tehniques that will be used to quantify longevityrisk.4.2.1 Pension plan denitionWe onsider two types of pension plans that, at retirement date, allow the partiipantto hoose between a single life annuity and a joint and survivor annuity. The twoplans dier with respet to the arual of annuity rights. Formally, the two plansare dened as follows:
• In a JointLife plan, the partiipant arues the right to reeive a joint andsurvivor annuity, onsisting of a deferred single life annuity with a yearly
90 Chapter 4. The eet of produt designnominal payment of 1, ombined with a deferred survivor annuity with a yearlynominal payment of w. At retirement date, the partiipant has the option toexhange, at an atuarially neutral rate, the survivor annuity for additionalsingle life annuity.
• In a SingleLife plan, the partiipant arues the right to reeive a single lifeannuity with a yearly nominal payment of 1. At retirement date, the parti-ipant has the option to exhange, at an atuarially neutral rate, part of thesingle life annuity for a survivor annuity. After exhange, the ratio of the nom-inal payment of the survivor annuity over the nominal payment of the singlelife annuity should be equal to w.For both types of pension plans, the liabilities onsist of a stream of payments infuture periods. Throughout this hapter, we onsider a xed and given year t, andquantify the unertainty in the payments in future years t+τ , for a partiipant withgiven harateristis. Beause in any future period, the level of the payment dependson whether the partiipant and/or the partner is alive, relevant harateristis arethose that aet the probability distribution of their remaining lifetimes. In additionto age, remaining lifetime also signiantly depends on gender and time. Indeed,women have higher life expetany than men, and past trends suggest that remaininglife expetany of future retirees might be substantially higher than the remaininglife expetany of urrent retirees. Therefore, we introdue the following notation:
• A partiipant is haraterized by a vetor ((x, g), p, (y, g′)), where x denoteshis (her) age, g ∈ {m, f} denotes the gender, p = 1 (p = 0) if the insured does(does not) have a partner, and, if p = 1, y denotes the age of the partner, and
g′ ∈ {m, f} denotes the gender of the partner;
• T (g)x,t denotes the remaining lifetime at time t of an individual with gender




for theindiator random variable that equals 1 if an individual (partiipant or partner)with gender g and age x at time t will survive at least τ more years, and zerootherwise.Then, the payments for a single life and a survivor annuity, respetively, aredened as follows (see, also, e.g., Gerber 1997):
4.2. The model 91i) A (deferred) single life annuity, whih yields a yearly payment of 1 in everyyear that the partiipant is alive and older than 65, i.e., the payment in period
t+ τ equals
L̃sl(x, g, τ, t) = 1(T (g)x,t >τ)
1(x+τ>65), for τ = 0, 1, . . . (4.1)ii) A (deferred) survivor annuity, whih yields a yearly payment of 1 in everyyear that the spouse outlives the partiipant, in ase the partiipant dies afterretirement age. The payment in period t + τ equals:
L̃surv(x, y, g, g








, for τ = 0, 1, . . . (4.2)In eah plan, the random payment at a future date to a given partiipant will beeither a single life annuity payment or a survivor annuity payment, but the nominalrights for eah type of annuity depend on:i) the onversion rate, i.e., the rate at whih the partiipant will be able to exhangeone type of annuity for the other type;ii) the type of pension plan;iii) the partiipant's hoie at retirement date between a single life annuity and ajoint and survivor annuity.In setion 4.3, we determine the atuarially neutral onversion rate for the ex-hange of survivor annuity rights for additional single life annuity rights, or vieversa. In Setion 4.4, we determine the nominal rights as a funtion of the partii-pant's hoie, for both types of pension plans.4.2.2 Quantifying longevity riskAs argued above, our fous in this hapter is on how the liabilities of pension plansthat oer both old-age insurane and partner pension insurane are aeted byunertainty in the remaining lifetimes of the partiipant and/or the partner, and onhow that eet depends on the design of the pension plan. We onsider a partiipantharaterized by ((x, g), p, (y, g′)) at date t. To avoid overloaded notation, we do notexpliitly denote age-, gender-, and time- dependene of the liabilities, and denote:
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• L̃sl(τ) and L̃surv(τ), for the normalized single life and survivor annuity paymentat date t+ τ , as dened in (4.1) and (4.2), respetively;






, (4.3)where r denotes the risk free interest rate. The (1− ǫ)% quantile of the distributionof L̃ is equal to the amount of money that, when invested at the risk free rate, isneeded to guarantee that the probability that in some future period there will beinsuient funds to over the liabilities is less than ǫ%.The present value of the future payments is aeted by two types of longevityrisk:
• non-systemati longevity risk, beause L̃(τ) depends on the remaining life-time of the partiipant and/or his partner, and, onditional on given survivalprobabilities, these remaining lifetimes are random variables;









, (4.4)2We assume that the probability that an insured reahes the age of 111 is negligibly small. Ourfous is on the relative importane of longevity risk in the two types of plans. We ignore interestrate risk.









































• p(g)x+s,t+s for s >= 0 denote the realized one-year survival probabilities ofthe ohort aged x in year t, as dened in (2.5);
• τp(g)x,t = p(g)x,t ·p(g)x+1,t+1 · · · · p
(g)
x+τ−1,t+τ−1 denotes the realized τ -years survivalprobability of the ohort aged x in year t.To determine L as a ombination of Lsl and Lsurv, we determine the rateat whih one type of annuity an be exhanged for the other (Setion 4.3),the nominal insured rights for the single life and the survivor annuity as afuntion of the partiipant's hoie (Setion 4.4), and the partiipant's hoieat retirement date (Setion 4.5).3Existing literature shows that there exists dependene between the remaining lifetimes of apartiipant and his (her) partner at miro-level, e.g., due to the fat that partners have similarlifestyles, or that the passing away of a partner aets the surviving relative's quality of life.Beause our fous in this hapter is on systemati longevity risk, we ignore this dependene andassume that the remaining lifetimes of the spouses, onditional on the survival probabilities, areindependent.
94 Chapter 4. The eet of produt design2. We use stohasti foreast models to foreast the probability distribution offuture survival probabilities p(g)x,s, for s ≥ t. We inlude proess risk, param-eter risk, and model risk. To inorporate model risk, we estimate the modelsdeveloped by Lee and Carter (1992), Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002a),and Cossette et al. (2007). To estimate the parameters in eah model, we useage-, gender-, and time-spei numbers of death and exposures to death forthe Netherlands, obtained from the Human Mortality Database.4 For a de-tailed desription of the models, the estimation tehniques, and the parameterestimates, we refer to Appendix 5.B.1.4.3 The onversion rateThe JointLife plan inludes the option to exhange survivor annuity rights for singlelife annuity rights. In ontrast, the SingleLife plan inludes the option to exhangesingle life annuity rights for survivor annuity rights. The liabilities of these pensionplans therefore depend on the rate at whih a single life annuity an be exhangedfor a survivor annuity, and vie versa.Pension laws typially presribe that the exhange of one type of liabilityfor another type of liability should be atuarially neutral. This implies that theonversion rate should be suh that the expeted present value of the liability pay-ments after exhange equals the expeted present value of the liability paymentsbefore exhange. While gender disrimination is typially not allowed by law (i.e.,the onversion rate annot depend on the gender of the insured and/or his (her)partner), pension laws vary in terms of how gender neutral liability values shouldbe determined.5 Some ountries allow the onversion rate to depend on the ageof the partner (suh as, for example, the United States); others prohibit suh agedisrimination (for example, the Netherlands).In this hapter we onsider a gender- and age-neutral onversion rate. Be-ause an insured aged x at date t has the option to exhange pension rights atretirement date, i.e., at date t = t + 65 − x, the onversion rate for that insuredwill depend on gender- and age-neutral liability values at date t. We let the gender-and age-neutral single life annuity, respetively survivor annuity, for a 65-year old4www.mortality.org5Dened benet plans in the US are tax favored only if gender neutral values are determinedon the basis of unisex life tables (see IRC setion 417(e)(3)).
4.3. The onversion rate 95insured at date t, be dened as the average of the liability for an insured with a threeyears younger partner, and an insured with a three years older partner, both withrespet to gender-neutral death probabilities. Speially, gender- and age-neutralliabilities are dened as:6
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Ft := {p(g)x,s | g ∈ {m, f}, x > 0, and s 6 t},denotes the set of one-year death probabilities for all ages, both genders, andall time periods until time t.ii) In a SingleLife plan, the partiipant an exhange some single life annuity rightsfor additional survivor annuity rights. Atuarially neutral exhange, at date t,6The age dierene is based on the average age dierene in married ouples (see, e.g. Brownand Poterba 2000). We have repliated our results with various alternative gender- and/or age-neutral onversion rates. In all ases, the qualitative results that we nd in this hapter remainvalid.
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t designof a nominal yearly single life annuity right of 1 yields nominal yearly survivorannuity rights of 1
e(t)











This gure displays seleted quantiles of the distribution of e(t + 65 − x), asa funtion of x: the median (bold line), the 25% and 75% quantile (dashedlines), and the 10% and 90% quantile (dotted lines).We observe the following:7The onversion rate an also be aeted by interest rate risk. Using a one-fator Vasiekmodel, we found that unertainty in the term struture of interest rates has a negligible eet onthe distribution of e(t). With a median trend in longevity, interest rate risk yields σ(e(t))/E[e(t)] <
0.4% for all ages between 25 and 64.
4.4. Longevity risk in nominal rights 97i) The probability distribution of the onversion rate shifts downwards for youngerohorts. This ours beause an inrease in life expetany of the partiipantimplies an inrease in the expeted value of the single life annuity, E [Lsl,n,t|Ft],but a derease in the expeted value of the survivor annuity, E [Lsurv,n,t|Ft].The latter ours beause the inrease in life expetany of the partiipantdelays survivor annuity payments, so that they are more heavily disounted.Although inreased life expetany of the partner an lead to a longer durationof survivor annuity payments, the former eet is dominant.ii) For young insureds, the unertainty in the onversion rate is substantial. Thisours beause exhange takes plae at date t = t+65−x, and the onversionrate depends on death probabilities at that time. For younger insureds, the ex-hange date t is further into the future, and therefore there is still onsiderableunertainty regarding the death probabilities at time t.Conversion rate unertainty has important onsequenes for both the partiipantand the pension provider. Depending on the type of plan and on the partiipant'shoie at retirement date, the level of the nominal payments for the single life annuityand/or for the survivor annuity will depend on the onversion rate, whih will onlybe realized at retirement date. Therefore, even though the longevity risk due tounertainty in the duration of the payments is fully borne by the pension fund, theexhange option indues longevity risk for the partiipant too. Unertainty in theonversion rate also aets the pension provider. First, it indues unertainty inthe produt mix after retirement, i.e., the ratio of survivor benets over single lifebenets. Seond, it indues dependene between the level of the payments and theduration of the payments. In the following setion, we rst investigate the eet ofonversion rate unertainty on the nominal insured rights.4.4 Longevity risk in nominal rightsThe previous setion shows that there is onsiderable unertainty regarding theonversion rate that will apply to insureds who are not yet retired. In this setion weshow how this unertainty aets the nominal insured rights for the single life annuityand the survivor annuity at retirement date. We onsider an insured haraterizedby ((x, g), p, (y, g′)) at time t. In ase the insured is still alive at retirement date,i.e., at date t = t+ 65− x, he will need to hoose between a single life annuity and
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t of produt designa joint and survivor annuity. Let
1surv ∈ {0, 1}, (4.9)be an indiator variable that, onditional on the insured being alive at time t =
t+65−x, equals 1 if he will hoose a joint and survivor annuity, and 0 otherwise. Inthis setion, we determine the nominal insured rights for a given hoie at retirementdate, i.e., we take 1surv as given. In Setion 4.5, we introdue a model for thepartiipant's hoie.First, onsider an insured in a JointLife plan. If the insured at time t = t+65−xwill prefer a joint and survivor annuity (1surv = 1), the nominal payment for thesingle life annuity equals Asl = 1, and the nominal payment for the survivor annuityequals Asurv = w. If the insured will prefer to hold a single life annuity (1surv = 0)(e.g., beause he no longer has a partner), he exhanges survivor annuity rightsfor single life annuity rights. Sine survivor annuity rights onsist of a nominalyearly payment of w, atuarially neutral exhange of these rights yields additionalsingle life annuity rights of w · e(t), where the onversion rate e(t) is as denedin (4.8). Therefore, the nominal yearly payment of the single life annuity equals
Asl = 1 + w · e(t), and there is no survivor annuity, so Asurv = 0. Thus,
(Asl, Asurv) = (1, w), if 1surv = 1,
= (1 + w · e(t), 0), if 1surv = 0. (4.10)Therefore, in ase of a JointLife plan, unertainty in the onversion rate e(t)aets the level of the nominal payments in ase the insured will prefer a singlelife annuity (1surv = 0). Compared to a urrent retiree, a younger insured in aJointLife plan who prefers a single life annuity will, with high probability, reeiveless additional single life annuity rights (w · e(t)) in exhange for survivor annuityrights (w). For example, when the ratio of insured rights for the survivor annuityover insured rights for the single life annuity equals w = 2/3, a urrent retiree wouldreeive an inrease of 13.64% in single life annuity rights in return for survivorannuity rights. The 95% ondene interval for a 25 year old is [9.46%, 12.79%].Next, onsider an insured in a SingleLife plan. If the insured hooses a single lifeannuity (1surv = 0), the nominal yearly payment for the single life annuity equals
Asl = 1, and there is no survivor annuity, so Asurv = 0. If the insured prefers a jointand survivor annuity (1surv = 1), he exhanges some single life annuity rights for




) of survivor annuity rights. Beause atuarially neutral exhange of anominal yearly single life annuity right of c(t) yields nominal yearly survivor annuityrights of 1
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) . (4.11)Therefore, for an insured in a SingleLife plan who hooses a joint and survivorannuity, the nominal yearly payment for the single life annuity equals Asl = 1 −
c(t) = 1
1+w·e(t)
, and the nominal yearly payment for the survivor annuity equals
Asurv = w · (1− c(t)) = w1+w·e(t) . Therefore,





), if 1surv = 1,





) and reeive more survivor annuity rights( w
1+w·e(t)
). There is substantial unertainty regarding the level of both the single lifeannuity and the survivor annuity rights. For example, when w = 2/3, a urrentretiree would have to give up 12.00% of single life annuity rights to reeive survivorannuity rights. The 95% ondene interval for a 25 year old is [8.64%, 11.34%].4.5 Plan liabilitiesIn this setion we use the results of the previous two setions to model the liabilitiesof a JointLife plan and of a SingleLife plan, respetively. Speially, we express
100 Chapter 4. The eet of produt designthe present value of payments (onditional on death probabilities) in eah pensionplan as a linear ombination of the present value of payments of a normalized singlelife annuity and survivor annuity, respetively.We rst determine the random payments in eah plan onditional on a givenhoie 1surv at retirement date, for partiipants with and without a partner.In ase of a JointLife plan, (4.10) implies that the payment at date t+ τ , is givenby:̃
L(τ)= 0, for τ < 65− x;
= (1 + w · e(t) · (1− 1surv)) · L̃sl(τ), for p = 0, τ > 65− x;
=
(
1 + w · e(t) · (1− 1surv)
)
· L̃sl(τ) + w1survL̃surv(τ), for p = 1, τ > 65− x,(4.13)where L̃sl(τ) and L̃surv(τ) denote the random payment of a normalized single lifeand survivor annuity, respetively, as dened in (4.1) and (4.2).In ase of a SingleLife plan, (4.12) implies that:
L̃(τ)= 0, for τ < 65− x;
=
(
1− 1surv · w·e(t)1+w·e(t)
)
· L̃sl(τ), for p = 0, τ > 65− x;
=
(
1− 1surv · w·e(t)1+w·e(t)
)




1(p=1) by 1(P (g)x,t =1), where P (g)x,t is an indiatorrandom variable that indiates whether the partiipants will have a partner (not neessarily theurrent one) at retirement date t = t+ 65− x.
4.5. Plan liabilities 101prefer a single life annuity, and so 1surv = 0. If the partner is alive at time
t = t+65−x, the hoie between a single life annuity and a joint and survivorannuity will depend on the ouple's preferene ordering. We let
1F := 1F ((x, g), (y, g
′), t) ∈ {0, 1}, (4.15)be an indiator variable that equals 1 if an insured with gender g aged 65 attime t with a partner with gender g′ aged 65 − (x − y), prefers a joint andsurvivor annuity, and zero otherwise. To avoid overloaded notation, but toemphasize that the hoie may depend on time beause death probabilitieshange over time, we denote 1F (t) for the preferene indiator. Then,
1surv = 1F (t) · 1(T (g′)y,t >65−x). (4.16)Note that 1surv is a random variable, beause it depends on 1(T (g′)y,t >65−x), andon 1F (t). The latter is likely to depend on death rates at time t = t+ 65− x.ii) For an insured aged x < 65 without a partner, the survivor annuity has novalue, and so he will prefer a single life annuity, i.e., 1surv = 0.iii) For a retiree (x > 65), 1surv is realized. Speially, 1surv = 1surv,ret, where
1surv,ret = 0 if the partiipant hose a single life annuity at date t = t+65−x <
t, and 1surv,ret = 1 if the partiipant hose a joint and survivor annuity.Combining hoie behavior as desribed above with payments onditional onhoie as given in (4.13) and (4.14) allows to write the present value of payments ina pension plan, L, as a ombination of the present value of payments of a single lifeand a survivor annuity, Lsl and Lsurv, as dened in (4.5) and (4.6). This yields thefollowing result.Proposition 4.5.1 Consider a partiipant haraterized by ((x, g), p, (y, g′)) at time
t, and let t = t+ 65− x denote the partiipant's retirement date. Then,
L = δ1 · Lsl + δ2 · Lsurv,with:i) For an insured aged x < 65 in a JointLife plan,
δ1 = 1 +
(




· w · e(t),
δ2 = 1F (t) · w · 1{p=1}; (4.17)
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t designand, in a SingleLife plan,




1 + w · e(t) · 1(p=1),
δ2 = 1F (t) ·
w
1 + w · e(t) · 1(p=1). (4.18)ii) For a retiree, δ1 is as in (4.17) and (4.18) with 1F (t) · 65−xp(g′)y,t replaed by
1pp,ret, and δ2 as in (4.17) and (4.18) with 1F (t) replaed by 1pp,ret.The proof an be found in Appendix 4.B. For an insured who already reahedretirement age at date t, i.e., x > 65, the nominal rights δ1 and δ2 are deterministi,beause both the onversion rate e(t), as well as the hoie indiator, 1pp,ret, wererealized at date t < t. In ontrast, the nominal insured rights for an insured who didnot yet reah retirement age are aeted by systemati longevity risk. They dependon the onversion rate at date t = t + 65 − x > t, whih is unknown at date t. Inaddition, for a partiipant with a partner, they depend on whether the partner isstill alive at date t (i.e., they depend on the survival probability 65−xp(g′)y,t ), and, ifso, on the ouple's preferene ordering, at date t, between a single life annuity anda joint and survivor annuity (i.e., on the hoie indiator 1F (t)). Both these fatorsdepend on death rates up to time t.4.6 Longevity riskIn this setion we use the results of the previous three setions to quantify theeet of longevity risk on the liabilities of a JointLife plan and of a SingleLife plan,respetively. Proposition 4.5.1 suggests that the two key fators that are likely toaet a plan's sensitivity to longevity risk are:i) The produt mix , i.e., the ratio of insured rights for the single life annuity overinsured rights for the survivor annuity.ii) Dependene between the nominal insured rights, after exhange, for the singlelife and the survivor annuity, δ1 and δ2, respetively, and the orrespondingduration of the payments, Lsl and Lsurv. This dependene ours beausenominal rights depend on the onversion rate e(t), and duration of paymentsdepends on the remaining lifetimes of the partiipant and/or his partner. Both
4.6. Longevity risk 103the onversion rate and the remaining lifetimes depend on unertain futuredeath rates.It an easily be veried that the eet of produt mix, i.e., δ2
δ1+δ2
, is idential in thetwo types of plans. This ours beause in both types of plans, the ratio of survivorannuity rights over single life annuity rights for a partiipant that hooses a jointand survivor annuity equals w. In ontrast, dependene eets are likely to dependstrongly on the type of pension plan, and, within eah plan, on the partiipant'shoie between a single life annuity and a joint and survivor annuity at retirementdate.In the following subsetions, we analyze these eets in detail. In Subsetion4.6.1, we analyze the eet of the partiipant's preferene between the two typesof annuities on longevity risk by omparing settings in whih the partiipant willprefer a single life annuity to settings in whih the partiipant will prefer a joint andsurvivor annuity. In Subsetion 4.6.2, we quantify longevity risk taking into aountthat the partiipant's hoie may depend on future survival probabilities. In allnumerial illustrations, partners are assumed to be of dierent gender, i.e., g = mimplies g′ = f , and vie versa; the partner of a male insured is three years younger(y = x − 3), and the partner of a female insured is three years older (y = x + 3).The interest rate is set to 4%, i.e., r = 0.04.4.6.1 Eet of hoie at retirement dateIn this setion we investigate how the eet of systemati longevity risk in the twotypes of plans depends on the partiipant's hoie at retirement date. Beause apartiipant without a partner will always hoose a single life annuity, it is suientto distinguish two types of partiipants: First, partiipants who will hoose a singlelife annuity at retirement date, i.e., partiipants without a partner (p = 0), orpartiipants with a partner who prefer to waive survivor annuity rights (p = 1 and
1F (t) = 0); seond, partiipants with a partner who prefer a joint and survivorannuity in ase both are alive at retirement date (p = 1 and 1F (t) = 1).Figure 4.6.1 displays σ(L)/E[L] as a funtion of the age of the partiipant, forthe two pension plans, and for two types of insureds: an insured who will hoosea single life annuity at retirement date, and a ouple that will hoose a joint andsurvivor annuity in ase they are both alive. The left panel is for males and theright panel for females.





































This gure displays σ(L)/E[L] as a funtion of age x, for p = 0, or p = 1 and
1F (t) = 0 (bold and solid lines), and p = 1 and 1F (t) = 1 (dashed and dottedlines), for a partiipant in a JointLife plan (solid and dotted lines) and for apartiipant in a SingleLife plan (bold and dashed lines). Left panel: males;right panel: females. In eah ase, w = 2/3.We see that in both types of plans longevity risk is substantially lower for apartiipant who prefers a joint and survivor annuity than for a partiipant whoprefers a single life annuity. Moreover, for both hoies, longevity risk is substantiallylower in a JointLife plan than in a SingleLife plan. This is summarized in thefollowing graph. Importane of longevity riskjoint annuity joint annuity single life annuity single life annuityin ≺ in ≺ in ≺ inJointLife plan SingleLife plan JointLife plan SingleLife planBelow, we disuss these two results in detail.The eet of the partiipant's hoie (1F (t))
4.6. Longevity risk 105For every age x, for both genders, and for both types of pension plans, longevityrisk risk is higher for a partiipant who will hoose a single life annuity at retirementdate (i.e., p = 0 or p = 1 and 1F (t) = 0).These results are driven by the fat that, for all ages and for both genders,single life and survivor annuity payments are negatively orrelated. This oursbeause a higher than expeted inrease in life expetany of the partiipant impliesa higher than expeted value of the single life annuity, but a lower than expetedvalue of the survivor annuity. The latter is due to the fat that the inrease in lifeexpetany of the partiipant delays survivor annuity payments, so that they aremore heavily disounted. Although inreased life expetany of the partner an leadto a longer duration of survivor annuity payments, this eet is dominated by theost reduing eet of the delay in onset of the payments. For male insureds, theorrelation between Lsl and Lsurv dereases from −0.6 at age 65 to −0.7 at age 25.For female insureds, it dereases from −0.8 at age 65 to −0.87 at age 25. Note thatthe dierenes between the two types of insureds are larger for men than for women.This ours beause the hedge potential of survivor annuity rights is larger for malesthan for females.The eet of the type of pension planFor every age x, for both genders, and for the two hoies, longevity risk is higherin the SingleLife plan than in the JointLife plan.This result is driven by the fat that the exhange option indues dependenebetween the level of payments for the single life and the survivor annuity (δ1 and
δ2), and the orresponding duration of payments (Lsl and Lsurv). Depending on thetype of plan and the partiipant's hoie, δ1 and δ2 depend on the onversion rate
e(t). For almost all ages x < 65, and for both genders, the orrelation between e(t)and Lsl is negative, i.e., ρ(e(t), Lsl) < 0, and the orrelation between e(t) and Lsurvis positive, i.e., ρ(e(t), Lsurv) > 0.9 Combined with Proposition 4.5.1, this yields thefollowing results for the orrelation between the level of payments and the duration9Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A displays the orrelation between e(t) and Lsl as well as theorrelation between e(t) and Lsurv for both males and for females, and provides the orrespondingintuition.
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t designof payments in the two plans. JointLife SingleLife
ρ(δ1, Lsl) ρ(δ2, Lsurv) ρ(δ1, Lsl) ρ(δ2, Lsurv)
p = 0 − 0 0 0
p = 1, 1F (t) = 0 − 0 0 0
p = 1, 1F (t) = 1 − 0 + −In ase of a JointLife plan, the orrelation between δ1 and Lsl is negative in allthree ases, whih implies that a higher than expeted inrease in the duration ofsingle life annuity payments (due to higher than expeted redution in mortalityrates) is partly mitigated by a higher than expeted redution in the level of theannuity payment, δ1. This hedge eet is not present in ase of a SingleLife plan.There, levels and durations are unorrelated, exept for the oupled partiipantwho prefers a joint and survivor annuity. For this partiipant, the eet of higherthan expeted duration of single life annuity payments is ombined with higher thanexpeted nominal payments. Although higher than expeted duration of survivorannuity payments is partly mitigated by lower than expeted nominal payments,the former eet is dominant.4.6.2 Eet of longevity risk in hoie at retirement dateThe previous subsetion shows that the eet of systemati longevity risk on eahplan's liabilities depends strongly on the partiipant's hoie at retirement date.However, the hoie itself an also be aeted by longevity risk, beause it is likelyto depend on death rates at the time the hoie is made. In this subsetion, weonsider a partiipant with a partner haraterized by ((x, g), 1, (y, g′)) at date t, andwe model the probability distribution of the random variable 1F (t) that indiateswhether the ouple, in ase they are both alive at time t = t + 65− x, will prefer ajoint and survivor annuity (1F (t) = 1), or a single life annuity (1F (t) = 0).Changes in death probabilities an have two ountervailing eets on the preferredhoie:i) We know from Setion 4.3 that the probability distribution of the onversion rateshifts downward over time. For any given death probabilities, a derease inthe onversion rate, eteris paribus, makes a single life annuity less attrativein both plans. In a JointLife plan, a lower onversion rate implies that lesssingle life annuity rights are reeived in return for survivor annuity rights of
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w. In a SingleLife plan, it implies that less single life annuity rights need tobe exhanged in return for survivor annuity rights.ii) For any given onversion rate, a derease in death probabilities of the partiipant,eteris paribus, an redue the attrativeness of a joint and survivor annuitybeause it indues a delay in the onset of survivor annuity payments.In this setion we set up a simple household utility model to quantify the aggre-gate eet. We onsider a setting where a ouple reeives soial seurity inome of
a in ase they are both alive, and of a′ in ase either the insured or the partner isdeeased. In addition, depending on the type of plan, the partiipant has aruedthe right to reeive a joint and survivor annuity (in a JointLife plan), or a single lifeannuity (in a SingleLife plan).10 Let C denote the partiipant's arued rights forthe single life annuity in a JointLife plan. Then, the arued rights for the survivorannuity equal w ·C. To guarantee atuarial equivalene of the arued rights in bothplans, we let the arued rights for a single life annuity in a SingleLife plan equal(
1 + w · E[e(t)]
)
· C.At retirement date (i.e., at time t = t + 65 − x), the ouple an, in both plans,hoose between a single life and a joint and survivor annuity, i.e., they an exhangesingle life annuity rights for survivor annuity rights, or vie versa. We denote 1f ∈
{0, 1} for a given hoie, where 1f = 0 if the ouple hooses a single life annuity, and
1f = 1 if they hoose a joint and survivor annuity. We denote 1F (t) for the ouple'soptimal hoie.In order to determine the ouple's optimal hoie, we rst determine how theouple's inome in future periods depends on their hoie. Let I(τ |1f) denote thehousehold inome (from soial seurity and pension plan) in period t+τ , for a givenhoie 1f ∈ {0, 1}. Beause at time t, the partiipant is 65 years old, and the partner10To avoid overloaded notation, we fous on the ase where one partner has arued pensionrights in a pension plan, and the other has not. The model an easily be extended to allow for thease where both partners have arued pension rights.
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t designis 65 + y − x years old, it follows from (4.10) and (4.12) that:11
I(τ |1f) = C̃ ·
[
1 + (1− 1f ) · w · e(t)
]











= C̃ · 1f · w + a′, if 1T (g)
65,t
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1 + (1− 1f ) · w · e(t)
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= 0,(4.19)where C̃ = C in ase of a JointLife plan, and C̃ = C · 1+w·E[e(t)]
1+w·e(t)
in ase of a SingleLifeplan.It now remains to speify the ouple's utility funtion. We assume an intertempo-rally separable, expeted lifetime utility funtion with equal weights for both part-ners, where the utility derived from household inome level x depends on whetherboth partners are alive, or only one partner is alive. Speially,
u(x) = uc(x) = 2 · 11−β ·
(
(1 + λ) · x
2
)1−β
, if both are alive, and β 6= 1;
= 2 · ln
(
(1 + λ) · x
2




· x1−β , if only one is alive, and β 6= 1;
= ln (x) , if only one is alive, and β = 1,where β denotes the risk aversion oeient of the household, and λ denotes theomplementarity parameter (see, e.g., Brown and Poterba 2000). Then, onditionalon given death probabilities, the ouple's lifetime expeted utility from a given hoie












C̃ · [1 + (1− 1f) · w · e] + a
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C̃ · 1f · w + a′
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, (4.20)where ρ denotes the time preferene parameter. Now, given death probabilities attime t, the household will hoose 1f ∈ {0, 1} suh as to maximize the expeted11Conditional on both being alive at time t, it follows from (4.9) that 1surv = 1f .
4.6. Longevity risk 109utility, i.e., they solve:
1F (t) = arg max
1f∈{0,1}
E [U(1f) | Ft] . (4.21)To investigate the eet of longevity risk on the ouple's optimal hoie, we simulated15.000 senarios for future death probabilities, and determined 1F (t) in eah senariofor all ages, both genders, both types of plans, for ρ = r = 0.04, a = 1365, a′ = 997,and various ombinations of the parameters C, β, and λ.12 We found that:i) Male expeted utility maximizers almost surely hoose for a joint and survivorannuity. This an be understood as follows. In both plans, a risk neutralmale insured (i.e., β = λ = 0) will prefer a joint and survivor annuity atdate t if, in expetation, it yields a higher present value of payos, i.e., if













. (4.22)Now, the fat that with high probability, males will have higher death ratesthan females implies that the gender spei single life annuity value E[Lsl|Ft]almost surely is stritly lower than the gender-neutral value E[Lsl,n,t|Ft]. Forthe same reason, E[Lsurv|Ft] is almost surely stritly higher than the gender-neutral value E[Lsurv,n,t|Ft]. Thus, (4.22) is almost surely satised. The atu-arial unfairness at individual level of the gender- and age-neutral onversionrate makes a joint and survivor annuity partiularly attrative to a risk neu-tral male. Risk aversion (i.e., β > 0) even inreases the attrativeness of ajoint and survivor annuity, beause it yields a smoother onsumption patternompared to a single life annuity. Although a higher value of λ or a lowervalue of C inreases the attrativeness of a single life annuity, we nd that forreasonable values of λ and C, the eet of the (unfairness of the) gender- andage-neutral onversion rate is dominant.ii) For the same reasons as desribed above, female risk neutral insureds wouldalmost surely prefer a single life annuity. In ontrast to males, however, theirpreferred hoie does vary nontrivially with the degree of risk aversion. Forsuiently low values of β, women will almost surely hoose for a single life12The values of a and a′ are based on the monthly Duth soial seurity benets for ouples andsingles.


















,where ξ and ξ′ denote the pessimism fator of the partiipant and the partner, re-spetively. A value of ξ (ξ′) higher than 1 indiates that the partiipant (partner)underestimates his survival probability. To investigate the eet of subjetive sur-vival probabilities on a ouple's hoie at retirement date, we onsider risk neutralpartiipants, i.e., β = λ = 0, who use subjetive survival probabilities. We assumethat ξ and ξ′ are independent LogNormal random variables, and, based on Salm(2006), we let E[ξ] = E[ξ′] = 1.041, σ[ξ] = σ[ξ′] = 1.029. We then nd that, forurrent as well as future retirees, approximately 72% of males and 24% of femaleshoose a joint and survivor annuity.We onlude by investigating whether and how hoie behavior aets longevityrisk in the two plans. In Figure 4.6.2, we display σ(L)/E[L] as a funtion of the
4.6. Longevity risk 111age of the partiipant, for male and female partiipants with a partner, for the twopension plans, and with 1F (t) determined by (4.21) for the two types of behavior:risk averse expeted utility maximizers with C = 1000, a = 1365, a′ = 997, λ = 0.5,





































This gure displays σ(L)/E[L] as a funtion of age, for risk averse expetedutility maximizers with C = 1000, a = 1365, a′ = 997, λ = 0.5, P (β = i) = 0.2,for i = 1, 2, . . . , 5, and ρ = 0.04 (dashed and dotted lines), and risk neutralsubjetive deision makers with ρ = 0.04 (solid and bold lines), in a JointLifeplan (solid and dotted lines) and in a SingleLife plan (bold and dashed lines).Left panel: males, right panel: females.As disussed in Subsetion 4.6.1, the dierene in longevity risk between the twoplans is strongly driven by orrelation between the nominal insured rights δ1 and
δ2, and the orresponding duration of payments, Lsl and Lsurv. The fat that thehoie variable 1F (t) depends on survival rates aets these orrelations. Comparedto the ase where 1F (t) is independent of future death rates, the orrelations betweennominal rights and durations weakly inrease, and, therefore, longevity risk weakly
112 Chapter 4. The eet of produt designinreases. However, beause the orrelations are less positive (more negative) in aJointLife plan than in a SingleLife plan, it is still the ase that the JointLife planis signiantly less aeted by longevity risk than the SingleLife plan.4.7 Conlusions and further researhThis hapter investigates the eet of longevity risk on pension plans that, at re-tirement date, allow the partiipant to hoose between a single life annuity and ajoint and survivor annuity. We show that these plans are aeted by longevity riskin two ways. First, the partiipant's hoie at retirement date aets the ratio ofsurvivor benets over single life benets, and, thus, aets the hedge potential thatarises form ombining these benets. Seond, for insureds who are not yet retired,the onversion rate is a random variable that depends on future realizations of deathrates. We show that onversion rate unertainty signiantly aets both the parti-ipant and the pension fund. For the partiipant, depending on his preferenes andthe type of pension plan, it indues unertainty in the level of the single life annuityrights and/or survivor annuity rights. For the pension fund, it indues dependenebetween the level of the payments and the duration of the payments. We nd that apension plan where partiipants arue both single life and survivor annuity rights,and are allowed to exhange their survivor annuity rights for additional single lifeannuity rights, is signiantly less aeted by longevity risk than the alternativeplan where partiipants arue only single life annuity rights, and an exhange partof those rights for survivor annuity rights.Let us nally indiate some interesting diretions for future researh. First,we have ignored interest rate risk. Even in the presene of interest rate risk, weexpet the orrelation between the level and the duration of payments for single lifeand survivor annuities, respetively, to be less positive (more negative) in a JointLifeplan than in a SingleLife plan. Therefore, we do not expet that interest rate risk willaet the relative importane of longevity risk in the two plans. However, it ould beinteresting to quantify the relative importane of longevity risk and interest rate riskin eah plan. Seond, we have used a relatively simple model for a ouple's hoiebetween the two types of annuities at retirement date, e.g., ignoring optimal savingsbehavior and (adverse) seletion issues. Seletion eets due to, e.g., heterogeneityin survival rates may aet the plan's sensitivity to longevity risk. If the two types ofplans oexist and individuals an hoose the type of plan they enter, suh seletion
4.A. Figure 4.A.1 113eets ould aet the relative importane of longevity risk in the two types of plans.4.A Figure 4.A.1Remember that e (t) = E [Lsurv,n,t|Ft]/E[Lsl,n,t|Ft]. Now, ρ(e(t), Lsl) < 0 and























This gure displays ρ(e(t), Lsl) as a funtion of x (dashed lines) for males(lower graph) and for females (upper graph), and ρ(e(t), Lsurv) as a funtionof x (dotted lines) for males (upper graph) and for females (lower graph).
114 Chapter 4. The eet of produt design4.B Proof of Proposition 4.5.1i) Consider an insured aged x < 65 with a partner (p = 1). Then, in ase of aJointLife plan, it follows from (4.13) that
L̃(τ) = 0, for τ < 65− x;
=
(






· L̃sl(τ) + w · 1surv · L̃surv(τ) for τ > 65− x.(4.23)Take any τ > 65−x. Then, given (4.16), and sine, onditional on F∞, the randomvariables T (g)x,t , T (g′)y,t , 1F (t) , and e (t) are independent, and sine E[e (t) |F∞] = e (t),and E[1F (t) |F∞] = 1F (t), it follows that:
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· E[L̃surv(τ)|F∞]. (4.24)Thus, for all τ > 65− x, (4.23) implies
E[L̃(τ)|F∞] =
(























































.Now, (4.17) follows immediately from (4.5) and (4.6).
4.C. Foreasting future mortality 115The proof for the SingleLife plan is similar.ii) Follows immediately from (4.4), (4.13), and (4.14), and the fat that 1surv = 0,and E[e (t) |F∞] = e (t) .iii) Follows immediately from (4.4), (4.13), and (4.14), and the fat that 1surv =



























x,t , (4.26)where k(g)t is an index of the level of mortality, a(g)x is an age-spei onstant de-sribing the general pattern of mortality by age, b(g)x is an age-spei onstantdesribing the relative speed of the hange in mortality by age, and where ǫ(g)x,t repre-sents the measurement error, assumed to satisfy ǫ(g)x,t | Kt ∼ N (0, σ2x,g), onditionalon Kt = {k(g)τ | g ∈ {m, f}, τ = t, t− 1, ...}. Moreover, we assume that the ǫ(g)x,t areindependent for dierent x and g, onditional on Kt.





























.The parameter ρ aptures the orrelation between kmt and kft over time.In ase of the model by Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002a), the age andgender spei numbers of deaths are modeled by a Poisson proess,
D
(g)
x,t | K̃t ∼ Poisson(E(g)x,t ea(g)x +b(g)x k(g)t ) , (4.29)with K̃t = Kt⋃{E(g)x,τ | g ∈ {m, f}, all x, τ = t, t− 1, ...} We assume that the D(g)x,tare independent for dierent x and g, onditional on K̃t. The proess for (k(m)t , k(f)t )is modeled as in ase of the Lee and Carter (1992)-model, i.e., via equations (5.29)(5.30).As third model, we onsider Cossette et al. (2007). These authors model the agespei numbers of deaths D(g)x,t via the Binomial Gumbel proess,
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3+j(x− xj)3+, (4.34)where (x − xj)3+ = (x − xj)3, in ase x − xj > 0, and zero otherwise. As internalknots we use x1 = 9.5, x2 = 20.5, x3 = 50.5, x4 = 60.5, and xr = x5 = 80.5. Theubi B-splines are tted to the (model spei) estimated b̂(g)x using the method ofleast squares.The model-spei parameters are estimated imposing the required normaliza-tions and using the estimation tehniques as desribed in the orresponding papers.For the Lee and Carter (1992)-model we rst estimate the parameters a(g)x , b(g)x ,and k(g)t using a singular value deomposition (SVD). Seondly, for all t 6 T and
g ∈ {m, f}, we re-estimate k(g)t suh that the estimated number of deaths usingthe estimates of a(g)x and b(g)x in equation (1) (with ǫ(g)x,t = 0) equals the observednumber of deaths. These re-estimated k(g)t , t 6 T , are used to estimate the pro-ess for (k(m)t , k(f)t ) using equations (5.29)(5.30). For the Brouhns, Denuit, andVermunt (2002a)-model and the Cossette et al. (2007)-model we use the iterativeproedure proposed by Goodman (1979) to obtain the Maximum Likelihood esti-mates, where the riterium to stop the proedure is a very small (i.e., 10−10) inreaseof the log-likelihood.Age, gender, and time spei numbers of death and exposed to death are ob-tained from the Human Mortality Database.13 In our ase x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 99, 100+},13See www.mortality.org.
118 Chapter 4. The eet of produt designwith 100+ the age group of people aged 100 years or more. We use the time period19772004, so that T = 2004. This time period minimizes the statisti proposedby Booth et al. (2002b) to test the hypothesis that the age omponents (b(g)x ) areinvariant over time. We use this seletion, sine mortality experiene in the indus-trialized world seems to suggest a substantial age-time interation in the twentiethentury.The parameter estimates relevant for the quantiation of the systematilongevity risk are plotted in Figure 5.B.1 (the b̂(g)x ) and presented in Table I (theparameter estimates of equations (5.29)(5.30)).Table 4.C.1: Estimation resultsModel g c(g) θ(g) σg ρLee-Carter m −1.6923 −0.4196 1.0628 0.4545
f −1.2902 −0.6056 1.3475Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt m −1.60771 −0.3386 0.7318 0.5873
f −1.2572 −0.5286 0.9491Cossette et al. m −1.6063 −0.3449 0.7270 0.5944
f −1.2535 −0.5273 0.9321Parameter estimates of equations (5.29)(5.30)). Lee-Carter: Lee and Carter(1992)-model; Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt: Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt(2002a)-model; Cossette et al.: Cossette et al. (2007)-model.The estimation results for the dierent models are quite omparable, with the esti-mation results of the Lee and Carter (1992) model slightly deviating from the othertwo models. At younger ages males and females are more sensitive to hanges in thetime trend, while also males around 60 and females around 77 show an inreasedsensitivity, see Figure 5.B.1. In terms of the k(g)t -proesses, we nd that the maledrift term is more negative than the female drift term, but in ase of females therst order moving average term is more negative. The risk in the female proess(given by ρ̂2σ̂2m + σ̂2f ) is also substantial higher than in ase of the males (given by
σ̂2m). Finally, there is a substantial orrelation between the male and female proess.We inlude three soures of systemati longevity risk: proess risk, parameterrisk, and model risk. First, using (4.31) and (4.32), given a spei model and giventhe orresponding model spei estimates, there is proess risk due to fat thatfuture values of k̂(g)T+s are risky, see equation (4.33). Next, given a spei model, the
4.C. Foreasting future mortality 119Figure 4.C.1: Estimated b(g)x after smoothing using ubi B-splines





































| x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 99, 100+}, g ∈ {m, f}, t ∈ {1977, . . . , T = 2004}
}
,the following steps are taken.1) For eah of the three models, the parameters â(g)x , b̂(g)x , and k̂(g)t are estimated
120 Chapter 4. The eet of produt designand the orresponding residuals r(g)x,t are omputed.14 Let Rt be the matrixwith omponents r(g)x,t , for g ∈ {m, f}, x ∈ {0, ..., 100+}.2) Next, for eah model, we generate B = 5000 repliations Rt(b), b = 1, ..., B, ofthe residual matrix Rt, by sampling with replaement.15 Using these residualmatries, the orresponding (model spei) bootstrapped numbers of death
D
(g)
x,t(b), b = 1, ..., B, are determined.163) Given the bootstrapped numbers of death D(g)x,t(b), we ompute the (modelspei) bootstrap estimates â(g)x (b), b̂(g)x (b) k̂(g)t (b), b = 1, ..., B, using thedesribed estimation tehniques.4) Given the bootstrap estimates â(g)x (b), b̂(g)x (b), k̂(g)t (b), we generate k̂mT+s(b) and
k̂fT+s(b), using the model spei version of (4.33), for s = 1, ..., 85 and b =
1, ..., B. This allows us to alulate the orresponding p(g)x,T+s(b) via (4.31) and(4.32), resulting in Ft(b) for appropriate t.5) Finally, for some quantity of interest F = F (Ft), we alulate the (modelspei) bootstrap values F (b) ≡ F (Ft(b)), for b = 1, ..., B, for eah of thethree models. On the basis of the distribution of all bootstrap values of F (b),merged over the three models, we are able to quantify the systemati longevityrisk.
14In ase of the Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002a)- and the Cossette et al. (2007)-model,we alulated the deviane residuals.15This orresponds to the residual bootstrap perentile interval-method of Efron and Tibshirani(1998). See also Koissi, Shapiro, and Högnäs (2006).16In ase of deviane residuals, this requires the use of the inverse relationship between numbersof death and deviane residuals.
Chapter 5Hedge eets in a portfolio of lifeinsurane produts with investmentrisk This hapter is based on Stevens, De Waegenaere and Melenberg (2010b).
5.1 IntrodutionOur goal in this hapter is to quantify longevity risk in portfolios of life insuraneproduts, taking into aount the potential eet of investment risk on the impatof longevity risk. Speially, our fous is on potential interations between liabilitymix eets and asset mix eets.Existing literature suggests that unertainty regarding the future develop-ment of human life expetany potentially imposes signiant risk on pension fundsand insurers (see, for example, Olivieri and Pitao, 2001; Brouhns, Denuit, and Ver-munt, 2002; Cossette, Delwarde, Denuit, Guillot, and Mareau, 2007; Dowd, Cairns,and Blake, 2006; Hári, De Waegenaere, Melenberg, and Nijman, 2008). Existing lit-erature also shows that the natural hedge potential that arises from ombining lifeannuities and death benets may be substantial (see, for example, Cox and Lin,2007; Wang, Huang, Yang, and Tsai, 2010; Tsai, Wang, and Tzeng, 2010). Theseanalyses quantify longevity risk in annuity portfolios by determining its eet onthe probability distribution of the present value of all future payments, for a given,deterministi, and onstant term struture of interest rates. A drawbak of thisapproah is that it does not allow to take into aount the possible interation be-121
122 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment risktween longevity risk and nanial risk, i.e., it is a liability-only approah. Hári etal. (2008) quantify longevity risk in portfolios of single life annuities in the pres-ene of nanial risk by determining its eet on the volatility of the funding ratio.The funding ratio is dened as the ratio of the value of the assets over the valueof the liabilities. They nd that nanial risk an signiantly aet the impat oflongevity risk on funding ratio volatility. However, a drawbak of a funding ratioapproah is that it requires speifying the probability distribution of the value ofthe liabilities at a future date. Determining the value of longevity-linked liabilitiesis still a ontentious issue. Although in reent years there has been onsiderableinterest in developing priing models for longevity-linked assets and liabilities (see,for example, Blake and Burrows, 2001; Dahl, 2004; Lin and Cox, 2005; Denuit, De-volder, Goderniaux, 2007; Bauer, Boerger, and Russ, 2010), the lak of liquidity fortrade in longevity-linked assets and/or liabilities makes it very diult to alibratethese models. As long as this remains the ase, it is unlear to what extent a fundingratio approah aurately reets the eet of longevity risk.Our goal in this hapter is threefold. First, we quantify the impat oflongevity risk in portfolios of life insurane produts, taking into aount poten-tial interations between nanial risk and longevity risk. To avoid making anyassumptions regarding the value at whih longevity-linked liabilities an be sold, wequantify risk by means of the probability of ruin in a run-o approah. Speially,for any given investment strategy, we determine the minimal required buer (i.e.,the asset value in exess of the best estimate value of the liabilities), suh that theprobability that the insurer or pension fund will be able to pay all future liabilitiesis suiently high (see, for example, Olivieri and Pitao, 2003). The size of thebuer will be aeted by longevity risk, whih arises due to unertain deviations inthe future liability payments from their urrent best estimates, and by nanial risk,whih arises due to unertainty in future returns on assets. Part of the nanial riskarises due to unertain returns on the assets needed to over unexpeted deviations ofthe liabilities from their expeted values, and, therefore, annot be fully hedged. Wend that the eet of this unhedgeable nanial risk on the required solveny buerdepends signiantly on the type of liability. This suggests important interationsbetween nanial risk and longevity risk.Seond, we quantify the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk on the naturalhedge potential, i.e., the risk redution, that arises from ombining liabilities withdierent sensitivities to longevity risk. Whereas nanial risk is typially hedgeable
5.1. Introdution 123for a deterministi stream of liabilities, the unhedgeable nanial risk arises fromthe unertainty in the stream of future payments. Life insurers and pension fundsoften hold several types of longevity-linked liabilities, suh as single life annuities,last survivor annuities, and death benet insurane.1 Beause the payments of thesedierent life insurane produts typially have dierent sensitivities to hanges inmortality rates, insurers with a diversied portfolio of liabilities may be less sen-sitive to longevity risk.2 The existing literature on suh liability mix eets fouseson the natural hedge potential, i.e., risk redution, of death benets in portfolios oflife annuities, and uses a liability-only approah to quantify the risk redution.3 Wequantify the eet of investment risk on the natural hedge potential from ombininglife insurane produts with dierent sensitivities to longevity risk. We nd, forexample, that ignoring unhedgeable investment risk may lead to signiant overesti-mation of the hedge potential from death benets in portfolios of single life annuities.The extent to whih the hedge potential is overestimated depends nontrivially onthe liability mix.Third, we quantify the eet of potential interations between liability mixeets and asset mix eets on the risk redution from investing in survivor swaps.Beause the payments of survivor swaps are based on atual survival of a referenepopulation, they may be used to partially hedge longevity risk. Existing literatureshows that the hedge potential an be aeted by basis risk, i.e., residual risk due todierenes in harateristis of the insured population and the referene population(see, for example, Dowd, Cairns, and Blake, 2006). In this hapter we show that, inaddition to basis risk, the hedge potential of survivor swaps also depends nontriviallyon both the asset mix and the liability mix. Depending on the liability mix, thehedge potential of survivor swaps may either inrease or derease when investmentrisk is higher.The hapter is organized as follows. In Setion 5.2 we dene the life insurane1Many dened benet pension funds oer both old-age pension insurane and partner pensioninsurane. The latter onsists of a survivor annuity that yields periodi payments if the partnerof the insured person is alive and the insured person has passed away. The Retirement EquityAt of 1984 (REA) amended the Employee Retirement Inome Seurity At of 1974 (ERISA) tointrodue mandatory spousal rights in pension plans.2Cox and Lin (2007) show empirially that a life insurer who has 95% of its business in annuitiesand 5% in death benets pries its annuities on average 3% higher than an insurer who has 50%of its business in annuities and 50% of its business in death benets. This indiates that insurerswith death benet liabilities have a ompetitive advantage.3Wang et al. (2010) and Tsai et al. (2010) quantify the natural hedge potential of death benetsin portfolios of life annuities, and determine the optimal liability mix.
124 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskliabilities that we onsider, and disuss how they are aeted by longevity risk.Setion 5.3 gives a formal denition of the risk measure. Setion 5.4 shows howinvestment risk aets the impat of longevity risk in single life annuities, survivorannuities, and death benets, respetively. In Setion 5.5, we quantify the eet ofthe interation between liability mix eets and asset mix eets. Setion 5.6 dealswith the eet of liability and asset mix on the hedge potential of survivor swaps.Setion 5.7 onludes.5.2 Life insurane liabilities and longevity riskIn this setion we introdue the life insurane liabilities that we onsider, and disusshow they are aeted by systemati and non-systemati longevity risk.In addition to traditional old-age pensions, whih take the form of a single lifeannuity, pension funds and insurers typially also oer other types of life insuraneproduts, suh as partner pensions and death benets. A partner pension onsists ofa survivor annuity. It provides the partner of a deeased partiipant with a life longannuity payment. The death benet onsists of a single payment at the moment theinsured person dies. Formally, we onsider the following three types of liabilities:(i) A single life annuity, whih yields a nominal yearly payment of 1, with a lastpayment in the year the insured person dies;(ii) A survivor annuity, whih yields a nominal yearly payment of 1 in every yearthat the spouse outlives the insured person;(iii) A death benet, whih yields a nominal single payment of 1 in the year thatthe partiipant dies.We let P = {sl, surv, db} denote the set of life insurane produts, and we denotea produt by p ∈ P, where p = sl refers to a singe life annuity, p = surv refers toa survivor annuity, and p = db refers to a death benet. These liabilities onsist of(a stream of) payments in future periods. Beause in any future period, the level ofthe payment depends on whether the insured person is alive, and, in ase of survivorannuities, whether the partner is alive, the net ash outow of these life insuraneproduts is aeted by two types of longevity risk:
• non-systemati longevity risk: onditional on given survival probabilities,whether an individual survives an additional year is a random variables;
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• systemati longevity risk: the survival probabilities for future dates are uner-tain.While non-systemati longevity risk is diversiable (i.e., the risk beomes negli-gible when portfolio size is large, see, for example, Olivieri and Pitao, 2001), thisis not the ase for systemati longevity risk. Therefore, throughout the hapter weassume that portfolios are large enough for non-systemati longevity risk to be neg-ligible, and fous on the impat of systemati longevity risk. Beause survival ratesdepend signiantly on age and gender, we haraterize an insured/partiipant bya vetor (x, g), where
x = x, g = g, if p ∈ {sl, db},
x = (x, y), g = (g, g′), if p = surv,where x denotes the age of the insured, g ∈ {m, f} denotes the gender of the insured,and, in ase of survivor annuities, y denotes the age of the partner, and g′ ∈ {m, f}denotes her/his gender. Then, for any given year t, the liability payments in a futureyear t + τ , τ ≥ 0 for a single life annuity, a survivor annuity, and a death benetinsurane for an individual haraterized by (x, g) in year t, are given by (see, forexample, Gerber 1997):4
L̃p,τ,t(x, g) = τp
(g)







y,t , for p = surv (survivor annuity),
= τ−1p
(g)
x,t − τp(g)x,t , for p = db (death benet), (5.1)where
• p(g)x+s,t+s for s >= 0 denote the realized one-year survival probabilities of theohort aged x in year t, as dened in (2.5);
• τp(g)x,t = p(g)x,t · p(g)x+1,t+1 · · · ·p
(g)
x+τ−1,t+τ−1 denotes the realized τ -years survivalprobability of the ohort aged x in year t.4Existing literature shows that there exists dependene between the remaining lifetimes of apartiipant and his (her) partner at miro-level, e.g., due to the fat that partners have similarlifestyles, or that the passing away of a partner aets the surviving relative's quality of life.Beause our fous in this hapter is on systemati longevity risk, we ignore this dependene andassume that the remaining lifetimes of the spouses, onditional on the survival probabilities, areindependent.














· P (τ), (5.3)where P (τ) denotes the urrent market value of a zero-oupon bond with maturity
τ . In Subsetion 5.3.2 we disus the alulation of he expetation in (5.3)5.3 Quantifying riskIn this setion we disuss how we quantify risk in portfolios that are sensitive toboth longevity risk and nanial risk. In Subsetion 5.3.1 we formally dene the riskmeasure. In Subsetion 5.3.2, we provide a brief disussion of the models aordingto whih the risk in the death rates, interest rates, and asset returns are generated.A omplete desription of these models an be found in Appendies 5.A and 5.B.5.3.1 Risk measureWe quantify risk in portfolios of life insurane produts by determining, for anygiven investment strategy, the minimal initial asset value suh that the probabilitythat the terminal asset value is positive is suiently large. The terminal assetvalue is dened as the remaining asset value after the last payment has been made.Without loss of generality, we express the initial asset value A0 as the best estimate
5.3. Quantifying risk 127value of the liabilities, BEL, plus a buer that is a perentage of the best estimatevalue, i.e.,
A0 = (1 + c) ·BEL. (5.4)Then, for a given ε > 0, we determine the minimum value of the buer perentage
c suh that:
P (AT < 0 | A0 = (1 + c) · BEL) 6 ε, (5.5)where T denotes the last period in whih a payment needs to be made, and ATdenotes the orresponding terminal asset value.The minimal required buer perentage c depends on the probability distri-bution of the terminal asset value, AT , whih in turn depends on the initial assetvalue A0, the liability payments, L̃τ (as dened in (5.2)), and the investment strat-egy. Speially, the asset dynamis is given by:
Aτ = (1 + rτ ) · Aτ−1 − L̃τ , τ = 1, · · · , T,where Aτ denotes the net asset value at the end of period τ , rτ denotes the returnon assets during period τ , and L̃τ denotes the liabilities paid at the end of period
τ . Beause we want to be able to distinguish between hedgeable and unhedgeablenanial risk, we allow for the ase where the insurer uses a dierent investmentstrategy for the best estimate value (BEL) and for the buer (c ·BEL). Speially,we dene the following strategies.Denition 5.3.1 An investment strategy onsists of:
• for every duration τ = 1, · · · , T : an asset mix for the best estimate valueorresponding to duration τ (i.e., the amount E [L̃τ] ·P (τ)); the orrespondingreturn in periods s = 0, · · · , τ is denoted rbe,(τ)s ;
• an asset mix for the buer portfolio; the orresponding return in periods τ =
0, · · · , T is denoted rbuτ .In every period τ , the aumulated value of the best estimate portfolio orrespondingto duration τ is used to pay the liabilities in period τ ; any shortage or exess is takenfrom, or reinvested in, the buer portfolio.



























 , (5.7)and Q1−ε(L) denotes the (1− ε)−quantile of L.Proof: The date-τ value of the best estimate portfolio orresponding to duration






). Combined with (5.3), this implies thatthe terminal asset value is given by:

































, (5.8)with L as dened in (5.7). Therefore, the terminal asset value AT is nonnegative if
(1 + c) · BEL > L, (5.9)The result now follows immediately from (5.5). The above proposition shows that the required buer perentage follows fromdetermining the 1 − ε quantile of the random variable L. The random variable L
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an be interpreted as follows. Conditional on any given future asset returns (rbus and
r
be,(τ)






, (5.10)i.e., L equals the disounted present value of all future liability payments. Thus,the standard approah in whih longevity risk is quantied by determining its eeton the probability distribution of the present value of liabilities an be seen as aspeial ase of our model. The more general ase in (5.7), however, allows to takeinto aount interations between nanial risk and longevity risk.5.3.2 Modeling mortality rates and asset returnsTo determine the minimum required buer from (5.6), we simulate 15,000 senariosfor death rates and asset returns, and on the basis of these senarios we alulatethe 1− ε quantile of L. In this subsetion we briey desribe the models we use togenerate these senarios.To model asset returns, we use a Vasiek model for the term struture ofinterest rates, ombined with a Geometri Brownian motion with time-varying driftfor stok pries. We inlude both proess risk (i.e., risk given estimated parametervalues) and parameter risk (i.e., risk due to estimation inauray). To estimate theparameters, we use the daily instantaneous short rate, the daily interest rate on a10 years Duth government bond, and the daily return on the Duth stok indexAEX, obtained from Datastream. For a more detailed desription of the modelsand the estimation tehnique, and for parameter estimates, we refer to Appendix5.A. We use these models to generate 15000 senarios for asset returns.For the probability distribution of the future survival probabilities we inludeproess risk, parameter risk, and model risk. To inorporate model risk, we estimatethree lasses of survival probability models, namely the Lee-Carter (1992) lass ofmodels, the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (2006) lass of models, and the P-Splines model(Currie, Durbin, and Eilers; 2004). We generate 5,000 senarios for future survivalrates from eah lass of models: 5,000 senarios from Lee-Carter (1992)-type models
130 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskwith three dierent speiations, namely the Lee-Carter (1992) model (1,666 se-narios), the Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002) model (1667 senarios), and theCossete et al. (2007) model (1,667 senarios); 5,000 senarios from Cairns-Blake-Dowd (2006) models with four dierent speiations, allowing for a quadrati termin the age eet, and/or onstant/diminishing age eets in the ohort eets (eahspeiation 1,250 senarios); and, 5,000 senarios from the P-Splines model withone speiation. To estimate the parameters in eah model, we use age-, gender-,and time-spei number of deaths and exposures to death for the Netherlands, ob-tained from the Human Mortality Database. For a detailed desription of the modelsand the estimation tehniques, and for parameter estimates, we refer to Appendix5.B.5.4 Hedgeable and unhedgeable investment riskIn this setion we investigate how investment risk aets the impat of longevityrisk in single life annuities, survivor annuities, and death benets, respetively. Todo so, we deompose L from (5.7) into three omponents, i.e.,
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.This omponent represents the asset value that, onditional on given assetreturns, is needed on date 0 in addition to BEL to pay all future expeted
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]), and longevity indued investment risk that arises due to unertainreturns on these deviations.Thus, the present value variable L an be deomposed in a deterministi termthat reets the required asset value in absene of both longevity risk and nanialrisk (BEL), a term that reets the required additional asset value in absene oflongevity risk, but with nanial risk (Linvest), and a term that reets the requiredadditional asset value due to longevity risk (Llong). Both Linvest and Llong are aetedby investment risk, but only Llong is aeted by longevity risk. Moreover, whereas
Linvest reets hedgeable risk (Linvest redues to zero when the expeted liabilitiesare ash ow mathed), Llong reets unhedgeable risk that arises due to unertaintyin the returns on assets required to over unexpeted liabilities.In this hapter we investigate the hedge eets of dierent life insurane produts.For the hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane liabilities with investment riskwe refer to:
• hedgaeble investment risk as the unertainty in the pure investment risk om-ponent Linvest;
• unhedgaeble investment risk as the unertainty in the longevity risk omponent
Llong arises from the unertainty in rbuτ ;
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• longevity risk as the unertainty in the longevity risk omponent Llong arisesfrom the unertainty in L̃τ ;
• natural hedge potential as the risk redution from ombining dierent life in-surane produt in the longevity risk omponent Llong.Note that the aim of the hapter is not to determine the optimal investment port-folio, but to investigate to what extent the hedge eets depend on the investmentportfolio.In the remainder of this setion we illustrate the eet of nanial risk on theimpat of longevity risk by omparing the benhmark ase, when L is dened as in(5.10), to the ase where investment returns are unertain. To quantify the eetof both hedgeable and unhedgeable interest rate risk, we ompare two investmentstrategies. The rst investment strategy is a risky one in whih all assets are(re)invested in a risky portfolio. The seond investment strategy is one in whih thebest estimate value is invested in bonds, and the buer portfolio is invested in riskyassets. Speially, we onsider the following two investment strategies:
• A risky investment strategy in whih both the best estimate value BEL, andthe buer c · BEL are (re)invested in a portfolio that yields returns rbus , i.e.,
rbe,(τ)s = r
bu



















, for all s = 0, · · · , T , and τ = 1, · · · , T, (5.12)and the buer c ·BEL is (re)invested in a portfolio that yields random returns

















]. These (unertain) deviations aet the value of the buer portfolio,generating unhedgeable investment risk.To investigate whether the impat of nanial risk depends strongly on the type ofliability, we onsider two types of insured individuals, i.e., male insureds and femaleinsureds aged x = 65, and three types of liabilities, i.e., single life annuities (i.e.,





] .Table 5.4.1 shows that the eet of investment risk on the minimal required buerperentage depends heavily on the type of liability. First, ompared to the liability-only approah (cLO), the required buer perentage under the risky investment strat-egy (crisky) inreases by a fator ranging from 2.5 (for female survivor annuities) tomore than 9 (for female death benets). These huge dierenes are partly due to thefat that under the naive investment strategy, there is a mismath between the dura-tion of the investments (one year) and the duration of the liabilities; this mismath
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5.5. Eet of unhedgeable investment risk 135(ii) deviations from the expeted value (L̃τ − E [L̃τ]) are subjet to unertain re-turns (i.e., rbus instead of r).The rst eet is deterministi, but the seond is stohasti and an thereforenontrivially aet required buer perentages. Speially, unertain buer returnsimply that L is aeted by simultaneous deviations of the liabilities from their ex-peted value (i.e., L̃τ − E [L̃τ] 6= 0), and of the returns from the at rate (i.e.,
rbus 6= r). The eet of unertain deviations of the liabilities from their expetedvalues is aggravated (weakened) when these deviations are aompanied by lower(higher) than expeted returns on the buer portfolio. Therefore, hanges in theliability mix will not only aet the pure longevity risk omponent, i.e., the riskgiven known future investment returns, but also the interations between longevityrisk and investment risk. Ignoring these interations may lead to inaurate quanti-ation of the hedge potential that arises from ombining dierent types of liabilities(for example, the natural hedge potential of death benets).In this setion we investigate the eet of interations between unhedgeablenanial risk and longevity risk in portfolios with single life annuities, survivor an-nuities, and death benets. To do so, we determine the buer perentage c from(5.6) and (5.13) for various asset and liability mixes, and ompare the results to thebuers resulting from a liability-only approah in (5.10) with r = 4%. To quan-tify the impat of unhedgeable nanial risk, we onsider four dierent investmentstrategies for the buer portfolio: 100% one-year zero-oupon bonds; 67% one-yearzero-oupon bonds, 33% equity; 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds, 67% equity; and
100% equity. With regard to the liability mix, we onsider portfolios that dierin terms of gender mix (ratios of male insured rights over total insured rights foreah produt) and in terms of produt mix (ratios of insured rights for the dier-ent life insurane produts) for eah gender. Gender mix nontrivially aets therequired buer perentage beause male and female mortality trends are not per-fetly orrelated. Produt mix nontrivially aets the required buer perentagebeause survivor annuity payments and single life annuity payments are negativelyorrelated. Therefore, we onsider two types of insured individuals, male insuredsand female insureds aged 65, who eah may hold insured rights (δi,p, see (5.2)) forthree dierent types of liabilities: single life annuities (p = sl), survivor annuities(p = surv), and death benets (p = db). The partner of a male insured (if present)is aged 62; the partner of a female insured (if present) is aged 68. It is veried easily
136 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskthat the minimum required buer perentage c is then given by (5.6) and (5.13)with:5
L̃τ = (1− γ) ·
[




L̃sl,τ(65, m) + wm · L̃surv,τ (65, 62, m, f) + dm · L̃db,τ (65, m)
]
, (5.14)where L̃sl,τ(·), L̃surv,τ (·), and L̃db,τ (·) are as dened in (5.1), and where
• γ is the fration of male single life annuities rights relative to the total singlelife annuities rights,
• wg for g ∈ {m, f} is the ratio of survivor annuity rights for gender g over singlelife annuities rights for gender g, and,
• dg for g ∈ {m, f} is the ratio of death benet rights for gender g over singlelife annuities rights for gender g.In Subsetion 5.5.1 we investigate interations between longevity risk and invest-ment risk in portfolios of single life and survivor annuities (dg = 0). In Subsetion5.5.2 we quantify the eet of unhedgeable investment risk on the hedge potentialfrom inluding death benets (dg 6= 0).5.5.1 Interation eets in annuity portfoliosIn this setion we onsider portfolios of single life and survivor annuities, and quan-tify the eet of unhedgeable investment risk on: (i) the required buer perentagefor a given liability mix, and, (ii), the hedge potential that arises from the liabilitymix. Without death benets, it follows from (5.14) that the eet of liability mixis fully haraterized by the gender mix γ, and by the ratios wm and wf of insuredrights for survivor annuities over insured rights for single life annuities for males andfemales, respetively.Figure 5.5.1 displays the minimum required buer perentage c as a funtion ofgender mix and produt mix in portfolios of single life and survivor annuities. To5Straightforward algebra shows that the aggregate liability payment in year τ in (5.2) is givenby (5.14) multiplied by ∑i∈I δi,sl, the total insured rights for single life annuities. It followsimmediately from Proposition 5.3.2 that the minimum required buer perentage c is unaetedwhen all liability payments are divided by ∑i∈I δi,sl > 0.
5.5. Eet of unhedgeable investment risk 137limit the number of parameters, we onsider the ase where the produt mix is equalfor both genders, i.e., wm = wf = w.The left panels in Figure 5.5.1 display the minimum required buer perent-age c as a funtion of gender mix (i.e., γ), for three dierent produt mixes:
• top panel: portfolios with only single life annuities, i.e., with w = 0;
• middle panel: portfolios with both single life and survivor annuities where theinsured right for survivor annuities is 35% of the insured right for single lifeannuities, i.e., with w = 0.35,
• bottom panel: portfolios with both single life and survivor annuities where theinsured right for survivor annuities is 70% of the insured right for single lifeannuities, i.e., with w = 0.7.The right panels display the minimal required buer perentage c as a funtionof produt mix (i.e., w), for three dierent gender mixes:
• top panel: portfolios with only male insureds, i.e., with γ = 1;
• middle panel: portfolios with only female insureds, i.e., with γ = 0;
• bottom panel: portfolios with 50% male insured rights and 50% female insuredrights, i.e., with γ = 0.5.In eah ase we onsider four dierent asset mixes for the buer portfolio: 100%equity (dashed-dotted lines), 67% equity and 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds (dot-ted lines), 33% equity and 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds (dashed lines), and
100% one-year zero-oupon bonds (thin solid lines). The bold solid lines lines orre-spond to the benhmark liability-only ase with a onstant and deterministi returnof r = 0.04.The gure shows that there are important interations between longevity riskand investment risk. First, the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk depends stronglyon the liability mix. Seond, the eet of liability mix depends nontrivially on theasset mix. Speially, we observe the following.Liability mix eets (i.e., eets of gender mix and produt mix). For any givenasset mix, both gender mix and produt mix an signiantly aet the requiredbuer perentage, beause dierent types of liabilities have dierent sensitivities tohanges in mortality rates. Speially:
138 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskFigure 5.5.1: Reserve requirements in portfolios of single life and survivor annuities.
































































































The left panels display the reserve requirements as a funtion of γ (gender mix).The upper panel represents a fund with only single life annuities (w = 0),the middle panel one with single life annuities and 35% survivor annuities(w = 0.35), and the bottom panel one with single life annuities and 70%survivor annuities (w = 0.7). The right panels display the reserve requirementsas a funtion of w (produt mix). The upper panel represents a fund withonly males (γ = 1), the middle one a fund with only females (γ = 0), andthe bottom one a fund with 50% male rights and 50% female rights (γ = 0.5).The urves orrespond to dierent ompositions of the buer portfolio: thinsolid urves 100% one-year zero-oupon bonds, dashed urves 67% one-yearzero-oupon bonds and 33% equity, dotted urves 33% one-year zero-ouponbonds and 67% equity, dashed-dotted urves 100% equity. The bold solidurves orrespond to the liability-only approah.
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• For eah produt mix w, portfolios with exlusively male liabilities (γ = 1) re-quire lower buer perentages than portfolios with exlusively female liabilities(γ = 0). However, in portfolios with only single life annuities (i.e., w = 0, toppanel), risk is minimized with a mixture of female and male liabilities. Thisours beause male and female liabilities are imperfetly orrelated, so thatthere is some diversiation eet from ombining these liabilities.6 Inludingsurvivor annuities (middle and lower panels) inreases the orrelation betweenmale and female liabilities and thus redues the diversiation eet. As aonsequene, mixing male and female liabilities does not yield signiant riskredution in these ases.
• Combining single life with survivor annuities (right panels) may either inreaseor derease the required buer perentage. This ours beause there aretwo opposite eets. On the one hand survivor annuities an redue requiredbuers beause survivor annuity payments are negatively orrelated with singlelife annuity payments.7 On the other hand, survivor annuity payments aremore aeted by the unertainty in future survival probabilities beause theyhave a longer duration (see Table 1). For portfolios with predominantly femalerights (middle panel), the former eet dominates; for portfolios with half maleand half female rights (bottom panel), the latter eet dominates.
• Aurate quantiation of liability mix eets requires speiation of the assetmix. For example, the middle right panel shows that the potential risk redu-tion from ombining single life annuities with survivor annuities is signiantlylarger when the buer portfolio is fully invested in equity than for the otherasset mixes that we onsider.6The underlying intuition in both ases is as follows. In eah ase, the random variable ofinterest an be written as a onvex ombination L = αL1+(1−α)L2 of two present value variables
L1 and L2. It holds thatVar {L} = α2 · Var {L1}+ (1 − α)2 ·Var {L2}+ 2α(1− α) · Cov{L1, L2}.Thus, the variane is minimized with an unbalaned portfolio that puts all weight on the liabilitywith the lowest variane if Cov{L1, L2}̇ > min{Var {L1} ,Var {L2}}, but the variane is minimizedat an internal α ∈ (0, 1) if Cov{L1, L2}̇ < min{Var {L1} ,Var {L1}}. Thus, shifting more weightto the higher risk liability is beneial if the ovariane is suiently low.7This ours for two reasons. First, an inrease in life expetany of the insured delays theonset of payments of the survivor annuity, so that they are more heavily disounted. Seond, thedierene between male and female life expetanies dereases, so that the duration of survivorannuity payments dereases.
140 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskImpat of unhedgeable investment risk. We observe two eets:
• For every liability mix, the required buer perentage is signiantly aetedby unhedgeable investment risk. An inrease in equity leads to a higher ex-peted return, but it also yields a higher probability that the realized returnis lower than expeted. The impat of unhedgeable nanial risk is minimizedwhen 1/3 of the buer is invested in equity.
• Aurate quantiation of the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk requires spe-iation of the liability mix. For example, for portfolios with predominantlyfemale rights, unhedgeable investment risk aets the required buer morestrongly when the fration of survivor annuity rights is high. The oppositeholds for portfolios with half male and half female rights. Although we arenot interested in the best equity portfolio, we do observe that the reserve re-quirement is lower if the insurer invests some of his buer portfolio in equities.This is due to the use of a partiular quantile of L in the determination ofthe reserve requirements and the equity risk premium. Hene, the investmentstrategy whih redues the ruin probability will depend on the quantile usedin the ruin probability.These results suggest that separately quantifying investment risk and longevityrisk, as is proposed by the Duth regulator, likely leads to inaurate quantiationsof the impat of longevity risk. Seond, ignoring the impat of unhedgeable nanialrisk may lead to inaurate quantiation of the risk redution that arises fromombining dierent types of longevity-linked liabilities.5.5.2 Natural hedge potential of death benetsIn this subsetion we investigate the eet of unhedgeable investment risk on thenatural hedge potential from death benets in portfolios of life annuities. To do so,we determine the minimum required buer perentage c as a funtion of both assetand liability mix. We then ompare the results to the benhmark ase onsideredin the existing literature (for example, Wang et al. 2010, and Tsai et al. 2010),where: (i) longevity risk is quantied with a liability-only approah (i.e., ignoringunhedgeable nanial risk), and, (ii) longevity-linked liabilities other than single lifeannuities and death benets (suh as, for example, survivor annuities) are ignored.
5.5. Eet of unhedgeable investment risk 141The following proposition shows that in the benhmark ase longevity riskin single life annuities an be fully hedged by death benets.Proposition 5.5.1 Let rbe,(τ)s = rbus = r, for s = 0, · · · , T , and τ = 1, · · · , T , andfor some (non-random) r > 0. Then, for portfolios of single life annuities and deathbenets with
dm = df =
1 + r
r
, (5.15)it holds that the terminal asset value AT is unaeted by longevity risk, and isnonnegative for any c > 0.Proof. It follows from the proof of Proposition 5.3.2 that AT = [(1 + c) · BEL− L]·
(1 + r)T , with L = ∑Tτ=1 L̃τ(1+r)τ . Moreover, it follows from (5.14), (5.15), and thefat that the portfolio does not ontain survivor annuities (i.e., wm = wf = 0) that:
L̃τ = (1− γ)
[




L̃sl,τ (65, f) + δL̃db,τ (65, f)
]
,where δ = 1+r
r
. Therefore,



































+ δ · 0p(g)65
= δ.The last equality follows from δ = 1+r
r
, 0p(g)x = 1, and T p(g)x = 0. Therefore, BEL =
L = δ, and the terminal asset value is given by AT = c · δ · (1 + r)T , whih isdeterministi and nonnegative for any c > 0. Proposition 5.5.1 shows that in the benhmark liability-only ase that is typiallyexamined in the literature, longevity risk in single life annuities an be fully hedgedwith death benets. In the remainder of this setion we show that unhedgeable
142 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskFigure 5.5.2: Reserve requirements in portfolios of single life and survivor annuitiesand death benets
































































































The graphs present reserve requirements as a funtion of d (ratio of deathbenets) in portfolios of life insurane produts. The left panels are portfolioswith only single life annuities, the right panels are portfolios with single lifeannuities and survivor annuities (w = 0.5). The upper panels orrespond to afund with only males (γ = 1), the middle panels orrespond to a fund with onlyfemales (γ = 0), and the lower panels orrespond to a fund with 50% malesand 50% females (γ = 0.5). The urves orrespond to dierent ompositionsof the buer portfolio: thin solid urves 100% one-years zero-oupon bond,dashed urves 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 33% equity, dotted urves33% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 67% equity, dashed-dotted urves 100%equity. The bold solid urves orrespond to the liability-only approah.
5.5. Eet of unhedgeable investment risk 143investment risk an signiantly redue the hedge potential from death benets inportfolios of life annuities.Figure 5.5.2 displays the eet of death benets on the required buer perent-age c for portfolios of single life and survivor annuities, and for given investmentstrategies. It onsiders a ase where produt mix is idential for both genders, i.e.,
w = wm = wf and d = dm = df . The left panels in Figure 5.5.2 display theminimum required buer perentage c as a funtion of d, the ratio of the insuredrights for death benets over single life annuities, in portfolios with only single lifeannuities, i.e., with w = 0. The right panels display the minimum required bueras a funtion of d, for portfolios of single life annuities and survivor annuities with
w = 0.5. The top panel orresponds to males (i.e., γ = 1), the middle panel tofemales (i.e., γ = 0), and the bottom panel to portfolios with 50% male rights and
50% female rights (γ = 0.5). In eah ase we onsider four dierent investmentstrategies for the buer portfolio: 100% equity (dashed-dotted lines), 67% equityand 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds (dotted lines), 33% equity and 67% one-yearzero-oupon bonds (dashed lines), and 100% one-year zero-oupon bonds (thin solidlines). The bold solid lines orrespond to the benhmark liability-only ase with aonstant and deterministi return of r = 0.04.In line with results reported in, for example, Wang et al. (2010) and Tsai etal. (2010), we nd that death benets an signiantly redue the required buerperentages in portfolios of life annuities. However, we nd that the risk redutionan be signiantly aeted by unhedgeable investment risk. Speially,
• Ignoring the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk leads to signiant overestima-tion of the hedge potential. Whereas with a liability-only approah to quantifylongevity risk (bold solid lines)), the minimum required buer perentage un-der the optimal hedge is zero (see Proposition 5.5.1), it varies from around 4%to more than 9%, depending on the asset mix when we take into aount theeet of unhedgeable nanial risk.
• Aurate quantiation of the hedge potential requires speiation of both theexisting liability mix and the asset mix. While the hedge potential from deathbenets is generally dierent for female liabilities (middle row) and for maleliabilities (upper row), the dierene is muh more signiant for the riskyinvestment strategy (100% stoks) than for the other strategies that we on-sider. Also, omparing the left and right panels shows that, depending on the
144 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskinvestment strategy, the hedge potential from death benets may, but neednot, derease signiantly when the portfolio also ontains survivor annuities.5.6 Hedge eets of survivor swapsIn this setion we investigate the hedge potential from investing in survivor swaps.Dowd, Blake, Cairns, and Dawson (2006) disuss the mehanism and use of survivorswaps as an instruments for managing, hedging, and trading mortality-dependentrisks. A survivor swap an be dened as a swap involving at least one future (stohas-ti) mortality-dependent payment. Given this denition, the most basi ase ofa survivor swap is an exhange of a single xed payment for a single mortality-dependent payment. More preisely, let ref denote a referene population. Then,at time t = 0, party A agrees with party B that A pays to B at time τ > 0 theamount K(τ, ref) known at time 0, and B pays to A at the amount S(τ, ref) whihdepends on realized mortality until date τ in the referene population, and is thusurrently stohasti. The payments made in this agreement are that party B pays
A the amount S(τ, ref)−K(τ, ref), if K(τ, ref) < S(τ, ref), and party A pays Bthe amount K(τ, ref) − S(τ, ref), if K(τ, ref) > S(τ, ref). Hene, the paymentfrom party B to party A equals:
SS(τ, ref) = S(τ, ref)−K(τ, ref), (5.16)where S(τ, ref) is the random mortality-dependent payment and K(τ, ref) is thexed payment.The survivor swaps we onsider in this hapter is one where the oating leg
S(τ, ref) is the realized survival rate for the 65-year old ohort in the underlyingreferene population, i.e., S(τ, ref) = τp(ref)65 . Typially, the xed leg K(τ, ref) isdetermined suh that there is no ash transfer at the time of the issue. However,there is urrently no publily traded market in longevity-linked produts and henewe do not observe the market prie of longevity risk.8 To avoid making assumptionsregarding the prie of the swap, we set K(τ, ref) equal to the urrent expeted valueof S(τ, ref). Then, the payment in period τ of the survivor swap is given by:








, (5.17)8For an exellent disussion on issues related to priing of longevity-linked assets or liabilities,see Bauer, Boerger, and Russ (2010).
5.6. Hedge eets of survivor swaps 145and there is a ash transfer at the time of issue whih equals the (over the ounter)prie of the survivor swap. We onsider a vanilla survivor swap V SS(ref) thatonsists of a portfolio of survivor swaps with maturities τ = 1, · · · , T .It now remains to speify a referene population. A natural referene groupfrom the point of view of the insurer (party B) is the population of the insurer.However, the insurer may then have more information about the population thanthe seller (party A) of the survivor swap. Sine the insurer may have this privateinformation, buying a survivor swap an be interpreted as a signal that the referenegroup has low mortality probability, and hene the prie of the survivor swaps wouldbe high, see Bis and Blake (2010). Another problem with the natural referenegroup from the point of view of the insurer is the tradeability of the survivor swaps;when every life insurer has a dierent referene group, many dierent survivor swapsare needed. This would lead to muh higher transation osts for the seller of thesurvivor swap, sine he has to put extra eorts in estimating the size of longevityrisk in the survivor swaps (Blake, Cairns, Dowd, and MMinn, 2006). In order toeliminate the private information problem and to inrease the tradeability, the wholepopulation of a ountry is often hosen as referene group, sine the information onthis referene group is the same for the issuer and buyer of the swap. An exampleis the rst longevity bond9 issued by European Investment Bank/Bank National deParis announed in November 2004, whih had as referene population the Englishand Welsh males at age 65 in 2003.In this setion we investigate the eet on solveny apital requirement ofvanilla survivor swaps with referene population the Duth aged 65 in 2006. Weuse two dierent vanilla survivor swaps, one with referene group the whole malepopulation aged 65 (i.e., ref = m), and another with referene group the wholefemale population aged 65 (i.e., where ref = f). Let sm (sf ) be the number ofvanilla survivor swaps with referene population males (females). Then, the liabilitypayment in year τ , net of payo from longevity swaps, is given by:
L̃τ = L̃τ − sm · SS(τ,m)− sf · SS(τ, f). (5.18)Let VV SS (sm, sf) denote the date-0 (over the ounter) prie of the vanilla survivor9The longevity bond was issued by the EIB and managed by BNP Paribas. The fae valuewas ¿540 million, and was primarily intended for purhase by U.K. pension funds. The survivorswap involved yearly oupon payments that were tied to an initial annuity payment of ¿50 millionindexed to the survivor rates of English and Welsh males aged 65 years in 2003. The longevitybond was withdrawn prior to issue (Mithell, Piggott, Sherris, and Yow, 2006).
146 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskswap. Then, it follows from Proposition 5.3.2 and (5.6) that the minimal requiredinitial asset value in order to limit the probability of ruin to ε is given by:



















) .Note that c(sm, sf) · BEL now represents the required buer in exess ofthe best estimate of the liabilities and the prie of the vanilla survivor swap. Notealso that a hange in the portfolio of swaps not only aets the required buer,but also the prie of the portfolio, VV SS (sm, sf). Beause we hoose not to makeassumptions regarding the prie of the survivor swaps, we annot determine theoptimal fration of survivor swaps, i.e., the fration that minimizes the requiredasset value A0. However, for any given portfolio of survivor swaps (sm, sf), wean determine the relative attrativeness of the vanilla survivor swaps for dierentliability mixes and asset mixes. Moreover, for any given asset mix, we an determinethe maximum prie of the portfolio of survivor swaps under whih a lower asset value,i.e., A0, is suient to over all future liabilities with probability at least 1− ε withsurvivor swaps than without survivor swaps. This maximum prie is given by:
V maxV SS (sm, sf) = [c(0, 0)− c(sm, sf)] · BEL. (5.19)In Subsetion 5.6.1 we investigate how the hedge eet of survivor swaps dependson the liability and asset mix in a benhmark ase without basis risk, i.e., in asetting in whih the survival rates of the insured population are idential to thoseof the referene population. In Subsetion 5.6.2 we investigate how these eets areaeted by basis risk that arises from dierenes in the mortality experiene in thereferene group of the survivor swap and the population of the insurer. In order tofous on the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk on the redution in longevity risk,we onsider the investment strategies dened in Setion 5.5.
5.6. Hedge eets of survivor swaps 1475.6.1 Vanilla survivor swaps and produt mixWe now investigate the potential hedge eets of survivor swaps for portfolios of lifeinsurane produts with dierent produt and gender mixes, and dierent invest-ment strategies. We also determine the maximum prie under whih investing insurvivor swaps leads to lower apital requirements in eah ase. In order to reduethe number of parameters, we let sm = γ · s, and sf = (1− γ) · s. It then followsimmediately from (5.1), (5.14), and (5.17), and from the fat that there is no basisrisk, that longevity risk in a fration s of the single life annuity rights for both malesand females is fully hedged.10Figures 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 display the minimum required buer, and the max-imum prie as dened in (5.19), respetively, as a funtion of s for dierent assetand liability mixes, i.e., in portfolios of single life annuities (left panels), and inportfolios of single life and survivor annuities with w = 0.5 (right panels), for males(top panel), females (middle panel), and γ = 0.5 (bottom panel). In eah asewe onsider four dierent investment strategies for the buer portfolio: 100% eq-uity (dashed-dotted lines), 67% equity and 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds (dottedlines), 33% equity and 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds (dashed lines), and 100%one-year zero-oupon bonds (thin solid lines). The bold solid lines orrespond to thebenhmark liability-only ase with a onstant and deterministi return of r = 0.04.From Figure 5.6.1 we observe that survivor swaps an lead to signiantredutions in the required solveny buer. However, the eet depends stronglyon both liability mix and asset mix. Beause there is no basis risk, longevity riskin portfolios with only single life annuities (left panels) an be fully eliminated bysurvivor swaps (with s = 1). For portfolios with also survivor annuities, the maximalrisk redution is attained by buying either stritly more or stritly less survivor swapsthan the fae value of the single life annuities, i.e., with s < 1 or s > 1. This oursbeause survivor annuities to some extent an provide a natural hedge for single lifeannuities, but on the other hand are also aeted more strongly by longevity riskbeause they have longer duration. The rst eet dominates for portfolios withonly female insureds, whereas the seond eet dominates for portfolios with halfmale and half female insured rights. Comparing the top left and right panels shows10It follows from (5.1), (5.14), and (5.17) that when sm = γ · s, and sf = (1− γ) · s, a fration
s of the single life annuity payments in year τ , γ · L̃sl,τ (65,m) + (1− γ) · L̃sl,τ (65, f), is eetivelyreplaed by its expeted value, γ · E [L̃sl,τ (65,m)]+ (1 − γ) · E [L̃sl,τ (65, f)] .
148 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskFigure 5.6.1: Reserve requirements in portfolios of annuities and vanilla survivorswaps without basis risk
































































































The gure displays the reserve requirements, c(s, s) as a funtion of sin a portfolio of life insurane produts, for a fund with only single lifeannuities (w = 0), left panels, for a fund with single life and survivorannuities (w = 0.5), right panels. The upper row orresponds to a fundwith only males (γ = 1), the middle row to a fund with only females(γ = 0), and the lower row to a fund with 50% male rights and 50%female rights (γ = 0.5). The urves orrespond to dierent ompositionsof the buer portfolio: thin solid urves 100% one-years zero-ouponbond, dashed urves 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 33% equity,dotted urves 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 67% equity, dashed-dotted urves 100% equity. The bold solid urves orrespond to theliability-only approah.
5.6. Hedge eets of survivor swaps 149Figure 5.6.2: Maximum prie of vanilla survivor swaps without basis risk



































































































The gure displays the maximum prie, p = c(0, 0)−c(s, s), as a funtionof s in a portfolio of life insurane produts, for a fund with only singlelife annuities (w = 0), left panels, for a fund with single life and survivorannuities (w = 0.5), right panels. The upper row orresponds to a fundwith only males (γ = 1), the middle row to a fund with only females(γ = 0), and the lower row to a fund with 50% male rights and 50%female rights (γ = 0.5). The urves orrespond to dierent ompositionsof the buer portfolio: thin solid urves 100% one-years zero-ouponbond, dashed urves 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 33% equity,dotted urves 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 67% equity, dashed-dotted urves 100% equity. The bold solid urves orrespond to theliability-only approah.
150 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskthat for male insureds, the hedge potential of survivor swaps redues dramatiallywhen the portfolio also ontains survivor annuities. Comparing the right top andmiddle panels shows that the hedge potential of survivor swaps in portfolios withboth single life annuities and survivor annuities is suiently weaker in portfolioswith predominantly male insureds.With regard to the interation between longevity risk and investment risk,we observe that ignoring the eet of unhedgeable nanial risk may lead to bothover- or underestimation of the hedge potential of survivor swaps, depending on theinvestment strategy.5.6.2 Vanilla survivor swaps with basis riskIn the previous setion we showed that vanilla survivor swaps an substantiallyredue reserve requirements in portfolios of life insurane produts. For portfoliosonsisting of only single life annuities, they an even eliminate all longevity risk.However, in these alulations we have ignored the impat of basis risk, i.e., themortality rates of the individuals in the referene group for the vanilla survivor swapare assumed to be equal to the mortality rates of the insured population. There isample empirial evidene, however, that survival rates of insured populations andier signiantly from those of the general population. As disussed above, thereare important hurdles to reate a liquid market in survivor swaps without basis risk,beause that would require ne tuning the survivor swap to the population of theinsurer.Dowd, Cairns, and Blake (2006) investigate the hedge eetiveness of alongevity bond with basis risk that arises beause the longevity bond is based on themortality experiene of the ohort of 60-year-old males, and the insured populationonsists of 65-year-old males. They nd that the hedge potential is not signiantlyaeted by this basis risk. In this hapter we quantify the eet of basis risk thatarises due to dierenes in survival probabilities for insured individuals omparedto those of the whole population. It is well-doumented that, due to adverse sele-tion, survival probabilities of insured individuals are generally dierent from thoseof the whole population (see, for example, Brouhns et al. 2002, and Denuit, 2008).Following Brouhns et al. (2002) and Denuit (2008), we will distinguish basis risk inase of group insureds, whih is relevant in partiular for pension funds, as well asbasis risk in ase of individual insureds, whih is partiularly relevant for insuraneompanies.
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h = (m, group) h = (f, group) h = (m, individual) h = (f, individual)
α(h) -0.71755 -0.577829 -1.54351 -1.024695
β(h) 0.79180 0.843850 0.81849 0.906784Table 5.6.1: Parameters estimates of the Cox relational model. Soure: Denuit(2008). We use the Cox-type relational model to model mortality rates of the in-sured population. Speially, the relationship between the gender-spei mortal-ity rates of insured group h relative to the gender-spei mortality rates for thetotal (ountry-wide) population group g, is modeled as (see Brouhns et al. 2002,and Denuit 2008):
log(µ
(h)
x,t ) = α
(h) + β(h) · log(µ(g)x,t), (5.20)where α(h) denotes the time- and age-independent dierene in mortality rates be-tween group g and h, and β(h) denotes the speed of the future mortality improve-ments of the group h relative to the general population with gender g. We use theestimated parameter reported in Denuit (2008), whih are given in Table 5.6.1 forgroup insureds and individual insureds, and for both males and females.11The negative sign of α(h) indiates that the fores of mortality of group andindividual insureds are lower than the general population. A larger negative valueof α(h) indiates that the dierene in the fores of mortality between group h andthe general population is larger. The value of β(h) smaller than one, in ombinationwith a negative value of α(h), implies that the dierene in the fores of mortalitybetween group h and the general population are smaller at old ages than at youngages. As before, we let sm = γ · s, and sf = (1− γ) · s, and we again onsiderthe ase where the referene population of the vanilla survivor swap is the generalpopulation of males and females, respetively, but we now let mortality rates of theinsured persons be given by (5.20).1211Notie that β(h) < 1, whih implies that the speed of the future mortality improvements inthe insured population is smaller than the orresponding speed for the general population. Thisours beause the adverse seletion observed in the Belgian individual life market is so strong thatthe future improvements for the insured population are weaker than for the general population.12In our model, mortality probabilities of the general population and of the population of theinsurer are perfetly orrelated. The low hedge eetiveness of the survival swaps is aused bythe fat that survival probabilities are non-linear transformations of the logarithm of the fores ofmortality. The eet is stronger for portfolios with both single life and survivor annuities beausethe dependeny between males and females.
152 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskFigure 5.6.3: Reserve requirements in portfolios of annuities and vanilla survivorswaps with basis risk: group insureds
































































































The gure displays the reserve requirements as a funtion of s in a portfolioof life insurane produts, for a fund with only single life annuities (w = 0),left panels, for a fund with single life and survivor annuities (w = 0.5), rightpanels. The upper row orresponds to a fund with only males (γ = 1), themiddle row to a fund with only females (γ = 0), and the lower row to a fundwith 50% male rights and 50% female rights (γ = 0.5). The urves orrespondto dierent ompositions of the buer portfolio: thin solid urves 100% one-years zero-oupon bond, dashed urves 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds and33% equity, dotted urves 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 67% equity,dashed-dotted urves 100% equity. The bold solid urves orrespond to theliability-only approah.
5.6. Hedge eets of survivor swaps 153Figure 5.6.4: Reserve requirements in portfolios of annuities and vanilla survivorswaps with basis risk: individual insureds
































































































The gure displays the reserve requirements as a funtion of s in a portfolioof life insurane produts, for a fund with only single life annuities (w = 0),left panels, for a fund with single life and survivor annuities (w = 0.5), rightpanels. The upper row orresponds to a fund with only males (γ = 1), themiddle row to a fund with only females (γ = 0), and the lower row to a fundwith 50% male rights and 50% female rights (γ = 0.5). The urves orrespondto dierent ompositions of the buer portfolio: thin solid urves 100% one-years zero-oupon bond, dashed urves 67% one-year zero-oupon bonds and33% equity, dotted urves 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds and 67% equity,dashed-dotted urves 100% equity. The bold solid urves orrespond to theliability-only approah.
154 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskIn Figures 5.6.3 and 5.6.4 we display the minimum required buer as afuntion of s, for dierent asset and liability mixes, i.e., in portfolios of single lifeannuities (left panels), and in portfolios of single life and survivor annuities with
w = 0.5 (right panels), for males (top panel), females (middle panel), and γ = 0.5(bottom panel). In eah ase we onsider four dierent investment strategies forthe buer portfolio: 100% equity (dashed-dotted lines), 67% equity and 33% one-year zero-oupon bonds (dotted lines), 33% equity and 67% one-year zero-ouponbonds (dashed lines), and 100% one-year zero-oupon bonds (thin solid lines). Thebold solid lines orrespond to the benhmark liability-only ase with a onstant anddeterministi return of r = 0.04. Figure 5.6.3 orresponds to group insureds, andFigure 5.6.4 orresponds to individual insureds. We assume that if an insured personbelongs to group (individual) insureds, the same holds for the insured's partner.13Comparing Figures 5.6.3 and 5.6.4 shows that the hedge eetiveness of sur-vival swaps with basis risk is signiantly smaller than without basis risk, espeiallyfor portfolios with both single life and survivor annuities.5.7 ConlusionsThis hapter quanties the eet of longevity risk of portfolios of life insuraneproduts, taking into aount that longevity risk indues unhedgeable nanial risk.We nd that unhedgeable nanial risk indues non-trivial interations betweenasset mix and liability mix. These interations aet the impat of longevity riskfor any given type of liability, as well as the potential eets of ombining dierenttypes of liabilities and/or investing in longevity-linked assets.Our results suggest that analyzing the joint eet of liability mix and assetmix on the overall risk is important for two reasons. First, taking into aount inter-ations between nanial risk and longevity risk may lead to more aurate solvenymeasures. Separating investment risk and longevity risk, as is often proposed by reg-ulators, unavoidably leads to inaurate quantiations of the impat of longevityrisk. Seond, ignoring the impat of unhedgeable nanial risk may lead to inau-rate quantiation of the risk redution that arises from ombining dierent typesof longevity-linked assets and liabilities. Speially, insurers may be able to reduetheir sensitivity to longevity risk by redistributing their risk. Our results indiate13Typially, the mortality probabilities of spouses are similar, due to, for instane, the livingonditions.
5.A. The distribution of the nanial returns 155that the extent to whih insurers may benet from suh mutual reinsurane dependsnot only on their liability portfolios, but also on their investment strategies. Finally,our results indiate that the hedge potential from investing in longevity-linked assetsuh as survivor swaps depends nontrivially on both the asset mix and the liabilitymix. The risk measure in this hapter is based on the ruin probability approah.As disussed in Chapter 2, the existing literature uses dierent approahes to quan-tify longevity risk. These inlude the disounted present value of liabilities approahand the funding ratio approah. The advantage of the ruin probability approah isthat it takes into aount both assets and liabilities, whih is not the ase in thedisounted present value of liabilities approah. Another advantage of the ruin prob-ability approah is that it does not require the prie of the liabilities, inluding a riskpremium for systemati longevity risk, whih would be required in the funding ratioapproah. However, the ruin probability approah has its limitations. First, it doesnot take into aount any shortfalls before time T . Although in our model, assetvalue is negative at some date i it is negative at expiration date, the risk measuredoes not take into aount the probability of tehnial default when solveny rite-ria speied by the regulator are violated, e.g., when the value of the assets dropsbelow the value as the liabilities. Seond, although we have a dynami rebalaninginvestment strategy whih depends on the realizations of the survival probabilitiesand investment returns, it is questionable whether a stati asset mix for the buerportfolio is optimal.5.A The distribution of the nanial returnsIn this setion we briey desribe the quantiation of the nanial risk. Finanialrisk might arise due to investing in (default-free) zero-oupon bonds with dierenttimes to maturity or in an equity stok index. The bonds are desribed by theVasiek-model, while the stok index is modeled by a Geometri Brownian Motionwith time-varying drift. We allow for orrelation between the bonds and the stokindex.In ase of the Vasiek-model the instantaneous spot rate, rt, evolves as anOrnstein-Uhlenbek proess with onstant oeients:
drt = (a− brt) dt+ σdZ1t , (5.21)
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ts in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskwhere a, b, and σ are model parameters, and Z1t is a standard Brownian Motion.The stok index, St, follows a Geometri Brownian Motion with time-varying drift:
dSt = µtStdt+ σSStdZ
2
t , µt = rt + λSσS, (5.22)where λS and σS are model parameters, and Z2t is a standard Brownian Motion.The orrelation between the standard Brownian Motions Z1t and Z2t is equal to ρ.Let P (n)t be the prie at time t of a zero-oupon bond with fae value of onewhih matures at time t + n, and let R(n)t be the orresponding yield to maturity
R
(n)
















































1− exp (−b · n)
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,with the additional parameter λ representing the prie of risk.To estimate the parameters of the Ornstein-Uhlenbek proess and the stokindex proess we disretize the stohasti dierential equations (SDE) of equations(5.21) and (5.22). Let ∆t be the time step, then we have, with α = a∆t, β = b∆t,and σ∆t = σ√∆t:
rt+∆t − rt = α− βrt + ǫt+∆t,
St+∆t − St
St






















,where Ft denotes the information available at time t, and N stands for a normaldistribution. For estimation purposes, we use ve implied moment onditions:

















































= 0. (5.25)We add to the moment restritions in (5.24) and (5.25) as extra moment onditions










= 0. (5.26)We use daily Duth nanial data obtained from Datastream from January 31, 1997till January 1, 2007. We use three time series, namely the one month interestrate, the interest rate on a 10 years Duth government bond, and the return onthe Duth stok index AEX. When estimating the model parameters using theGeneralized Method of Moments (GMM) (with optimal weighting matrix) based onthe moment restritions (5.24)(5.26), we make use of the Newey-West ovarianematrix estimator. We experimented with the lag length in this estimator. Thereported estimates orrespond to lag length equal to ... Table 5.A.1 displays theestimates and the standard deviation of the estimates of the model parameters.We inlude two soures of nanial risk: proess risk and parameter risk. First,using (5.22) and (5.23) and using the GMM-based estimates, there is proess riskdue to the fat that future values of rt and St are risky. Next, these foreasts arebased on estimates sensitive to estimation inauray. The orresponding risk isreferred to as parameter risk. Let θ be the vetor of all parameters estimated byGMM. The GMM-estimator θ̂GMM satises √T (θ̂GMM − θ) d→ N (0, Vθ). Let V̂θbe a onsistent estimator of Vθ. To quantify the nanial risk, we simulate 15,000senarios as follows. First, we simulate a θ from the N (θ̂GMM , V̂θ/T)-distribution,to inorporate parameter risk, and then, given this θ, we simulate the relevant futurevalues of rt, R(n)t , and St, using (5.21)(5.23), to inorporate proess risk.











, (5.27)where m(g)x,t is the entral death rate. This rate is given by m(g)x,t = D(g)x,t/E(g)x,t , with
D
(g)
x,t the observed number of deaths in year t in the ohort with gender g and aged













x,t , (5.28)where k(g)t is an index of the level of mortality, a(g)x is an age-spei onstant de-sribing the general pattern of mortality by age, b(g)x is an age-spei onstantdesribing the relative speed of the hange in mortality by age, and where ǫ(g)x,t repre-sents the measurement error, assumed to satisfy ǫ(g)x,t | Kt ∼ N (0, σ2x,g), onditionalon Kt = {k(g)τ | g ∈ {m, f}, τ = t, t− 1, ...}. Moreover, we assume that the ǫ(g)x,t areindependent for dierent x and g, onditional on Kt.














































,where σg is the gender-spei standard deviation of the error term e(g)t , and where
ρmf aptures the orrelation between e(m)t and e(f)t .In ase of the model by Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002), the age and genderspei numbers of deaths are modeled by a Poisson proess,
D
(g)
x,t | K̃t ∼ Poisson(E(g)x,t ea(g)x +b(g)x k(g)t ) , (5.31)with K̃t = Kt⋃{E(g)x,τ | g ∈ {m, f}, all x, τ = t, t− 1, ...}. We assume that the D(g)x,tare independent for dierent x and g, onditional on K̃t. The proess for (k(m)t , k(f)t )′is modeled as in ase of the Lee and Carter (1992)-model, i.e., via equations (5.29)(5.30).As third model, we onsider Cossette et al. (2007). These authors model the agespei numbers of deaths D(g)x,t via the Binomial Gumbel proess,
D
(g)
x,t | K̃t ∼ Bin(E(g)x,t , 1− exp(−ea(g)x +b(g)x k(g)t )) , (5.32)where we again assume that the D(g)x,t are independent for dierent x and g, ondi-tional on K̃t, and where we model the proess for (k(m)t , k(f)t )′ via equations (5.29)(5.30).The model-spei parameters are estimated imposing the required normaliza-tions and using the estimation tehniques as desribed in the orresponding papers.In order to avoid loalized age indued anomalies in b̂(g)x in the three models, wefollow Renshaw and Haberman (2003). These authors proposed to smooth the age
160 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskTable 5.B.1: Estimation results for the Lee-Carter modelsModel g c(g) θ(g) σg ρLee-Carter m −1.854 −0.131 1.612 0.881
f −1.576 −0.373 1.779Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt m −1.849 −0.096 1.376 0.897
f −1.519 −0.148 1.572Cossette et al. m −1.854 −0.097 1.386 0.916





















x,T , with q(g)x,T the observed one-year death probability in year T and q̂(g)x,T theorresponding model-spei one-year death probability.14See www.mortality.org.
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Figure 5.B.1: Estimated b(g)x after smoothing using ubi B-splines. Left panel:
g = m; right panel: g = f . The solid urve orresponds to the Lee and Carter(1992)-model; the dashed urve orresponds to the Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt(2002)-model, and the dotted urve orresponds to the Cossette et al. (2007)-model.5.B.2 P-SplinesIn this setion we desribe the P-spline model proposed by Currie, Durbin, andEilers (2004). Let By = By(xy), be a ny × cy regression matrix of B-splines basedon explanatory variable xy and let Ba = Ba(xa), be a na × ca regression matrix ofB-splines based on explanatory variable xa. The regression matrix for our model isthe Kroneker produt:
B = By ⊗ Ba.For the general population we assume:
D(m) +D(f) | E(m) + E(f) ∼ Poisson((E(m) + E(f)) exp (Bα(p))) , (5.34)where the data is arranged in olumn order, that is D(g) = ve (D(g)) and E(g) =ve (E(g)), and the log of a vetor is the log applied omponentwise. The generaltrend in the fore of mortality of the whole population is given by Bα(p). For the
162 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskdierene in the fores of mortality between the general population and the genderspei fores of mortality we regress for both g = m and g = f :
D(g) | E(g) ∼ Poisson(E(g) exp(Bα̂(p) +Bα(g))) , (5.35)where Bα(p) is estimated in the previous step and, thus, assumed to be known inthe seond step.To avoid under-smoothing, we use a penalty on α of the form α′Pα, where thepenalty matrix P is given by:




yDy ⊗ Ica ,with λa and λy smoothing parameters, Icy an identity matrix of size cy, Da a so-alleddierene matrix of dimension (ca − pa)× ca (that takes the olumn-wise diereneof another matrix when post-multiplied), where pa is the order of the penalty onage, and with Ica and Dy dened similarly. Given the smoothing parameters λa and
λy, the parameter vetor α is estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood based on(5.34) or (5.35) (with Bα̂(p) given), orreted for the penalty 1
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5.B. The distribution of the mortality probabilities 163Table 5.B.2: Parameter settings and Output P-spline modelGeneral Males-general Females-general
bdega 3 3 3
porda 2 2 2
na 91 91 91
ca 21 21 21
λa 15 1400 820
bdega 3 3 3
pordy 2 2 2
ny 30 30 30
cy 8 8 8





c∈C c · γ
(g)
c = 0.3) As 2) but with β(g)3,x = (x− x)2 − σ2x (where σ2x is the variane of the ages in
X ), together with the extra identiation onstraint ∑c∈C c2 · γ(g)c = 0.4) As 2) but with β(g)4,x = C(g) − x, for some onstant parameter C(g), togetherwith the (single) identiation onstraint ∑c∈C γ(g)c = 0.Version 1) is the original CBD-model, proposed in Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006).Let κt = (κ(m)1,t , κ(m)2,t , κ(m)3,t , κ(f)1,t , κ(f)2,t , κ(f)3,t )′, and Kt = {κτ | τ = t, t− 1, · · · }. Similarto the model by Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002), the age and gender speinumbers of deaths are modeled by a Poisson proess,
D
(g)
x,t | K̃t ∼ Poisson(m(g)x,tE(g)x,t) ,
164 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskwith K̃t = Kt⋃{E(g)x,τ | g ∈ {m, f}, all x, τ = t, t− 1, ...}, together with the assump-tion that the D(g)x,t are independent for dierent x and g, onditional on K̃t. Here,
m
(g)
x,t is linked to q(g)x,t via m(g)x,t = − log(1− q̂(g)x,t), f. (5.27). The parameters κt, for
t ∈ T , γc, for c ∈ C, and C(g) are estimated by maximizing the orresponding loglikelihood, where we use for T the sample period from 1977 until 2006 and for theset X of ages the ages 60 until 100+.In terms of κt, we assume, f. (5.29)(5.30),
κt = κt−1 + µ+ et, et | Kt−1 ∼ N (0, V ) , (5.37)where µ and V represent the mean vetor and ovariane matrix of Dt = κt −
κt−1. Following Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006) we assume as non-informativeprior distribution for (µ, V ) the Jereys prior:
p (µ, V ) ∝ |V |−3/2,where |V | is the determinant of the ovariane matrix V . The posterior distributionfor (µ, V |D), with D = (D1, · · · , DT ), then satises





,where µ̂ =T−1 n∑
t=1
Dt,and V̂ =T−1 T∑
t=1
(Dt − µ̂) (Dt − µ̂)
′
.Table 5.B.3 displays the estimates of µ for the dierent models.5.B.4 Quantifying Longevity RiskWe inlude three soures of systemati longevity risk: proess risk, parameter risk,and model risk. First, given a spei model and given the orresponding modelspei estimates, there is proess risk due to fat that future values of q̂(g)t arestill risky. Next, given a spei model, the foreasts of q̂(g)t are based on modelspei estimates, sensitive to estimation inauray. The orresponding risk isreferred to as parameter risk. Finally, dierent models might be used to alulatethe foreasts, resulting. Assuming that some prior distribution is used to do theforeast alulations, there is in model risk.
5.B. The distribution of the mortality probabilities 165Table 5.B.3: Parameter estimates of the CBD-models
µ
(m)
1 · 102 µ
(m)
2 · 104 µ
(m)
3 · 105 µ
(f)
1 · 102 µ
(f)
2 · 104 µ
(f)
3 · 105CBD 1 -1.3723 8.3578 -1.1211 1.3925CBD 2 -1.3203 3.9099 -1.0141 17.7359CBD 3 -1.3708 8.0533 2.1365 -0.87047 1.7736 -5.8667CBD 4 -3.9336 -1.7694 6.7977 36.4297
LogL # par BICCBD 1 -12042 120 24905CBD 2 -9344 236 20302CBD 3 -9220 294 20449CBD 4 -9431 240 20503The table displays the estimation of the parameter µ and the log like-lihood, number of parameter, and the Bayesian Information Criterion(BIC) for the dierent CBD-models. For model CBD 4 we have used
C(m) = 74 and C(f) = 75.To inorporate model risk, we generate 5000 senarios from eah lass of models:5000 senarios from the Lee-Carter (1992)-type models (1666 senarios from the Lee-Carter (1992) model, 1666 senarios from the Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002)model, and 1667 senarios from the Cossete et al. (2007) model); 5000 senarios fromCairns-Blake-Dowd (2006) models (1250 senarios from eah of the four variants),and 5000 senarios from the P-Splines model.To inorporate parameter risk, we simulate in eah of the senarios parametersin a model-spei way. For example, in ase of the Lee and Carter (1992) modelwe simulate α(g)x , β(g)x , σ2x,g, c(g), θ(g), σg, and ρmf , using a bootstrap proedure,following Koissi, Shapiro, and Högnäs (2006). A similar approah is used in ase ofthe Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002) model and Cossete et al. (2007) model.In ase of the P-Splines model we simulate α-s, using the approximate normal dis-tribution of the estimated α̂. In ase of the CBD-models we simulate µ and V fromthe orresponding posterior distribution.To inorporate proess risk, we simulate in ase of the Lee-Carter (1992) model,given the simulated parameter values, future values of k(g)t (by simulating futurevalues of e(g)t ) and future values of ε(g)x,t . This results in senario-spei future valuesof q(g)x,t . In ase of the Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002) model and Cossete etal. (2007) model we proeed in a similar way. However, in these models we ignorethe potential proess risk in the error terms ε(g)x,t , whih are set equal to zero (in
166 Chapter 5. Hedge eets in a portfolio of life insurane produts with investment riskfat, we did not present these error terms in these ases). In ase of the P-Splinesmodel the simulated α-s also inorporate proess risk. In ase of the CBD-modelswe simulate, given the simulated µ and V , future values of κt (by simulating futurevalues of et). Similar to the Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt (2002) and Cossete etal. (2007) models, we ignore both in the P-spline model and the CBD-models thepotential proess risk in the error terms ε(g)x,t (these error terms are also not presentedin ase of these models).
Chapter 6Annuity deisions with systematilongevity risk
This hapter is based on Stevens (2010).
6.1 IntrodutionOur goal in this hapter is to investigate the optimal annuity deision in a life-yle model when there is systemati longevity risk. Life expetany has inreasedsubstantially over the past deades, and is expeted to inrease further in the fu-ture. However, there is onsiderable unertainty regarding the exat developmentin future life expetany. This unertainty is alled systemati longevity risk.1 Sys-temati longevity risk an be modeled by allowing future survival probabilities to bestohasti. In studies investigating optimal annuity deisions systemati longevityrisk is typially ignored. However, its presene aets the optimal life-yle dei-sions in a number of ways. First, systemati longevity risk is a non-diversiablerisk and therefore it will have a nonzero prie of risk, ompliating the priing ofannuities. Seond, stohasti future survival probabilities imply stohasti futureannuity pries, further ompliating the optimal life-yle deisions of the individ-ual. We allow for a nonzero prie of risk in the annuity pries using risk-neutralsurvival probabilities, following Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006a). Third, we allowfor stohasti future survival probabilities and optimal deisions whih depend on1Naturally, we also allow for idiosynrati longevity risk, whih is due to a random individualremaining lifetime, onditional on given survival probabilities. This is also referred to as non-systemati longevity risk. 167
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 longevity riskthe evolution of these survival probabilities. To solve the optimization problem withstohasti future survival probabilities we follow Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, andStroud (2005) and Carroll (2005), and using extensions proposed by Koijen, Nij-man, and Werker (2009). In addition to allowing for systemati longevity risk,2 weextend the urrent literature on optimal annuity deisions by not only investigatingthe possibility of investing in an immediate annuity but also in a deferred annuity.The existing literature on optimal annuitization in the ontext of immediateannuities but without systemati longevity risk is extensive. The literature was initi-ated by the seminal paper by Yaari (1965). Yaari (1965) and others (see, for example,Merton, 1983; and Davido, Brown, and Diamond, 2005) show that an individual'soptimal investment hoie is to invest all his wealth in annuities. This is shown in astandard Modigliani life-yle model of savings and onsumption without a bequestmotive, with as only investment opportunity a risk-free asset and atuarially fairannuities. The rationale behind this result is that the returns from annuities domi-nate the risk-free return, sine the apital invested in annuities is alloated only tothe survivors. Although these results suggest that retirees will voluntarily purhaseannuities, in most ountries very few atually do so (see, among others, Friedmanand Warshawsky, 1990; Poterba and Wise, 1998; Moore and Mithell, 2000; Bütlerand Teppa, 2007; and Dushi and Webb, 2004b). This annuity puzzle has generateda lot of literature aimed at solving this puzzle.3 We show that systemati longevityrisk redues the attrativeness of an immediate annuity, thereby reduing the opti-mal level of annuitized wealth when purhasing an annuity at retirement date. Thus,systemati longevity risk seems to be an important ingredient in understanding theannuity puzzle.This hapter also ontributes to the literature on the optimal timing of the2Coo and Gomes (2009) also allow for systemati longevity risk in a life-yle model, but intheir paper the individual maximizes the expeted lifetime utility in a setting with only a risk-freeasset and a longevity bond, without annuities or equities as investment opportunities.3For example, the evidene for the size of an individual's bequest motive and the orrespondingeet in a life-yle model is mixed (see, for example, Yaari, 1965; Friedman and Warshawsky,1990; Bernheim, 1991; Brown and Poterba, 2000; Hurd and Smith, 2001; and Vidal-Meliá andLejárraga-Garía, 2006). Other authors have examined the strategi bequest motive (see, forexample, Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985). Another possible explanation for the annuitypuzzle is the default risk of the annuity issuer (see Babbel and Merrill, 2007) or the illiquidity orirrevoability of annuities (see Sinlair and Smetters, 2004; and Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker,2009). In addition, behavioural eets (see, for example, Hu and Sott, 2007; Brown, 2007; Brown,Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel, 2008; and Gazzale and Walker, 2009) may inuene the deisionto forgo voluntary annuitization.
6.1. Introdution 169purhase of annuities. Muh researh has been devoted to nding the optimal fra-tion of wealth invested in annuities and the best timing for purhasing annuities.Due to atuarial unfairness of annuities postponing the purhase of an annuity pur-hase may be rational, beause the mortality redit is too low just after retirementage.4 Milevsky (1998) proposed postponing the annuity purhase until the mortalityredit is larger than or equal to the equity risk premium. However, this annuitiza-tion strategy would only be optimal for risk-neutral individuals. Blake, Cairns, andDowd (2003) found an optimal annuitization age in the range of 65 to 80, dependingon individual harateristis suh as risk aversion and bequest motive. Milevskyand Young (2002) estimated that the real option to annuitize remains valuable untilthe age range 75-85, also depending on individual harateristis. Dierent assump-tions of the utility funtion have been made to nd the optimal time to purhaseannuities. These inlude the HARA utility (see Kingston and Thorpe, 2005) andthe power utility (see Stabile, 2006). Others have investigated the optimal gradualannuity purhase pattern during retirement. For example, Kapur and Orszag (1999)and Horne, Maurer, and Stamos (2008) found that gradual annuitization is optimaluntil the mortality redit is larger than the equity return. In our setting we nd thatfor a 65-year-old individual postponing the annuity purhase is utility-dereasing dueto systemati longevity risk. This dierene with the existing literature illustratesthe importane of systemati longevity risk in the life-yle optimization problem.This hapter also ontributes to the literature on the attrativeness of de-ferred annuities. The literature on the optimal deferral period of a deferred annuitywhih is purhased at retirement date is not very extensive. Milevsky (2005) providesa desription of (ination-linked) deferred annuities, referred to as Advaned-Life De-ferred Annuities (ALDAs). This hapter states that deferred annuities, purhasedat the retirement date, starting to pay after a deferral period of around 15 to 25years, are optimal. A deferred annuities is optimal beause suh an annuity pro-vides longevity insurane at a low prie. Hu and Sott (2007) mention that deferredannuities may be more desirable for individuals than immediate annuities, beausethe former overweight small probabilities. Dus, Maurer, and Mithell (2005) showthat deferred annuities an enhane the expeted payout and ut the expeted short-fall risk. In a setting with only a risk-free asset and given rules of thumb for theonsumption level, Gong and Webb (2009) show that deferred annuities provide4The mortality redit is dened as the (yearly) exess return of an annuity relative to the returnon the risk-free investment. The mortality redit is formally dened in Setion 6.4.
170 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity risklongevity insurane at a low ost. Horne and Maurer (2008) nd that a deferredannuity whih starts inome payments at the age of 65 might beome more appeal-ing than an immediate one when the loading fator is high enough. Bayraktar andYoung (2009) nd that it is always optimal to purhase an immediate annuity in-stead of a deferred one, when an individual's objetive is to minimize the probabilityof nanial ruin. We extend this literature in two ways. First, we ompare annu-ities with dierent deferral periods. Seond, we take into aount that the atuarialunfairness in annuity pries may be due to a risk premium for systemati longevityrisk. We use a risk-neutral priing approah to model the risk premium in annuitiesdue to systemati longevity risk. This results in annuities with a risk premium forsystemati longevity risk that is dependent on the deferral period. We nd that theoptimal deferral period is short and that the utility gain from purhasing an annu-ity with the optimal deferral period instead of an immediate annuity is very small.Moreover, we nd that when an individual purhases an annuity with a moderatedeferral period (around 10 years) he an hold a substantial amount of liquid wealthwith a low redution in the expeted lifetime utility.This hapter is organized as follows. In Setion 6.2 we present the preferenesof the representative individual and desribe the stohasti foreast models we useto foreast the probability distribution of future survival probabilities. Setion 6.3presents the parameter alibration of the distributions of the equity returns and thedistribution of the future survival probabilities. The attrativeness of an annuityis aeted by the prie and the payment stream. Therefore, in Setion 6.4 werst illustrate the eet of systemati longevity risk on both the prie of a deferredannuity and an immediate annuity. In addition, we illustrate the eet of systematilongevity risk on the mortality redit. In Setion 6.5 we determine the optimalhoies of an individual in the expeted lifetime utility model. We show the eet ofdierent annuity hoies and the eet of systemati longevity risk on the optimaldeisions of the individual. Robustness heks are subsequently performed in Setion6.6. Setion 6.7 presents the onlusions.6.2 Preferenes, survival probabilities, and annu-itiesThis hapter investigates an individual's optimal fration of wealth invested in eithera deferred annuity or an immediate annuity, and the eet of systemati longevity
6.2. Preferenes, survival probabilities, and annuities 171risk on this deision. The optimal annuity deision is determined in a setting withthree soures of risk:i) investment risk, aused by a random return in the equity market;ii) idiosynrati longevity risk, due to a random individual remaining lifetime(onditional on given survival probabilities);iii) systemati longevity risk, due to random future survival probabilities.Setion 6.2.1 denes an individual's expeted lifetime utility funtion anddesribes the onstraints the individual faes. The optimal hoies of an individ-ual depend on the probability distribution of future survival probabilities whih isdesribed in Setion 6.2.2, and on the priing of annuities, whih is desribed inSetion 6.2.3.6.2.1 The individual's optimization problemIn this setion we desribe the optimization problem inluding the onstraints faedby an individual who maximizes an expeted utility of lifetime onsumption. Theinvestment hoie onsists of the frations of wealth invested in a risky asset, arisk-free asset, and in an annuity. We onsider two types of annuities:i) An immediate annuity whih yields a nominal yearly payment of 1, with anal payment in the year the insured dies;ii) a deferred annuity whih yields a nominal yearly payment of 1, after a deferralperiod of d years when the insured is still alive, with a nal payment in theyear the insured dies.Let A(d)x+t,t denote an annuity with a deferral period of d years bought by an individualat time t with time-0 age x . Note that an immediate annuity represents a speialtype of a deferred annuity, namely one with a deferral period equal to one (i.e.,
d = 1).5 We determine an individual's lifetime expeted utility and optimal hoies5An annuity an either be an ordinary annuity or an annuity-due. The dierene betweenthe two types of annuities is that an annuity inome payments an either be at the beginning ofa speied period (i.e., an annuity-due) or at the end of the speied period (i.e., an ordinaryannuity). An annuity with d = 1 is an ordinary immediate annuity and an annuity with d = 0is an immediate annuity-due. Note that using only a deferred annuity with a deferral period ofzero years, one an obtain the same payment stream as with a deferred annuity with a deferral
172 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskfor two ases, namely urrently purhasing a deferred annuity with a xed deferralperiod d and postponing the purhase of an immediate annuity until a xed time
s.6 We assume that the individual has an intertemporally separable, expetedlifetime onstant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility funtion, without a bequestmotive. To avoid overloaded notation, the time at whih we alulate the expetedlifetime utility, i.e., the base year, is set equal to zero, unless otherwise mentioned.We assume that the individual invests in an annuity only one, at a xed time s ≥ 0,and invests in only one type of annuity, i.e., an annuity with deferral period d (with
d = 1 for an immediate annuity). To investigate the eet of the dierent types ofannuities and the eet of postponing the annuity purhase we alulate the optimalonsumption, investment, and annuity hoies onditional on the annuity type (i.e.,onditional on d), and the time when an annuity is purhased (i.e., onditional on
s). We obtain the optimal annuity hoie by omparing the orresponding expetedlifetime utilities.We onsider an individual aged x at date t = 0, with remaining lifetime Tx,0,and with orresponding realized survival probabilities px+s,s as dened in (2.4) for
t = 0. Note that at any date t > 0, it holds true that
τpx+t,t = P (Tx,0 > t+ τ |Tx,0 > t,F∞)
=
P (Tx,0 > t+ τ |F∞)




px+s,s. (6.1)Let γ denote the oeient of relative risk aversion; let β be the time prefereneparameter (also referred to as the subjetive disount fator); let Wt be the liquidwealth level in period t; let Ct be the onsumption level in period t; and let Atbe the annuity inome in year t. An individual is haraterized by his time-0 age
x, wealth level before annuity inome and onsumption, Wt, and the time-t statevariables orresponding to the annuity inome, At, and Bt.period of one year. This ours beause the dierene between the two annuities is only a ertainimmediate payment. Under arbitrage-free priing the prie of an annuity with an initial paymentin the following year and an annuity with an immediate initial payment equals the level of theurrent payment. In this hapter, when we refer to immediate annuities, we mean an ordinaryannuity with an initial payment in the following year, i.e., d = 1.6Note that one an also investigate the eet of postponing the purhase of deferred annuities.However, as we will argue in Setion 6.7, this will probably not be optimal due to the systematilongevity risk.
6.2. Preferenes, survival probabilities, and annuities 173Now we onsider a given time s at whih annuities with a deferral period of
d years are bought, and determine the optimal investment and onsumption hoies.At time t the endogenous state variables areWt, At, and Bt and the exogenous statevariables at time t are denoted by the vetor Xt.7 Let (Ct, wt) be the set of ontrolvariables in year t, i.e., the time-t level of onsumption and the fration of wealthafter annuity inome and onsumption invested in equity, respetively, and let as(d)be an additional ontrol variable at time s, i.e., the fration of after-onsumptionwealth whih in year s is invested in an annuity with a deferral period of d years.The time-t expeted lifetime utility Jt of an individual is dened by:

























, if t > s.(6.2)At or before time s, the individual maximizes his expeted lifetime utility withthe fration of liquid wealth invested in equity, the onsumption, and the frationof wealth invested in annuities at time s as ontrol variables. After time s theindividual does not purhase new annuities, and hene the ontrol variables are onlythe sequene of urrent and future frations of liquid wealth invested in equities,and the yearly onsumption levels.The wealth dynamis of the individual, for all τ ≥ 0, are given by:
Wτ+1 =
{
(Wτ − Cτ ) · (1− as(d)) ·
(




, if τ = s,
(Wτ + Aτ − Cτ ) ·
(




, if τ 6= s, (6.3)where rrf is the time-independent risk-free return, and rτ is the (risky) return onequity between year τ and τ + 1. The rst equation orresponds to the wealthdynamis in the year in whih the individual purhases an annuity and the seondorresponds to the wealth dynamis in the years in whih the individual does notpurhases an annuity. The individual faes a sequene of short-selling onstraintsand liquidity onstraints. These onstraints imply that an individual annot bor-row against future inome. Hene, the objetive funtion for the individual, as7The exogenous state variables depend on the evolution of the future survival probabilities upto time t. The evolution of the survival probabilities is desribed in Setion 6.2.2. The evolution ofan individual's information about the distribution of the future survival probabilities is desribedin Appendix 6.B.
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 longevity riskrepresented in (6.2), is maximized subjet to the wealth dynamis in (6.3) and thefollowing onstraints:
0 ≤ as(d) ≤1, (6.4)
0 ≤ wτ ≤1, for τ ≥ 0, (6.5)





At, if t 6= s+ d− 1,







) , if t = s, d = 1, (6.7)with A0 = 0, Vs (A(1)x+s,s) the time-s prie of an immediate annuity, and
Bt+1 =
{







) , if t = s,with B0 = 0, and Vs(A(d)x+s,s) the time-s prie of an annuity with a deferral period of
d years. The state variable Bt does not play a role when d = 1.To obtain the optimal onsumption and investment hoies we use asimulation-based method whih an deal with many exogenous state variables, pro-posed by Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara, and Stroud (2005) and by Carroll (2006). Inaddition, we inlude several extensions whih were proposed by Koijen, Nijman, andWerker (2009). In Appendix 6.B the method used to obtain the optimal onsump-tion and investment hoies is desribed.6.2.2 Survival probabilitiesAs an be observed from equation (6.2) the optimal life-yle hoies of anindividual depend on future survival probabilities of the individual. In this hapterfuture survival probabilities are stohasti. In this setion we desribe the modelingof the probability distribution of future survival probabilities. We use the modelproposed in Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006a). This CBD model is attrative beause








t + (x+ t) · k(2)t + ǫx+t,t, (6.8)where k(i) = [k(i)t , k(i)t+1, . . .]′ for i ∈ {1, 2} are stohasti proesses with t being therst year of mortality data, and ǫx+t,t an the age- and time-spei idiosynratiresidual assumed to be independent and identially distributed (i.i.d.) normallydistributed with zero mean and age-spei variane.We estimate the proess for mortality probabilities using mortality data. Let






]′, for t > t. Following Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006a) we assume thatthe individual foreasts these stohasti proesses by a two-dimensional random walkwith drift:
kt+1 = kt + µ+ C ·Nt, (6.9)where µ is a onstant 2×1 vetor, C is a onstant 2×2 upper triangular matrix, and
Nt is a two-dimensional standard Gaussian proess. For longevity risk it is ommonto inlude not only proess risk, i.e., the risk arising from the random proess Nt,but also parameter risk (see, for example, Cairns, Blake, and Dowd, 2006a). Thereis a onsensus in the literature that the exlusion of parameter unertainty, given aspeiation like (6.8)(6.9), would lead to a signiant underestimation of longevityunertainty.8 Let Dt = kt − kt−1, and D = [Dt+1, . . . , Dt+n]′ with n = t − t. Toinorporate parameter risk in the parameters µ and V = C ·C ′ we use the Jerey'sprior as in the CBD model, a non-informative prior distribution, whih is a ommonprior for the multivariate Gaussian distribution in whih both µ and V are unknown:
p (µ, V ) ∝ |V |−3/2,8Likewise, the investor might allow for parameter unertainty in the equity proess. Sine ourfous in this hapter is on the eet of systemati longevity risk, we assume that the investor onlyaounts for proess risk in the equity proess.
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 longevity riskwhere |V | is the determinant of the ovariane matrix V . The posterior distributionfor (µ, V |D) at time τ satises:






, (6.11)where µ̂τ and V̂τ are the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of thestohasti proess based on the revealed information up to time τ . At any time
τ > t these parameters are estimated by:
µ̂τ =
1






τ − t ·
τ∑
t=t+1
(Dt − µ̂τ) · (Dt − µ̂τ)
′
. (6.13)6.2.3 Annuity priesThe prie of an annuity depends on the probability distribution of an individual'sremaining lifetime. The atuarially fair prie (i.e., the expeted disounted ashows) of an annuity an be determined using the probability distribution of thestohasti future survival probabilities whih is desribed in Setion 6.2.2. Theatuarially fair value of an annuity does not inorporate the eet of systematilongevity risk on the prie the annuity. Idiosynrati longevity risk is diversiable(i.e., the risk beomes negligible when the the portfolio size is suiently large) andthus will not be pried in an eient market without arbitrage opportunities. Inontrast, systemati longevity risk does not derease with the portfolio size, andmay thus lead to a risk premium.There is strong empirial evidene that the market prie of annuities exeedsthe atuarially fair one (see Mithell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) forthe US market and Frinkelstein and Poterba (2002) for the UK market). To aountfor this, the existing life-yle model literature ommonly uses a loading fator.Commonly, the loading fator is seen as a transation ost, (see, among others,Mithell et al., 1999). However, the atuarial unfairness might be due to the prieof systemati longevity risk rather than transation osts, whih is also mentionedin Milevsky and Young (2007). The premium for systemati longevity risk in anannuity might be signiant whih implies that the atuarial fair value might be a
6.2. Preferenes, survival probabilities, and annuities 177signiant underestimation of the market prie.9 More importantly, a loading fatorindependent of the deferral period of an annuity does not neessarily properly reetthe risk premium for systemati longevity risk.No liquid market exists yet for systemati longevity risk (see Blake, Cairns,and Dowd, 2008). Therefore, it is diult to alibrate the market prie of systematilongevity risk. The existing literature proposes dierent approahes to obtain a fairvalue for annuities when systemati longevity risk exists. These approahes inludethe utility maximization priniple (see Malamund, Trubowitz, and Wüthrih, 2008);the Sharpe ratio approah (see, for example, Milevsky, Promislow, and Young, 2006,2008; Bayraktar, Milevsky, Promislow, and Young, 2009; and Bauer, Börger, andRuÿ, 2009); the Wang transform (see Lin and Cox, 2005; Cox and Lin, 2007; Denuit,Devolder, and Goderniaux, 2007; and Lin and Cox, 2008), and risk-neutral priing(see Cairns, Blake, and Dowd, 2006a). An exellent overview of dierent priingmethods is given in Bauer, Börger, and Ruÿ (2009).In this hapter we use the risk-neutral approah to alulate the risk premiumfor systemati longevity risk. The risk-neutral approah is based on long-establishednanial eonomi theory and states that, if the overall market is arbitrage-free,there exists a risk-neutral measure suh that the prie of an annuity equals the ex-peted disounted payments under the risk-neutral measure. Due to market inom-pleteness many risk-neutral risk measures might exist. Therefore, we shall assumethat an individual is ating in an equilibrium setting, and that this equilibriumselets a market onsistent (unique) risk neutral measure. Following the existing lit-erature on life-yle models we also use, as alternative to the risk-neutral approah,a loading fator for priing annuities. As loading fator we take 7.3%, whih isin line with Mithell et al. (1999), and ommonly used in the life-yle literature(see, for example, Horne, Maurer, and Stamos, 2008). Hene, this hapter onsid-ers annuity market pries that exeed the atuarially fair ones whih are modeledusing:i) risk-neutral survival probabilities;ii) a loading fator, whih is independent of the deferral period of an annuity.9For example, the Solveny II projet (Group Consultatif Atuariel Europeen, 2008) requires thevaluation of annuities using a market-to-model approah. The approah proposed in the SolvenyII guidelines leads to a valuation of an annuity whih is approximately 6% to 9% higher than thereal-world expeted disounted ash ows of an annuity for an annuitant aged 65, due to systematilongevity risk (see Olivieri and Pitao, 2008b).





















,(6.14)where 1(x+t,t)τ is an indiator whih equals one if the individual with age x + t attime t is alive at time t+ τ , and zero otherwise.As an be observed from equation (6.14), to alulate the prie of an annu-ity using the risk-neutral approah we need the risk-adjusted expetation of futuresurvival probabilities. The probability distribution of future survival probabilities isdesribed in Setion 6.2.2. To inlude the market prie of systemati longevity riskwe follow the method proposed in Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006a). In this methodthe risk-adjusted priing measure Q(λ) is modeled using an adjustment in the dy-namis of the stohasti proess kt. Let λ = [λ1 λ2]′ be the vetor representing themarket prie of systemati longevity risk, whih is assumed to be time-independent.The dynamis of the proess kt under the real-world measure is desribed in equation10In ase of unertainty in the instantaneous forward interest rate urve it has been shown that,under the assumption of independene of the instantaneous forward interest rate and survivalprobabilities, equation (6.14) still holds, replaing ( 11+rrf )τ on the right hand by the time-t prieof a zero-oupon bond with fae value 1 maturing in year t + τ (see, for example, Cairns, Blake,and Dowd, 2006a).
6.3. Parameter alibration 179(6.9). The proess k̃t under the risk-adjusted measure Q(λ) is given by:
k̃t+1 =k̃t + µ+ C · (Nt − λ) ,
=k̃t + µ̃+ C ·Nt, (6.15)where µ̃ = µ − C · λ. Whereas the individual updates the parameters µ and Vontinuously, we assume that the parameter λ is not updated over time.6.3 Parameter alibration6.3.1 Finanial marketIn this setion we desribe the nanial market return proesses. We assume that,besides dierent types of annuities, the nanial market onsists of a risk-free asset,and a risky asset. The yearly return on the risk-free asset is set at 4% and assumedto be time-independent. Hene, we have that rrf = 0.04. Dene St as the time-tstok prie, assuming that there are no dividends.11 Then rt ≡ St+1St −1 is the yearlyequity return between year t and t + 1. The stok prie is modeled as a Brownianmotion with drift:
dSt = µ
S · St · dt+ σS · St · dZt,where µS ≡ rrf + λS · σS and σS are model parameters, with λS the parameter forthe market prie of equity risk, and Zt is a standard Brownian motion. Followingthe life-yle literature we set λS equal to 0.155 and σS equal to 0.158, resulting inan expeted yearly exess equity return equal to 4% and a standard deviation ofthe yearly equity return equal to 17% (see, for example, Gomes and Mihaelides,2005; Yao and Zang, 2005; and Coo, Gomes, and Meanhout, 2005). The equityrisk premium of 4% is lower than the historial one, whih is very ommon inthis literature. The lower-than-historial return is an adjustment in order to taketransation osts into aount, most of whih are in the form of mutual fund fees.Due to the high dimensionality of modeling the transation osts expliitly (as is,for example, done in Heaton and Luas, 1996) it is ommon to use this shortutrepresentation of a lower expeted return to take into aount transation osts. InSetion 6.6 as a robustness hek we set λS equal to 0.343 resulting in an expeted11Note that when there are dividends, the return dynamis are not aeted when the dividendsare reinvested in equities.
180 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskyearly equity exess return equal to 7%. This leads to an equity risk premium whihis in line with historial results (see, for example, Brennan and Xia, 2002).6.3.2 Systemati longevity riskTo estimate the parameter values of the stohasti proesses k(1) and k(2) weuse age-, gender-, and time-spei mortality probabilities for the United States,obtained from the Human Mortality Database.12 Figure 6.3.1 displays the parametervalues of the stohasti proess for males in the US from t = 1970 to t = 2006, bytting (6.8). The value of k(1)t displays the time-t general level of mortality. Thegeneral derease over time in the level of the stohasti proess k(1)t implies thatthere is generally a derease in the level of the mortality probabilities over time. Thegeneral inrease over time in the value of k(2)t implies that the mortality redutionis generally lower at higher ages.Figure 6.3.1: Estimated parameter values of the stohasti proesses k






























This gure displays the estimated parameter values of the stohasti proesses
k(1) and k(2). The left panel displays the estimated parameter values of thestohasti proesses k(1), the right panel displays the estimated parametervalues of the stohasti proesses k(2). The stohasti proesses are estimatedusing US male mortality data from 1970 to 2006.Using US male mortality probabilities from 1970 to 2006 we obtain the esti-12Available from the Human Mortality Database: www.mortality.org.






V̂t =Ĉt · Ĉ ′t =
[
0.0069237 −0.00010012
−0.00010012 1.4765 · 10−6
]
,where Ĉt an be reovered from a Choleski deomposition of V̂t.Reall that the base year is set equal to 0. To foreast the distribution ofthe future mortality probabilities we take as the starting value of k0 the estimate k̂torresponding to t = 2006, i.e., k0 = k̂t = [−10.1157 0.092799]′. The mortality prob-abilities are foreasted by simulating the parameters µ and V for eah path. LetMAbe the maximum attainable age, whih is set at 110 years. Then, given the simulatedparameters µ and V , we simulate the paths of kt for eah future time period, i.e., for
t = 1, . . . ,MA− x, given the assumed values of k0. The distribution of future mor-tality probabilities is obtained by the simulated values of the stohasti proesses
kt and the simulated residuals {ǫx+t,t|x+ t ∈ {x, . . . ,MA}, t ∈ {1, . . . ,MA− x}}.Eah suh path gives us a path of the future mortality probabilities.6.3.3 Priing systemati longevity riskIn Setion 6.2.3 we mentioned that the market prie of an annuity exeedsthe atuarially fair one, whih might be due to systemati longevity risk. Sinethere is no liquid market for systemati longevity risk it is diult to alibrate therisk-neutral survival probabilities using empirial data. Although little informationis available, it is reasonable to assume that life insurers requires a positive riskpremium for systemati longevity risk.13 This implies that the physial expetationof the disounted ash ows is lower than the risk-adjusted expetation.The risk adjusted proess for survival probabilities, as dened in equation(6.15), depends on the parameter λ. Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006a) alibrated asparameter value λ = [0.175 0.175]′, using the EIB/BNP longevity bond, whih was13Sine there is no market for systemati longevity life insurers, there is no equilibrium prie forit, and insurers would have to hold a reserve for systemati longevity risk. There exists also naturalounterparties of systemati longevity risk in annuities, for example death benet providers. How-ever, it is still likely that there is a positive risk premium, beause short (for example annuities)exposure is 30-40 larger than long (for example death benets) exposure (soure: Amerian Coun-il of Life Insurers, U.S. Life Insurane Moody's Statistial Handbook, August 2006; PensionMarkets in Fous, OECD, Otober 2006; and Moody's U.K. Life Insurane Industry Outlook,January 2007).
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isions with systemati longevity riskannouned in November 2004.14 We will use this alibrated value of λ for priingannuities.15 Using the alibrated parameter λ = [0.175 0.175]′ in the risk-neutralpriing we obtain a market prie for an immediate annuity whih is 7.35% higherthan the atuarially fair one. Using the empirial pries of immediate annuitiesMithell et al. (1999) found a loading fator of 7.3%.16 This might imply that usingonly the risk-adjusted proess Q(λ) with λ = [0.175 0.175]′, one ould explain theprie observed in the real-world by only using the risk-neutral priing method forsystemati longevity risk.One might argue that the prie of systemati longevity risk using the al-ibrated parameter from Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006a) (i.e., λ = [0.175 0.175]′)might be an overestimation of the real one, sine the longevity bond was withdrawnprior to issue. As an alternative, we assume that the individual postulates a uniformdistribution on λ = [λ1 λ2]′, i.e., λ1 = λ2 ∼ U (0, 0.175). Note that this stohasti
λ leads to a lower risk premium for systemati longevity risk than the alibrated
λ = [0.175 0.175]′.In summary, for the priing of annuities we distinguish three ases:i) the alibrated parameter on the EIB/BNP longevity bond, i.e., λ =
[0.175 0.175]′;ii) a stohasti λ, with λ1 = λ2 ∼ U (0, 0.175);iii) a loading fator, whih is set equal to 7.3%, irrespetive of the deferral period.The last ase is inluded in order to ompare our results with the existing literatureon life-yle models. As we will show in the following setion, for deferred annuitiesthe risk-neutral priing method implies that the risk premium as fration of he14The EIB/BNP longevity bond was withdrawn prior to issue. One of the reasons why thisissue was unsuessful might be the prie of the longevity bond indiating that this alibrated λoverestimates the prie of systemati longevity risk. However, there are several design issues (seeBlake, Cairns, and Dowd (2008) for an extensive investigation of the failure of this longevity bond)whih might explain why the bond was withdrawn prior issue.15The longevity bond was based on publily available Oe for National Statistis (ONS) dataon English and Welsh mortality for a ohort of males aged 65 in 2003. Tuljapurkar, Nan, and Boe(2000), among others, have shown that the mortality development in western ountries has similarpatterns. This indiates that that the driving fores for the deline in mortality may be the samein western ountries, whih implies that the prie of longevity risk would be similar for westernountries. Hene, it might indiate that the market prie of risk (λ) is approximately the same inwestern ountries.16This holds for immediate annuities. Sine we do not have information on the loading fatorfor deferred annuities we do not know whether this also holds for deferred annuities.
6.4. The eet of longevity risk on annuity pries 183atuarially fair prie of an annuity premium is inreasing in the deferral period. Bydetermining the optimal hoies in the life-yle model in a setting where annuitiesare pried using a onstant loading fator we show that our results also hold when theatuarial unfairness in annuities is independent of the deferral period of a deferredannuity.
6.4 The eet of longevity risk on annuity priesThis hapter extends the existing literature on life-yle models in two ways, namelyby inluding systemati longevity risk and by allowing an individual to purhase adeferred annuity. Clearly, the optimal annuity deision also depends on the urrentand future pries of the dierent annuities. Therefore, before investigating the op-timal annuity deision in a utility framework setting in Setion 6.5, we investigatein this setion the eet of systemati longevity risk on the prie of immediate anddeferred annuities.Systemati longevity risk aets the prie of annuities in two ways. First,systemati longevity risk leads to a risk premium in the prie of annuities. Seond, itleads to unertain future survival probabilities and thus to stohasti future annuitypries. We determine the urrent prie of deferred annuities and the probabilitydistribution of the prie of immediate annuities purhased at time s > 0, using themodel to foreast the distribution of future survival probabilities. For illustrativepurposes we onsider a 65-year-old male at time t = 0 and set λ = [0.175 0.175]′(see Setion 6.3.3).Figure 6.4.1 displays the eet of systemati longevity risk on the urrentprie of deferred annuities, as a funtion of the deferral period. The left paneldisplays the prie as a funtion of the deferral period (solid urve, the expetationunder the Q-measure), the atuarially fair prie (dashed urve, the expetationunder the P-measure), and the risk premium for the systemati longevity risk of theannuity (dashed-dotted urve, the dierene in the expetation under the Q- andthe P-measure). The right panel displays the fration of the prie of the annuitywhih is due to the risk premium, i.e., the risk premium as fration of the prie, asa funtion of the deferral period.
184 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskFigure 6.4.1: Prie of deferred annuities
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The left panel of this gure displays omponents of the prie of a deferredannuity as a funtion of the deferral period. The solid urve orresponds tothe market prie of a deferred annuity; the dashed urve to the atuarially fairprie, i.e., the expeted disounted ash ows; and the dashed-dotted urve tothe risk premium for systemati longevity risk. The right panel of this guredisplays the risk premium for systemati longevity risk as a perentage of theprie of a deferred annuity.From Figure 6.4.1 we observe that, as expeted, both the prie of an annuityand the risk premium are dereasing funtions of the deferral period. This oursbeause a longer deferral period redues the (expeted) number of payments tobe made. The deline in the risk premium for systemati longevity risk is smallfor short deferral periods, and large for long deferral periods.17 This ours beausesystemati longevity risk for payments to be made for short durations is muh smallerthan it is for long durations. Finally, we observe that the risk premium as frationof the prie of an annuity is an inreasing funtion of the deferral period. The17The risk premium for a deferred annuity with a long deferral period is high. This oursbeause there is a large amount of unertainty in the probability of surviving until advantagedages onditional on being alive at the age of 65. In addition, the risk premium is high due to theskewness of the distribution of the probability of surviving.
6.4. The eet of longevity risk on annuity pries 185unertainty in the survival probabilities is greater for survival probabilities fartherin the future, whih leads to (relatively) higher risk premiums for payments whihhave a longer maturity.Instead of purhasing a deferred annuity the individual an also postponethe purhase of an immediate annuity. The inome stream of a deferred annuitywith deferral period d an be mimiked by the following strategy: when the indi-vidual is alive at time d − 1 he purhases an immediate annuity (with d = 1), andwhen the individual is not alive at time d − 1 he does not purhase any annuities.Although the inome stream of a deferred annuity an be mimiked using an im-mediate annuity, when urrently purhasing a deferred annuity the prie is known,whereas the future prie for an immediate annuity is urrently stohasti. As newmortality information beomes available, it an be onsulted before setting the an-nuity pries. Therefore, when the annuity purhase is postponed there is generallyless unertainty about the development of future survival probabilities. This reduesthe risk premium for longevity risk for an annuity, thus making it more attrative.However, a disadvantage of postponing the purhase of the annuity is that there isurrently unertainty about what the future prie of an annuity will be.Figure 6.4.2 displays the median (dashed urve) and 95% ondene intervals(dashed-dotted urves) of the disounted prie of an immediate annuity at date


















+(1− d−1px+t,t) · 0
)]
.The eet that part of the buyers of a deferred annuity are not alive at time d − 1dominates the eet of a risk premium for systemati longevity risk whih is generallylower when the moment of purhase is postponed. Note that, even for an individualwithout any bequest motive, it might still improve utility to postpone the purhase
186 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskof an annuity instead of urrently purhasing a deferred annuity, sine the moneyinvested in deferred annuities annot be invested in equities, whih redues theapital gains from the equity risk premium.Figure 6.4.2: Present value of annuity pries



























This gure displays seleted quantiles of the present value of the date-s prie ofan immediate annuity and the prie of a deferred annuity as a funtion of theage at whih the initial payment is made. The solid urve orresponds to theurrent market prie of a deferred annuity; the dashed urve orresponds to thepresent value of the median market prie of an immediate annuity purhasedat time s; and the dashed-dotted urves orrespond to the present value of the95% ondene bounds of the market prie of an immediate annuity purhasedat time s.Let us nally disuss the eet of systemati longevity risk on the attra-tiveness of annuities. The attrativeness of annuities as an investment opportunityis due to pooling: i.e., the individuals who live longer than expeted are subsidizedby those who do not. This realloation of the ontributions of those who die tothose who survive, is referred to as the mortality redit advantage, see, for example,Milevsky (1998), Milevsky and Young (2002), and Horne, Maurer, and Stamos(2008). The mortality redit (MC) is dened as the return from urrently purhas-
6.4. The eet of longevity risk on annuity pries 187ing an annuity and selling it (at market prie) the following year in exess of therisk-free return. This is equivalent to the exess return of purhasing an annuityinstead of postponing its purhase to the sueeding year. In a setting withoutsystemati longevity risk the mortality redit is dened as:






















, (6.17)where 1d=0 is an indiator funtion whih equals one if d = 0, and zero otherwise, and
1px+t,t is the deterministi one-year survival probability. Beause 1px+t,t is betweenzero and one, the mortality redit is always positive. This ours due to the risk-sharing priniple, i.e., in the following year the annuitized wealth is re-alloated tothe survivors.In a setting with systemati longevity risk the mortality redit from (6.16)equals:
















.(6.18)Compared to the mortality redit in a setting with deterministi mortality probabil-ities, the mortality redit in a setting with stohasti mortality probabilities diersin two ways. First, from equation (6.18) we observe that the mortality redit isstohasti instead of deterministi, beause Vt+1 (A(max{0,d−1})t+1,x+1 ) depends on the evo-lution of the mortality probabilities until time t + 1. Seond, the mortality reditis dependent on the deferral period d in a setting with systemati longevity risk,whereas it is independent of the deferral period in a setting without systematilongevity risk. This is due to the fat that the prie of an annuity in the followingyear depends on the hange in the distribution of future survival probabilities due torevealed mortality information between time t and time t+ 1. This hange may bedierent for dierent ages, resulting in various hanges to the risk-adjusted expeteddisounted ash ows of the dierent annuity payments.Figure 6.4.3 displays seleted quantiles of the distribution of the mortalityredit as a funtion of the age of the individual, for immediate annuities (i.e., d = 1).
188 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskFigure 6.4.3: Mortality redit for immediate annuities














This gure displays seleted quantiles of the distribution of the mortality reditfor immediate annuities under the real-world measure, as a funtion of the ageof the individual. The solid urve orresponds to the median mortality reditfor immediate annuities under the real-world measure and the dashed urvesorrespond to the 95% ondene bounds of the mortality redit for immediateannuities under the real-world measure.From Figure 6.4.3 we observe that in a setting with systemati longevity risk,in ontrast to a setting without systemati longevity risk, the mortality redit anbe negative. A negative mortality redit implies that it is heaper for the individualto urrently invest in the risk-free asset and purhase an immediate annuity in thefollowing year than to urrently purhase an immediate annuity. This an ourdue to systemati longevity risk, whih might lead to a hange in the distribution offuture survival probabilities when new mortality information is revealed. Note thatfrom age 72, the eet of the positive mortality probability is generally larger thanthe eet of the new information on mortality probabilities, leading to a positivemortality redit with a probability of more than 97.5%. Moreover, reall that theexpeted exess return of equity is set at 4%, whih is lower than the median ofthe mortality redit for the ages above 80. As disussed in Milevsky and Young










= J0 (W0, 0, 0, X0) , (6.19)with J0 (W0, 0, 0) as dened in (6.2). In our results we ompare the utility (quantiedby the ertainty equivalent onsumption) obtained by the optimal onsumption andinvestment hoies to the utility of the onstant onsumption level that arises fromurrently investing all after-onsumption wealth in annuities. We refer to this in-vestment strategy as the fully annuitized (fa) strategy. The orresponding ertaintyequivalent onsumption in this strategy equals CECfa = W0/(1 + V0 (A(1)0 )),where the denominator equals the prie of a yearly onsumption of one, i.e., theurrent onsumption plus the prie of an immediate annuity.In Setion 6.5.1 we investigate the optimal fration of wealth invested in a de-ferred annuity and the orresponding ertainty equivalent onsumption onditional
190 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskon the immediate purhase of a deferred annuity, i.e., s = 0, for dierent deferralperiods. In Setion 6.5.2 we investigate the optimal fration of wealth invested in animmediate annuity and the orresponding ertainty equivalent onsumption ondi-tional on postponing the purhase of an immediate annuity, i.e., d = 1. We assumethat the individual purhases an immediate annuity only one.
6.5.1 Purhasing a deferred annuity at retirement date
In this setion we investigate the eet of the deferral period on the expeted lifetimeutility of an individual, onditional on urrently (s = 0) purhasing a deferredannuity. We maximize the individual's expeted lifetime utility as given in (6.2)given onstraints (6.3)(6.6) for annuities with d = 1, . . . , 15 (i.e., dierent deferralperiods, inluding an immediate annuity), respetively and s = 0 (i.e., immediatelypurhasing an annuity).First, let us investigate the eet of the deferral period on an individual'sexpeted lifetime utility. Figure 6.5.1 displays the ertainty equivalent onsumptionrelative to the ertainty equivalent onsumption in the fully annuitized strategy, asa funtion of the deferral period. The gure also illustrates the eet of the priingmethod of annuities (i.e., using a risk-neutral approah or using a onstant loadingfator of 7.3%) on the optimal deision.
6.5. Optimal life-yle hoies 191Figure 6.5.1: Certainty equivalent onsumption onditional on purhasinga deferred annuity at retirement date
















This gure displays the ertainty equivalent onsumption relative to the fullyannuitized strategy as a funtion of the deferral period of the annuities. Thesolid urve orresponds to the ertainty equivalent onsumption when annu-ities are pried using risk-neutral priing with λ = [0.175 0.175]′. The dashedurve orresponds to the ertainty equivalent onsumption when annuities arepried using the stohasti λ. The dashed-dotted urve orresponds to theertainty equivalent onsumption when annuities are pried using a loadingfator of 7.3%, irrespetive of the deferral period. The dotted urve orre-sponds to a setting without systemati longevity risk with a loading fator of7.3%.In Figure 6.5.1 we observe the following:i) the optimal annuity is a deferred annuity with a short deferral period;ii) the eet of systemati longevity risk on the utility gain (or loss) of a longerdeferral period is negligibly small.As expeted, we observe that when urrently purhasing an immediate annuity (i.e.,
d = 1) the ertainty equivalent onsumption relative to the fully annuitized strategy
192 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskis greater than one. This indiates that the investment and onsumption hoiesin the fully annuitized strategy are not the optimal ones. The utility gain, relativeto the fully annuitized strategy, is similar in a setting with and without systematilongevity risk, using a onstant loading fator for annuity pries. When the annuitiesare pried using the risk-neutral survival probabilities, the utility gain obtained bypurhasing an annuity with the optimal deferral period instead of purhasing animmediate annuity is negligibly small. We also observe that the optimal deferralperiod is short: only three years when risk-neutral priing is used (for both λ =
[0.175 0.175]′ and the stohasti λ) and four years when a loading fator of 7.3% isused. An inrease in the deferral period has two eets, namely:i) A longer deferral period leads to heaper annuities. Beause annuities witha longer deferral period are heaper the individual an invest more in otherassets, i.e., in the risk-free asset or in equities, and/or purhase an annuitywith a higher inome stream. When the individual hooses to invest a lowerproportion of initial wealth in an annuity, a higher fration of initial wealthmay be invested in equities, leading to a higher equity risk premium. Whenthe individual does not hoose to invest less in a deferred annuity, a higherdeferral period leads to a higher inome level in the payo phase.ii) A longer deferral period leads to fewer periods with an inome guarantee.Hene, there are more periods with greater unertainty in the onsumptionlevel. This unertainty redues an individual's expeted lifetime utility.We observe that for deferred annuities with a short deferral period, the rst ef-fet dominates. However, for longer deferral periods, the seond eet dominates,resulting in a short optimal deferral period.The attrativeness of an annuity with a longer deferral period is that it isheaper. As mentioned previously, the redution in the prie of annuities an beused to either inrease the inome level after the deferral period and/or to inreasethe fration of wealth invested in equities or in the risk-free asset. To illustratethis, the upper panel of Figure 6.5.2 displays the optimal fration of initial wealthwhih is invested in a deferred annuity as a funtion of the deferral period. Thelower panel of Figure 6.5.2 displays the optimal level of normalized (i.e., relative tothe fully annuitized strategy) yearly annuity inome after the deferral period as afuntion of the xed deferral period.
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yle hoies 193Figure 6.5.2: Optimal annuity deision





















































This gure displays the optimal annuity deision as a funtion of the defer-ral period of the urrently purhased annuity. The upper panel displays theoptimal fration of after-onsumption wealth whih is urrently used for thepurhase of deferred annuities, i.e., a0(d). The lower panel displays the optimalannuity inome relative to the optimal annuity inome in the fully annuitizedstrategy, i.e., a0(d) · V0 (A(1)65,0) /V0 (A(d)65,0). The solid urve orresponds toannuities pried using the risk-neutral priing for systemati longevity riskwith λ = [0.175 0.175]′. The dashed urve orresponds to annuities pried us-ing the stohasti λ. The dashed-dotted urve orresponds to annuities priedusing a loading fator of 7.3%, irrespetive of the deferral period. The dottedurve orresponds to a setting without systemati longevity risk and annuitiespried using a loading fator of 7.3%, irrespetive of the deferral period.In Figure 6.5.2 we observe the following:
194 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riski) the optimal fration of annuitized wealth is dereasing in the deferral periodof the annuity;ii) after a short deferral period the optimal annuity payment in the payout phaseis dereasing in the deferral period;iii) systemati longevity risk redues the attrativeness of annuities.In Figure 6.5.2 we observe that the fration of wealth whih is invested in a deferredannuity is a dereasing funtion of the deferral period. However, the annuity inomelevel is an inreasing funtion of the deferral period up to a deferral period of threeyears. This implies that an inrease in the deferral period (for d ≤ 3) initiallyleads to less annuitized wealth, but in the payo phase to more wealth invested inannuities. This leads initially to fewer, but in the payo phase to more apital gainsfrom the mortality redit. This ours beause initially the optimal annuity inomeinreases in the deferral period. When the deferral period is longer than three yearsboth the optimal fration of annuitized wealth and the optimal annuity paymentlevel are dereasing funtions in the deferral period. This ours beause annuitiesare illiquid. The illiquidity of an annuity restrits the individual's onsumptionsmoothing. Therefore, when the individual is faed with muh lower than expetedreturns in the nanial market, he annot adjust his annuitized wealth level. Thismay lead to a substantial redution in the onsumption level until the payo phaseof the deferred annuity; this is not optimal.Let us nally investigate the eet of systemati longevity risk on the opti-mal fration of annuitized wealth. Systemati longevity risk may have two eetswhen the individual urrently purhases a deferred annuity. First, it leads to arisk premium whih is an inreasing funtion of the deferral period. Compared toa loading fator whih is independent of the deferral period, an inreasing loadingfator leads to a higher fration of annuitized wealth. In addition, it makes a longerdeferral period less attrative. Seond, systemati longevity risk leads to stohastivalues of the survival probabilities. The unertainty in the future survival proba-bilities makes annuities less attrative. In Figure 6.5.2 we observe that exludingsystemati longevity risk leads to an inrease the optimal the fration of annuitizedwealth when purhasing an immediate annuity from 83.2% to 89.7%.18 This ours18For the sake of omparison, we kept the same pries of deferred annuities, using a loadingfator of 7.3%.
6.5. Optimal life-yle hoies 195beause systemati longevity risk leads to unertainty in the utility gain of an an-nuity; i.e., when future survival probabilities are lower than expeted they are lessattrative. In the setting with systemati longevity risk the individual adjusts hisonsumption level to the newly revealed mortality information: he onsumes morewhen the survival probabilities are lower than expeted and he saves more when thesurvival probabilities are higher than expeted. In order to be able to adjust hisonsumption, the individual needs liquid wealth. Although there is a small eetof systemati longevity risk on the fration of annuitized wealth, the eet of sys-temati longevity risk on the utility is negligible small. This implies that the utilitygain from setting the hoies optimal onditional on the newly revealed mortalityinformation is negligible small when the individual purhases deferred annuities.This ours due to the annuity inome, when an individual lives muh longer thanexpeted he still has a substantial annuity inome at high ages and this redues theeet of an adjustment in the onsumption when new mortality data reveals. Inter-estingly, the eet of systemati longevity risk on the fration of annuitized wealthis negligible small after a short deferral period. This ours beause the adjustmentsof the hoies on a hange in the distribution of the future survival probabilities aresmall. In addition, the individual has more liquid wealth and thus is more able toadjust his onsumption level as survival probabilities are realized. When the deferralperiod is larger than three years the dierene in the optimal fration of annuitizedwealth with and without systemati longevity risk is negligibly small, due to thesubstantial amount of liquid wealth. Hene, the exlusion of systemati longevityrisk leads to a higher utility for an immediate annuity, but not for a deferred annuity(with a moderate or long deferral period).Let us now disuss how our ndings relate to the existing literature on de-ferred annuities. For our representative agent it would be optimal to purhase adeferred annuity whih starts with an initial payout at the age of 68. Our ndingdeviates from the literature that argues that deferred annuities with a long deferralperiod are preferable (see Milevsky, 2005; Dus, Maurer, and Mithell, 2005; Horneand Maurer, 2008; and Gong and Webb, 2009). Milevsky (2005) show that, underthe assumption of a real interest rate of 3.25%, that deferred annuities have a highermoney's worth. Dus, Maurer, and Mithell (2005) show that deferred annuitizationwith a xed withdrawal rule an enhane expeted payouts and ut expeted short-fall risk. Horne and Maurer (2008) show, in a life yle model with labor inomerisk and equity risk, that during the working life buying deferred annuities where
196 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskpayouts start either at age 65 or at age 85 and may inrease the expeted lifetimeutility relative to buying immediate annuities during the working phase. Gong andWebb (2009) show that for a ouple, with only non-systemati longevity risk, whenthe risk aversion is low and the annuitant money's worth is low enough, using anaive deumulation strategy (the rule-of-thumb strategy is an equal onsumptionin all periods prior to the age at whih the ALDA payments ommene) it maybe optimal to purhase a deferred annuity with payments ommening at the ageof 85. Our ndings primarily dier from existing literature sine we determine theoptimal hoies dynamially using the objetive funtion to maximize an individ-ual's expeted lifetime utility. This diers from existing literature whih uses eitherexpeted shortfall risk using rules of thumbs for the hoies or using an individual'sutility where an individual's hoies are determined using rules of thumbs. Theexisting literature argues that a deferred annuity allows for mortality redits whenthey are high, and allows for liquid wealth to earn the equity risk premium whenthey are low. We nd that the low mortality redit just after the annuity transationdoes not oset the utility loss beause of the illiquidity of the annuity. The illiq-uidity of annuities restrits an individual's opportunities to smooth onsumption.This aets the expeted lifetime utility, espeially when the individual is faed withadverse shoks in the equity market before the payo phase. Therefore, onditionalon the purhase of a deferred annuity with a long deferral period, it is not optimal toinvest a large proportion of the liquid wealth in an annuity; i.e., the individual needsmuh more preautionary saving when the deferral period is long. This is in linewith the results of Bayraktar and Young (2009). They found that immediate annu-ities are more preferable than deferred annuities, in a setting where an individualminimizes lifetime ruin probability instead of maximize expeted lifetime utility.6.5.2 Postponing the purhase of an immediate annuityAn alternative to purhasing a deferred annuity at retirement date is to postponethe purhase of an immediate annuity. The advantage of postponing the annuitypurhase is that the individual maintains only liquid assets until the moment theannuity is purhased. This allows the individual to adjust his onsumption andannuity inome level to the realizations of the nanial market, at the moment theannuity is purhased. The disadvantage of postponing the annuity purhase is thatthe prie of the annuity is urrently stohasti and that the individual does notreeive the mortality redit until the moment of the purhase of an annuity. In this
6.5. Optimal life-yle hoies 197setion we maximize the individual's expeted lifetime utility as given in (6.2) givenonstraints (6.3)(6.6) for an immediate annuity (i.e., d = 1) with s = 0, . . . , 20(i.e., dierent xed postponement periods, with s = 0 immediately purhasing anannuity).Figure 6.5.3 displays the ertainty equivalent onsumption onditional onpurhasing an immediate annuity at time s, relative to the urrently fully annuitizedstrategy, and as a funtion of the postponement periods. The individual maximizeshis utility by investing in the risk-free asset and in equities, and, at time s, in anannuity.Figure 6.5.3: Certainty equivalent onsumption onditional on the post-ponement period of an immediate annuity
















This gure displays the ertainty equivalent onsumption relative to the fullyannuitized strategy as a funtion of the postponement period of the purhaseof immediate annuities. The solid urve orresponds to the ertainty equiv-alent onsumption when annuities are pried using risk-neutral priing with
λ = [0.175 0.175]′. The dashed urve orresponds to the ertainty equivalentonsumption when annuities are pried using the stohasti λ. The dashed-dotted urve orresponds to the ertainty equivalent onsumption when an-nuities are pried using a loading fator of 7.3%, irrespetive of the deferralperiod. The dotted urve orresponds to the ertainty equivalent onsumptionin a setting without systemati longevity risk and annuities are pried using aloading fator of 7.3%, irrespetive of the deferral period.
198 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskLet us rst investigate the eet of postponing the purhase of an immediateannuity on an individual's expeted lifetime utility. In Figure 6.5.3 we observe thatwith systemati longevity risk the ertainty equivalent onsumption is dereasing inthe postponement period. The three main eets of postponing the annuity purhaseon the expeted lifetime utility of the individual are:i) Mortality redit. By postponing the annuity deision the individual does notearn the mortality redit of the annuity until the moment of purhasing theannuity.ii) Equity risk premium. By postponing the annuity deision the individual hasuntil time s only liquid wealth. Therefore, he is less restrited in the frationof total wealth he invests in equities. This might lead to a higher apital gainfrom the equity risk premium.iii) Conversion rate risk. Due to stohasti survival probabilities the prie of anannuity in the future is stohasti, whih results in onversion rate risk.We observe that the positive eet of postponing the annuity purhase, i.e., theequity risk premium, is smaller than the negative eets, i.e., the missed mortalityredit and the onversion rate risk. This ours beause just after retirement, themissed mortality redit is small, but the onversion rate risk is substantial. Thisonversion rate risk is aeted by hanges in survival probabilities in two ways. Theannuity pries in the future are aeted by the dierene in realized and expetedsurvival probabilities on the one hand and by a hange in the expeted trend in theevolution of future survival probabilities on the other hand.Next, let us investigate the eet of systemati longevity risk on the eet ofan individual's expeted lifetime utility onditional on postponing the purhase ofan immediate annuity. In Figure 6.5.3 we observe that the inlusion of systematilongevity risk has two eets, namely:i) whereas it is optimal to postpone the purhase of an immediate annuity in asetting without systemati longevity risk, this is not the ase in a setting withsystemati longevity risk;ii) after a short postponement period the utility loss of inreasing the post-ponement period with an additional year is muh larger in a setting withoutlongevity risk than in a setting with systemati longevity risk.
6.5. Optimal life-yle hoies 199There are two opposite eets of systemati longevity risk on the expeted lifetimeutility when the purhase of an annuity is postponed. On the one hand systematilongevity risk redues the attrativeness of an immediate annuity, as disussed inSetion 6.5.1. On the other hand, systemati longevity risk leads to unertainty inthe future pries of annuities whih leads to a lower utility when the annuity pur-hase is postponed in a setting with systemati longevity risk than in one withoutit. When the postponement period is short, exluding systemati longevity risk andthus a deterministi prie of annuities purhased in the future leads to a higherutility when the annuity purhase is postponed. When the postponement periodis longer, exluding systemati longevity risk leads to a larger derease in the er-tainty equivalent onsumption. This is due to the fat that immediate annuities aremore attrative in a setting without systemati longevity risk than in a setting withsystemati longevity risk.Figure 6.5.4 displays seleted quantiles of the optimal fration of annuitizedwealth as a funtion of the postponement period (i.e., as funtion of s). Note thatthe individual has CRRA preferenes, whih implies that the optimal fration ofannuitized wealth is independent of the past equity returns and the wealth level ofthe individual.19 This implies that the optimal fration of wealth annuitized is onlyaeted by the unertainty in the survival probabilities. First, in Figure 6.5.4 weobserve that, as expeted, the fration of wealth invested in an immediate annuitygenerally inreases with the length of the postponement period, or equivalently, withthe age of the individual. This ours beause the mortality probabilities inreasewith age whih generally leads to a higher mortality redit (see Figure 6.4.3).Seond, in Figure 6.5.4 we also observe that the unertainty in the distribu-tion of the optimal fration of annuitized wealth is large. Therefore, we investigatehow the evolution of future survival probabilities aets the fration of annuitizedwealth. To do so, we deompose the total eet in an eet due to hanges in therisk premium for systemati longevity risk (whih is primarily aeted by hanges inthe unertainty in the future survival probabilities) and an eet due to hanges inthe atuarial fair value (whih is primarily aeted by hanges in expeted survivalprobabilities). We alulate the orrelation between the optimal fration of wealthinvested in an annuity and the atuarially fair value. We nd that they are positively19Note that this only holds when the return dynamis of the asset portfolio are modeled in suha way that past returns do not have an inuene on urrent and future returns. In our setting thereturn proess is stationary, sine we use a random walk with drift proess to model the prie ofequities.
200 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskFigure 6.5.4: The optimal fration of wealth invested in an annuity ondi-tional on the postponement period





























This gure displays the seleted quantiles of the optimal fration of after-onsumption wealth whih is invested in annuities as a funtion of the age ofthe individual at the moment of purhase of the immediate annuity. The solidurve orresponds to the median; the dashed urves orrespond to the 50%ondene bounds; the dashed-dotted urves orrespond to the 80% ondenebounds; and the dotted urves orrespond to the 90% ondene bounds.orrelated.20 This ours beause a hange in the expeted survival probabilities hasa small eet on the attrativeness of an annuity, but a muh larger eet on theprie of an annuity. We also alulate the orrelation between the optimal fration ofwealth invested in an annuity and the risk premium for systemati longevity risk inthe annuity, and we nd a negative orrelation.21 This ours beause an inrease inthe risk premium in an annuity leads to a higher ost without additional expetedpayments, making an annuity less favorable. Interestingly, the eet of a hangein the atuarially fair value on the optimal fration of annuitized wealth is larger20The orrelation between the atuarially fair value and the fration of annuitized wealth isapproximately 0.8 depending on the time of the purhase of an annuity.21The orrelation between the risk margin and the fration of annuitized wealth is between 0and -0.3, and a dereasing funtion in the time of the purhase of an annuity.
6.6. Alternative individual harateristis and nanial market parameters 201than the eet of a hange in the risk premium. This ours beause a hange inthe atuarially fair value is due to a hange in the expeted survival probabilities.The onsequene of higher survival probabilities is a higher atuarially fair value ofan annuity on the one hand, and a larger onsumption eet at higher ages on theexpeted lifetime utility on the other hand. Therefore, when the individual expetsto live longer due to newly revealed survival information, the optimal fration of an-nuitized wealth inreases. This is due to the higher prie of an annuity and due to ahigher weight in the expeted lifetime utility funtion of onsumption at advanedages.6.6 Alternative individual harateristis and nan-ial market parametersThe results shown in the previous setions suggest that systemati longevity riskmay signiantly aet an individual's annuity deision. In this setion we showthat these results are robust to alternative assumptions in individual harateristisand nanial market parameters. In the existing literature (see, for example, Blake,Cairns, and Dowd, 2003; Horne, Maurer, and Samos, 2008; and Babel and Mer-rill, 2007) dierent assumptions on the risk aversion oeient and the equity riskpremium are used. In this setion we investigate the robustness of the results forhanges in the risk aversion oeient and in the equity risk premium. In partiular,we ompute the optimal annuity deisions for a less risk averse individual, i.e., anindividual with a risk aversion oeient of 2 instead of 5. Moreover, we omputethe optimal annuity deisions when the expeted exess return on equities is 7%(i.e., λs = 0.343) instead of 4% (i.e., λs = 0.155). As disussed in Setion 6.3.1,in the standard life-yle model literature the exess return is set lower than theempirial one in order to ope with transation osts.First, we investigate the robustness of the utility-loss when postponing theannuity purhase. We nd that for the dierent alternative individual harateristisand nanial market parameters, i.e., for both a lower value of the risk aversionparameter (γ = 2, with λs = 0.155) and for a higher equity risk premium (λs =
0.343, with γ = 5) it is optimal not to postpone the annuity purhase. Either a lowerrisk aversion (γ = 2) or a higher equity risk premium (λs = 0.343) does lead to asmaller utility loss when the annuity purhase is postponed than in the ase where
γ = 5 and λs = 0.155. In a setting with systemati longevity risk, for the investigated
202 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskvalues of the risk aversion and the equity risk premium, we nd that it is only optimalto postpone the annuity purhase when both the risk aversion is low and the equityrisk premium is high (γ = 2 and λs = 0.343). Assuming a higher equity risk premium(λs = 0.343), we nd that the optimal fration of wealth urrently invested in animmediate annuity is approximately 60%. This is lower than the average observedfration of annuitized wealth of the urrent retiring US ohort, taking into aountthe pre-existing annuitized wealth, suh as soial seurity benets and dened benetpension plans (see Dushi and Webb, 2004a, using data of the Health and RetirementSurvey). Although a high equity risk premium of 7% explains the empirial levelof annuitization this equity risk premium seems empirially to be too high (see thedisussion in Setion 6.3.1). One possible explanation of the annuity puzzle mightbe that the individual does not take transation osts into aount. Hene, whenthe individual would not be rational and expets a too high equity risk premium,this might explain the individual's hoie to forgo annuitization.Next, we investigate the robustness of the optimal deferral period to alterna-tive individual harateristis and nanial market parameters. Table 6.6.1 displaysthe optimal deferral period under the dierent assumptions.Table 6.6.1: Optimal deferral period
γ λs priing annuities d⋆ gain in CEC5 0.155 λ = [0.175 0.175]′ 3 0.06%5 0.155 stohasti λ 3 0.10%5 0.155 loading fator (7.3%) 4 1.19%5 0.343 λ = [0.175 0.175]′ 3 0.07%2 0.155 λ = [0.175 0.175]′ 5 0.30%This table displays the optimal deferral period of annuities urrently purhasedfor several alternatives of the parameters in the model. The rst olumnorresponds to the risk aversion parameter; the seond olumn orresponds tothe parameter for the expeted exess return on equity (i.e., λs = 0.155 if theexpeted exess return is 4% and λs = 0.343 if the expeted exess return is7%); the third olumn orresponds to the priing of annuities (using a loadingfator of 7.3% or using risk-neutral survival probabilities); the fourth olumnorresponds to the optimal deferral period; and the last olumn orrespondsto the gain in ertainty equivalent onsumption when purhasing an annuitywith the optimal deferral period instead of purhasing an immediate annuity.In this table we observe that the optimal deferral time is short, also in ases
6.7. Conlusions 203where risk aversion is lower or the equity risk premium is higher. As expeted, whenrisk aversion is low enough or the return on an alternative to an annuity payment(i.e., the expeted return on equity) is higher, it beomes more favorable to deferthe rst annuity payment. When deferring the rst annuity payment, the individualoptimally invests a lower fration of wealth in a deferred annuity at retirement date,whih is partly invested in equities, depending on risk aversion. The utility gain isvery small when purhasing an annuity with the optimal deferral period instead ofan immediate one and this result is robust for all ve examined alternatives of theparameters of the individual harateristis and the nanial market.6.7 ConlusionsThis hapter investigates the eet of systemati longevity risk on an individual'soptimal annuitization deision in a life-yle model. In addition, we investigate theoptimal annuity produt an individual should purhase, i.e., a deferred annuity atretirement date or an immediate annuity purhased either at retirement date or at axed time in the future. We argue that systemati longevity risk aets the optimalannuity deision in three ways. First, due to systemati longevity risk the prie ofan annuity purhased in the future depends on the distribution of future survivalprobabilities, and therefore it is urrently stohasti. Seond, systemati longevityrisk aets the urrent market prie of a deferred annuity. The impat of systematilongevity risk on the market prie of an annuity depends on the type of the annuity.For payments with greater longevity unertainty (payments at advaned ages), therisk premium as fration of the expeted disounted ash ow of the payment, ismuh higher than for payments with smaller longevity unertainty (payments in therst years following the purhase of an annuity). Compared to a loading fator whihis independent of the deferral period, this makes deferred annuities less attrative.Third, systemati longevity risk leads to annuities whih are less attrative. Thisours beause the systemati longevity risk leads to unertainty in the value ofannuities, thereby making annuities a more risky investment.In the ontext of our life-yle model we show that systemati longevity riskaets an individual's annuity deision in two ways. First, due to the unertaintyin the future pries of annuities, it is utility-inreasing for an individual aged 65to purhase an annuity urrently instead of postponing the annuity purhase. Thisdiers from the existing literature, whih ignores systemati longevity risk. Seond,
204 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskwe show that systemati longevity risk makes deferred annuities less attrative.We nd that it is optimal to urrently purhase an annuity with a short deferralperiod. However, we nd that the utility loss of urrently purhasing an immediateannuity, instead of urrently purhasing an annuity with the optimal deferral period,is negligibly small.This hapter an be extended in several ways. For example, many modi-ations and extensions an be made with respet to the CRRA utility funtion,suh as adding a bequest motive. Obviously, this will aet the quantitative results.However, sine the mehanisms as desribed in this hapter will probably remainin plae, the qualitative results, i.e., the eet of systemati longevity risk and theeet of an inrease in the deferral period, will probably also remain in plae. Thishapter ould also be extended by inluding other types of annuities, suh as vari-able annuities, or dierent options in the annuity (for example, a period-ertain, ora lump-sum option), allowing for the purhase of a portfolio of dierent types ofannuities, or allowing the individual to gradually purhase annuities. For example,the model ould be extended by allowing for the postponement of the purhase ofdeferred annuities. However, this might not be optimal, beause, as observed in thease of immediate annuities, it is utility-reduing to postpone the annuity purhasedue to the urrently stohasti prie of these annuities. It would be more inter-esting to extend the literature on optimal gradual annuitization by allowing for aombination of annuity produts purhased at dierent moments in the life-yle.This hapter extends the urrent literature on life yle models in two ways.First, we allow for systemati longevity risk as a risk fator for the individual.Seond, for the literature on literature on life yle model investigating the optimaldeferral period, we inlude other soures of risk than only non-systemati longevityrisk. We allow also for systemati longevity risk and equity risk. Individuals alsofaes other kinds of risk, suh as health risk, housing risk, and interest rate risk.Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2009) show that inluding health risk makesannuitizing at retirement age more favorable and this would enfore the result wefound. Housing wealth is a risky asset, like equities, but it is also dierent fromequities sine it provides a onstant utility stream and selling a house will lead tomoving osts.
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.Let θ̂t = [µ̂(1)t µ̂(2)t V̂ (1,1)t V̂ (1,2)t V̂ (2,2)t ]′ be the vetor of the maximum likelihood esti-mates of the parameters of the stohasti survival proess based on the informationrevealed up to time t and let Et [·] be the expetation onditional on the exogenousand endogenous state variables at time t.Formally, as desribed in Setion 6.2.1, the individual solves:













.The individual's optimization problem is subjet to liquidity and short-selling on-straints, and given the endogenous (A0, B0, and W0) and exogenous (X0) statevariables. The liquidity and short-selling onstraints are:
0 ≤ as(d) ≤1,
0 ≤ wτ ≤1, for τ ≥ 0,
Cτ ≤Wτ + Aτ , for τ ≥ 0.The evolution of the endogenous state variable Wτ is given by:
Wτ+1 =
{
(Wτ − Cτ ) · (1− as(d)) ·
(




, if τ = s,
(Wτ + Aτ − Cτ ) ·
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, if τ 6= s,





At, if t 6= s+ d− 1,







) , if t = s, d = 1,with A0 = 0, and
Bt+1 =
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t+s + (x+ t+ s) · k(2)t+s + ǫx+t+s,t+s
) .Systemati longevity risk aets the survival probabilities generating additional un-ertainty in our life-yle model. As dened in equations (6.10) and (6.11), for theproess of the survival probabilities we assume that there exists parameter risk inthe distribution of future survival probabilities. We assume that the individual up-dates the parameters in the CBD model. The distribution of the parameters in theCBD model is given by:
V −1|D ∼Wishart(τ + t− t, (τ + t− t+ 1)−1V̂ −1τ ) ,
µ|V,D ∼MV N
(
µ̂τ , (τ + t− t + 1)−1V
)
,where µ̂τ and V̂τ = Ĉ ′τ Ĉτ are the maximum likelihood estimates of µ and V at time





































θ̂t+1 =θ̂t +∆θ̂t ,






































































































The individual updated information at time t on the distribution of the survivalprobabilities is fully aptured by Xt = [k(1)t k(2)t θ̂′t]′.In Appendix 6.B.1 we provide the normalizations whih we use later in theappendix. In Appendix 6.B.2 we desribe the method to obtain the urrently optimallevel of annuitized wealth, onditional on the purhase of a deferred annuity with axed deferral period. Finally, in Appendix 6.B.3 we desribe the method to obtainthe optimal level of annuitized wealth, onditional on a xed postponement periodbefore purhasing an immediate annuity.6.B.1 RenormalizationIn this setion we present the normalizations. To improve the readability, inthis appendix we drop the rst argument in the value funtion Jt. Let u(Ct) = C1−γt1−γ .The individual solves:








(Wt + At+1 − Ct)
(
1 + rrf + wt
(
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)) if t 6= s
(Ws − Cs) (1− as)
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At if t 6= s+ d− 1





· as if t = s, d = 1 (6.21)
Ct ≤Wt + At (6.22)
Bt+1 =
{







) , if t = s. (6.23)
208 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskWe start by onsidering the time after the deision of annuity inome wherethe individual has a xed yearly annuity inome level, i.e., at time t > s. First, weonsider this problem at the last period, i.e., at time MA − x. The utility of theindividual is given by:
JMA−x (WMA−x, AMA−x, XMA−x) =
(WMA−x + AMA−x)
1−γ
1− γ . (6.24)Let the variables with an overline be the variables without an overline, divided bythe annuity inome,22 then we an rewrite (6.24) as:











.(6.25)Also the wealth equation and budget onstraint an be rewritten as:
Wt+1/At =




































Ct ≤W t + 1, (6.22′)where (6.20') and (6.22') are (6.20) and (6.22) reformulated in terms of variableswith an overline.Next, onsider t =MA− x− 1. Using (6.25) we have:































W t+1, 1, Xt+1
)]
}s.t. (6.21), (6.20'), (6.22'), W t =Wt/At, and Ct = Ct/At. (6.26)22Assuming At > 0 for t > s, i.e., the individual has a positive annuity inome level.








u(Ct) + β · Et
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. At time t =MA− x− 1 the expression for J t (W t, Xt) orrespondsexatly to the maximization part in (6.26), hene we have:
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u(Ct) + β · Et
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Ct ≤W t + 1,whih has only a single state variable, it is possible to obtain the level of thevalue funtion, onsumption, and other variables of interest by using the appro-priate funtion, e.g., Jt (Wt, At, Xt) = A1−γt · J t (W t, Xt) and Ct (Wt, At, Xt) =
At · Ct (Wt/At, Xt). Notie that the normalization with respet to At is equivalentwith the normalization with respet to Bt, beause by denition for time t > s + dthe value of At is equal to the value of Bt.Next, onsider the problem with a deferred annuity where the annuity is not yetpaying, i.e., we onsider the problem at time s < t < s+ d− 1 with d > 1. We havethat the utility is given by:
Jt (Wt, At = 0, Bt, Xt)=max
{wt,Ct}
{u(Ct)+βEt [px+t,tJt+1 (Wt+1, At+1, Bt+1, Xt+1)]}s.t.
Wt+1 =(Wt − Ct) ·
(





210 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskUsing equation (6.27) for time t = s + d and equation (6.29) for t < s + d, we anrewrite the utility funtion as:
Jt (Wt, At=0, Bt, Xt)=max
{wt,Ct}
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(6.28)Dene a new value funtion:
J t
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u(Ct) + β · Et
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Ct ≤W t.This expression for J t (W t, At = 0, Xt) orresponds exatly with the maximizationpart in (6.28). Hene, we have Ct(Wt, Bt, Xt) = Bt · Ct(W t, Xt) and:




W t, At = 0, 1, Xt
)
=B1−γt · J t
(
W t, At = 0, Xt
)
. (6.29)Now onsider the moment of purhasing an immediate annuity. We havethat the utility of the individual at time s is given by:
Js (Ws, As = 0, Xs) = max
{ws,as,Cs}
{u(Cs) + β · Es [px+s,sJs+1 (Ws+1, As+1, Xs+1)]}s.t.
Ws+1 =(Ws − Cs) · (1− as) ·
(











6.B. Method to alulate optimal annuity deision 211Notie that the state variable of the annuity inome at time s an be dropped, sineit is by denition equal to zero, beause the individual purhases only annuities attime s.Dene a variable with a hat by the orresponding variable without a hat dividedby the wealth level at that moment.23 We an rewrite the utility funtion as:
Js (Ws, Xs) = max
{ws,as,Cs}

















)]}s.t. Ĉs = Cs/Ws






























)]}s.t. Ĉs = Cs/Ws (6.30)Dene a new value funtion:
































Ĉs ≤1.This expression for Ĵs(As = 0, Xs) orresponds exatly to the maximization part in23Assuming Wt > 0 for t ≤ s, i.e., the individual has, at times before the purhase of an annuitya positive wealth level. In ase Wt = 0 for some t ≤ s the onsumption level at that time is equalto zero, due to the budget onstraint and hene Jt(0) = −∞.
212 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity risk(6.30). Hene, we have that Cs(Ws, As = 0, Xs) = Ĉs(As = 0, Xs) ·Ws and:
Js(Ws, As = 0, Xs) = W
1−γ
s · Js(1, As = 0, Xs)) =W 1−γs · Ĵs(As = 0, Xs).(6.32)This implies that for t = s the optimal onsumption level is a linear funtion of thewealth level, the optimal fration of after onsumption wealth invested in annuitiesis independent of the wealth level, and the after onsumption and annuitized wealthinvested in equities is independent of the wealth level.Finally, we onsider the time before the purhasing of an annuity, i.e. attime t < s. First, onsider the problem at time t = s− 1:
Jt (Wt, At = 0, Xt) = max
{wt,Ct}
{u(Ct) + βEt [px+t,tJt+1 (Wt+1, At+1 = 0, Xt+1)]}s.t. (6.33)
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct) ·
(





Ct ≤Wt.Using equation (6.32), we an rewrite the utility funtion as:
Jt (Wt, At = 0, Xt) = max
{wt,Ct}
{u(Ct) + βEt [px+t,tJt+1 (Wt+1, At+1 = 0, Xt+1)]}s.t. (6.20)-(6.22)
=W 1−γt · max{wt,Ĉt}
{










Jt+1 (1, At+1 = 0, Xt+1)
]}s.t. Ĉt = Ct/Wt (6.34)Dene a new value funtion:
Ĵt(At = 0, Xt) = max
{wt,Ct}
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6.B. Method to alulate optimal annuity deision 213This expression for Ĵt(At = 0, Xt) orresponds exatly to the maximization partin (6.34). Hene, we have:
Jt (Wt, At = 0, Xt) = W
1−γ
t · Jt (1, At = 0, Xt) = W 1−γt · Ĵt(At = 0, Xt). (6.36)Using equation (6.36) instead of equation (6.32), the exat same logi an be re-peated bak an arbitrary number of periods. Hene, we have that Jt(Wt, At =
0, Xt) = W
1−γ
t · Ĵt(At = 0, Xt) and Ct(Wt, At = 0, Xt) = Ĉt(At = 0, Xt) ·Wt. Thisimplies that for t ≤ s the optimal onsumption level is a linear funtion of the wealthlevel, and the fration of wealth invested in annuities (at time s) and the fration ofwealth invested in equities (at time t ≤ s) is independent of the wealth level.The individual's optimal hoie for problem (6.33) an be determined by settingthe rst order onditions of the value funtion given in equation (6.35) equal tozero. However, in Appendix 6.B.3 we will use an alternative solution method, using
Jt(Wt, At = 0, Xt) = W
1−γ
t · Ĵt(At = 0, Xt) and Ct(Wt, At = 0, Xt) = Ĉt(At =










214 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskSimilar to Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009), at any intermediate point in timethe lifetime utility funtion satises the Bellman equation:
J t
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1− γ + β · Et
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px+t,t · J t+1
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x+ t+ 1,W t+1, At+1, Xt+1
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. (6.39)Equation (6.38) is the rst order ondition of (6.37) with respet to the fration ofliquid wealth invested in equity and equation (6.39) is the rst order ondition of(6.37) with respet to the onsumption level.To solve the individual's lifetime investment and onsumption problem weuse a grid of the endogenous state variable after-onsumption normalized wealth,
W̃t = W t + At − Ct. Following Carroll (2006) we use an after-onsumption wealthspae with a triple exponential growth rate between the grid points between 0.001and 100 and the grid point 0. To obtain results within reasonable time, we omputethe expetations through a regression, similar to the simulation method proposedby Longsta and Shwartz (2001) for priing Amerian-style options. First, wesolve w⋆t using equation (6.38), next we solve C⋆t using equation (6.39). To solve
w⋆t based on (6.38), we follow Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009). We dene Htest portfolios with dierent frations of wealth invested in equities, i.e., eahtest portfolio is haraterized by its fration of wealth invested in equities. Weuse an equally spaed grid of the fration of liquid wealth invested in equities, i.e.,
wt(h) ∈ {0, 1/(H − 1), . . . , 1}. Then, for a given test portfolio, we parameterizethe onditional expetation as a funtion of the exogenous state variables in orderto solve equation (6.38).24 Let C⋆t+1(h) be the optimal normalized onsumption24Following Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2009) we ompute the expetation through regressions

















, h = 1, . . . , H , (6.40)where θt (W̃t, wt(h),) are the parameters to be estimated using least squares, and




) be the regression oeients of θt (W̃t, wt(h)) orresponding to the









, for k = 1, . . . , K, (6.41)where ψt,k (W̃t) are the parameters to be estimated using least squares, and Xht =[
1 wt(h) (wt(h))






), exp(Ĉ(2,2)t ), exp(k(1)t ), and exp(k(2)t ), inluding ross-terms in the polynomialexpansion, to apture all relevant information on the exogenous state variables. We tried severalpolynomial expansions of the state variables. This speiation turned out to be the most aurate,i.e., had the lowest sum of squared error. We take the exponent of the state variables, beause thefuture survival probabilities are exponential transformations of the state variables.26Notie that using this method does not inorporate the short-selling onstraints. The short-





















,(6.42)where νt (W̃t) are the parameters to be estimated using least squares. We use linearregression after taking the logarithm of the expetation, in order to ensure that theonditional expetation is stritly positive implying that the onsumption is stritlypositive. The wealth level at time t follows from W t = W̃t −At + Ct.Finally, we have to determine the optimal fration of wealth invested in adeferred annuity. To determine the optimal fration of wealth urrently (at time
s = 0) invested in deferred annuities we alulate the expeted utility for dierentportfolios, onditional on an individual's initial wealth level. The portfolios dier inthe fration of annuitized wealth, and hene their annuity inome level. Conditionalon the purhase of a deferred annuity with a deferral period of d years, a⋆0(d) theoptimal fration of annuitized wealth is then determined by:
a⋆0(d) = argmax
a0(d)
J0 (W0(a0(d)), A0(a0(d)), B0(a0(d)), X0) , (6.43)where W0(a0(d)), A0(a0(d)), B0(a0(d)) are the values of the endogenous state vari-ables onditional on a0(d). The optimal fration of annuitized wealth is thus ob-tained by omparing the expeted lifetime utility of an individual, given the opti-mal onsumption and investment hoies, onditional on the fration of annuitizedwealth.6.B.3 The optimal postponed annuity levelIn this appendix we desribe the method to obtain the optimal annuity deisionwhen the individual postpones the purhase of an immediate annuity. Contrary toselling onstraints implies that the frations of wealth invested in equities should be between zeroand one. Therefore, we investigate whether the orner solutions (i.e., w⋆t = 0 and w⋆t = 1) areoptimal. In ase both roots are in the [0, 1] interval, we selet the one with the highest utility level.
6.B. Method to alulate optimal annuity deision 217urrently purhasing a deferred annuity, when postponing the purhase of immediateannuities, the deision may depend on the state variables. Let s be the number ofyears until the annuity is purhased, hene the individual purhases an immediateannuity (d = 1) at time s. In this ase Bt does not play a role, and hene theendogenous state variables at time t are fully aptured by At and Wt.To solve the optimal onsumption and investment hoies using the bak-wards indution algorithm, we distinguish three types of deision moments, namely:i) After time s. The optimal deisions are obtained for a grid of endogenousstate variables. Using the method desribed in Appendix 6.B.2 we obtain op-timal investment and onsumption hoies onditional on the wealth level, theannuity inome level, and the exogenous state variables. We normalize by theannuity inome level, the normalizations are desribed in Appendix 6.B.1. Wereover the original state variables and C⋆t by multiplying the orerespondingnormalized variable with the annuity inome level.ii) At time s. At this time the individual has to determine the optimal annuityinome level, besides the optimal onsumption and investment hoies. Themethod to obtain these optimal hoies is desribed in the remainder of thissetion.iii) Before time s. The optimal deisions are obtained for a given wealth level.Using the method desribed in Appendix 6.B.2 the optimal investment andonsumption hoies are obtained, onditional on the exogenous state variablesand the wealth level.At time t ≤ s we solve the original problem to determine the optimal hoieas a funtion of the wealth level state variables. Beause we know the that there isa linear relation between the wealth level and onsumption, and that the optimalfration of wealth invested in equity or annuities does not depend on the wealthlevel, we know the optimal hoies of the individual for any wealth level whenwe alulate it only for one positive wealth level. The advantage of this seondmethod is that the formula of the rst order onditions are the same as the formulaof the rst order onditions for the optimal deferred annuity deision, as givenin equation (6.38) and (6.39). Hene, we an also use the method desribed inAppendix 6.B.2 to determine the individual's optimal hoie when the individualhas not yet purhased an annuity. Therefore, in Appendix 6.B.3 we determine the
218 Chapter 6. Annuity deisions with systemati longevity riskoptimal Ct(Wt, At = 0, Xt) and the optimal fration of after-onsumption wealthinvested in equity given thatWt−Ct = 1. LetW t be the wealth level at time t whihleads to an after onsumption wealth of 1 at time t, i.e.,W t−C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt) = 1.To obtain the optimal onsumption level for a Wt > 0 we use:





1 + C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt)
· (1 + C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt)) , At = 0, Xt)
=
Wt
1 + C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt)
· C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt)
=
C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt)
1 + C⋆t (W t, At = 0, Xt)
·Wt. (6.44)The approah to obtain the optimal deisions at time s is an extension of themethod explained in Appendix 6.B.2, by adjusting the rst order onditions for theannuity deision and inluding the rst order ondition for the optimal fration ofannuitized wealth. To obtain the optimal deisions at time s we have three ontrolvariables, namely (Cs, ws, as(1)). An inrease in as and thus At leads to an inreasein an individual's inome level at time t > s+ d of the same size and, thus, impatshis wealth level at time t. Moreover, an inrease in At leads to an inrease in At+1of the same magnitude, i.e., the annuity inome inreases not only for the followingyear, but for all future years.In order to avoid over-notation denote Jt = Jt(x + t,Wt, At, XPt ). Using ∂Jt∂Wt =
(C⋆t )
































· (. . .)
))]
Notie that both Es+1[1+(px+s+1,s+1β (C⋆s+2C⋆s+1)−γ(1 + px+s+2,s+2β (C⋆s+3C⋆s+2)−γ (. . .)))]and, in the normalized problem Js+1 (1−as(1)as(1) (1 + rrf + ws (rs − rrf)) Vs(A(1)x+s,s))depend on time s + 1 expetation of a funtion of the optimal onsumption levels
















































+ (1− a⋆s(1)) ·
(




,where C⋆s , w⋆s , and a⋆s(1) are the time-s optimal onsumption, fration of liquidwealth invested in equity, and fration of wealth invested in annuities, respetively.To solve the hoies at time s we dene H2 test portfolios. These testportfolios are haraterized by the fration of after-onsumption wealth invested inannuities (as(1, h1) ∈ {0, 1/(H − 1), . . . , 1} , for h1 ∈ H), and the fration of after-annuitized liquid wealth invested in equity (ws(h2) ∈ {0, 1/(H − 1), . . . , 1} , for h2 ∈
H). Hene, eah test portfolio is haraterized by (as(1, h1), ws(h2)). Let h =
(h1, h2), and C⋆s+1(h) be the optimal onsumption level at time s+ 1 orrespondingto test portfolio h, and Js+1(h) the value of the Bellman at time s+1 orrespondingto test portfolio h. We generalize equation (6.40), to solve the investment deisionat time s we rst parameterize for every h ∈ H2:










XPs · θas,k (as(1, h1), ws(h2)) =Es[px+s,s
(
C⋆s+1(h)












)].Furthermore, we generalize equation (6.41) by parameterizing the regression oe-ients on a polynomial basis:
θws,k (as(1, h1), ws(h2)) = X
h
s · ψws,k,
θas,k (as(1, h1), ws(h2)) = X
h
s · ψas,k,
















+ (1− a⋆s(1)) ·
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].Given the above desribed tehnique we nd the optimal annuity, onsumption,and investment deision at time s, onditional on the exogenous state variablesand a after-onsumption wealth of one. The optimal investment deisions (w⋆s , and
a⋆s(1)) are independent of the wealth level, and in order to reover the originaloptimal onsumption level we use equation (6.44). Using the tehnique desribedin Appendix 6.B.2 we obtain the individual's optimal onsumption and investmenthoies for any time when he does not purhase an annuity.
27When the optimal w⋆s or a⋆s(1) is outside the [0,1℄-interval we determine the optimal ornersolutions, i.e., a⋆s(1) = 1 and we determine w⋆s onditional on as(1) = 0, a⋆s(1) onditional on
w⋆s = 1, and a⋆s(1) onditional on w⋆s = 0, and selet the one with the highest utility level. Notiethat when a⋆s(1) = 1, there is no liquid wealth after onsumption, and hene the rst order onditionwith respet to wt equals zero, for all wt.
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Langlevenrisio inlevensverzekeringsproduten
SamenvattingIn dit proefshrift behandelen we enkele onderwerpen op het gebied van langleven-risio. Het uitstaand risio van produten met langlevenrisio, met name door pen-sioenfondsen en levensverzekeraars, is groot. Een indiatie van de grote van de marktvoor langlevenrisioproduten is dat het vermogen van Nederlandse pensioenfond-sen, volgens de OECD, 129.82% (ongeveer 750 miljard euro) van het bruto binnen-lands produt was in 2009.28 Wereldwijd is het private pensioenvermogen opgelopentot een waarde van 25 triljoen dollar aan het eind van 2009.29 Al dit vermogen isopgebouwd om, na pensionering, voldoende vermogen te hebben om de rest van hetleven te onsumeren, het liefst op hetzelfde niveau als voor pensionering. Als weallen (gemiddeld) langer leven dan we momenteel verwahten hebben we ook meervermogen nodig voor de onsumptie tijdens ons pensioen.Voor langlevenrisio wordt er vaak ondersheid gemaakt tussen een systematishen een niet-systematish deel. Het niet-systematishe langlevenrisio is het risio dat,gegeven de jaarlijkse sterftekansen, in een portefeuille het aantal overlevenden iederjaar onzeker is. Met de wet van de grote aantallen kan bewezen worden dat dit risiorelatief verwaarloosbaar klein wordt als het aantal deelnemers in de portfolio maargroot genoeg is. Het systematish langlevenrisio van een pensioenprodut is daar-entegen onafhankelijk van het aantal deelnemers. Dit systematish langlevenrisiokomt doordat toekomstige sterftekansen momenteel onzeker zijn. In dit proefshriftfoussen we op het systematish langlevenrisio, omdat het niet-systematish lang-levenrisio klein is voor portefeuilles van pensioenfondsen met een redelijk aantal28Bron: OECD Global Pension Statistis, http://stats.oed.org/.29Bron: OECD Priniples of Oupational Pension Regulation Methodology for Assessment andImplementation. 237
238 Samenvattingdeelnemers. Dit proefshrift behandelt vershillende manieren om het systematishlanglevenrisio voor pensioenfondsen en levensverzekeraars te bepalen en het opti-maal beheren hiervan. Dit kan door middel van de manier van pensioenopbouw(met partnerpensioen op risiobasis of op opbouwbasis), natuurlijke hedge mo-gelijkheden en kapitaalmarktoplossingen.In Hoofdstuk 2 geven we een overziht van de bestaande literatuur op het ge-bied van langlevenrisio. We foussen hier op de modellen om de kansverdelingvan toekomstige sterftekansen te voorspellen, vershillende gebruikte methodes omlanglevenrisio te kwantieren voor levensverzekeringsproduten en methodes omhet langlevenrisio te beheersen. De modellen om de kansverdeling van toekom-stige sterftekansen te voorspellen die worden beshreven zijn het Lee-Carter model,het Cairns-Blake-Dowd model en het P-splines model en uitbreidingen op de mo-dellen. Deze modellen worden in de rest van het proefshrift ook gebruikt om dekansverdeling van toekomstige sterftekansen te modelleren.In de literatuur bestaan er drie vershillende methoden om het langlevenrisio inlevensverzekeringsproduten te kwantieren. De methoden zijn met behulp van deonzekerheid in de verdisonteerde ontante waarde van de verplihtingen, de onze-kerheid in de toekomstige dekkingsgraad en de ruïne kans. Deze methodes hebbenieder hun voor- en nadelen en we gebruiken in de overige hoofdstukken van het proef-shrift alle drie methoden om het langlevenrisio in levensverzekeringsproduten tekwantieren. Bovendien laten we in dit hoofdstuk zien dat voor een Nederlandspensioenfonds met alleen 65-jarige mannen met ouderdomspensioenrehten het aan-tal deelnemers sleht 628 hoeft te zijn wil het systematish langlevenrisio een grotereet hebben dan het niet-systematish langlevenrisio. Voor een fonds met alleen65-jarige vrouwen met ouderdomspensioenrehten is het systematish langlevenrisioal groter dan het niet-systematishe bij een aantal deelnemers van 317.Tot slot behandelen we in Hoofdstuk 2 nog mogelijke manieren om het lang-levenrisio in levensverzekeringsproduten te redueren. De overige hoofdstukkenvan dit proefshrift dragen ook bij aan het onderzoek naar de eiëntie van derisioredutie van enkele van deze manieren. Een mogelijke manier is via kapitaal-marktoplossingen het risio over te hevelen aan andere partijen, met waarshijnlijkdaarbij een betaling van een risiopremie. De produten in de markt van langleven-risio kunnen vergelijkbaar zijn met de produten in de markt van rampenrisiowelke verhandelt worden door middel van atastrophe bonds, kortweg CAT bonds.Tussen januari 2008, toen de eerste langlevenrisiotransatie plaatsvond, en februari
Samenvatting 2392010 hebben er aht langlevenrisiotransaties plaatsgevonden. De nog jonge marktvoor langlevenrisio, in tegenstelling tot de rampenrisiomarkt, is nog erg illiquide.Daardoor is het nog niet mogelijk om een marktprijs voor langlevenrisio te bepalen.In Hoofdstuk 3 bepalen we de prijs van langlevenrisio voor vershillende le-vensverzekeringsproduten en de hoeveelheid benodigde buerkapitaal voor dezeproduten. We doen dit door middel van een marktonsistente manier, namelijkde Cost of Capital methode. Deze methode wordt ook voorgesteld in Solveny II,het voorstel voor de nieuwe regelgeving ten aanzien van onder andere het benodigdkapitaal en waardering van verplihtingen voor verzekeraars in Europa. In de Costof Capital methode moet de verzekeraar voldoende vermogen aanhouden om met tenmiste 99.5% zekerheid over één jaar geen dekkingsgraad onder de 100% te hebben.De regelgever stelt dus verpliht dat de verzekeraar een buer aanhoud ter groote vanhet vershil tussen het vereist vermogen en de (markt-) waarde van de verplihtingen.Vanwege het aanhouden van deze buer, die niet vrij kan worden geïnvesteerd, wilde verzekeraar een vergoeding hiervoor. Deze vergoeding, een zogenoemde Cost ofCapital rate vermenigvuldigd met de grootte van de buer, is de risiopremie voorhet langlevenrisio in de Cost of Capital methode. In deze methode is waarde vaneen levensverzekeringsprodut dus gelijk aan de verwahte ontante waarde van deverplihtingen plus de risiopremie.Levensverzekeringsproduten hebben typish een lange looptijd die de berekeningvan de risiopremie omplieert. Voor de bepaling van de risiopremie is namelijkniet alleen de huidige grootte van de buer nodig, welke zorgt dat de kans op on-derdekking over één jaar kleiner is dan 0.5%, maar ook de verwahte waarde vanalle toekomstige buers. Bovendien hangt de dekkingsgraad in een volgend jaar afvan de, op dat tijdstip geldende, waarde van de verplihtingen (op marktwaarde)en dus ook van de, op dat tijdstip, verwahte toekomstige buers. Dit zorgt ervoordat aurate bepaling van de waarde van verplihtingen met behulp van simulatieste veel omputertijd in beslag zou nemen. Daarom ontwikkelen we een geslotenvorm benadering van de kansverdeling van de waarde van toekomstige betalingenvan levensverzekeringsproduten. Met behulp van deze benaderde kansverdeling ishet doen van simulaties voor de bepaling van de waarde van verplihtingen niet meernodig en kan de waarde van de levensverzekeringsproduten snel worden bepaald.De regelgever onderkent de problemen van het vaststellen van de benodigde bueren de waarde van de verplihtingen met behulp van de Cost of Capital methode.Daarom stelt zij een vereenvoudiging voor om de berekeningen uit te voeren. De
240 Samenvattingbenodigde buer voor het éénjaarsrisio kan in deze vereenvoudiging bepaald wor-den door middel van twee senario's. Het ene senario is de verwahte toekomstigesterftekansen en het andere senario is een onmiddellijke en permanente daling inde verwahte toekomstige sterftekansen met 20%. De benodigde buer voor hetéénjaarsrisio is gelijk aan het vershil in de ontante waaarde tussen deze twee se-nario's. Verzekeraars hebben de keuze tussen een intern model te gebruiken volgensde Cost of Capital methode of deze benadering toe te passen bij de bepaling van debuer en de waarde van de verplihtingen. In Hoofdstuk 3 vergelijken we de waardevan de verplihtingen en de benodigde buer voor levensverzekeringsproduten vooreen 65-jarige. Wij vinden dat de vereenvoudiging van de regelgever leidt tot een veelhogere waarde ven de verplihtingen en benodigde buer dan wanneer deze bere-kend worden met behulp van ons voorgestelde interne model. Dit komt doordat hetinterne model uitgaat van het Lee-Carter model om toekomstige sterftekansen tevoorspellen, waarbij het eenjarig risio veel kleiner is dan een redutie in de toekom-stige sterftekansen binnen één jaar met 20% zullen afnemen. Daarnaast stelt deregelgever een aantal vereenvoudigingen met betrekking tot het interne model voor.We onstateren dat de vereenvoudigingen een groot eet hebben op de waarde vande verplihtingen bij het verge-lijken van de waarde met behulp van het internemodel met en zonder de voorgestelde vereenvoudigingen met betrekking tot hetinterne model. De voorgestelde vereenvoudigingen met betrekking tot het internemodel leiden er in het algemeen toe dat de waarde van de verplihtingen wordenondershat in vergelijking tot de waarde van de verplihtingen zonder de vereen-voudigingen.Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de mogelijkheid om langlevenrisio voor pensioenfondsente verlagen met behulp van de manier van opbouw van het pensioen. We vergelijkenin dit hoofdstuk twee vershillende pensioenontraten. De deelnemers van hetpensioenfonds bouwen in beide pensioenontraten ouderdomspensioen, welke beta-lingen heeft vanaf leeftijd 65 indien de deelnemer levend is, op. Het vershil tussende pensioenontraten is dat het partnerpensioen, welke betalingen heeft wanneerde deelnemer is overleden maar de partner van de deelnemer nog levend is, in het eneontrat op opbouwbasis is en in het andere ontat op risiobasis. In Nederland,maar ook bijvoorbeeld in Amerika, kan je pensioen volgens de beide ontratenopbouwen. Een eis van de regelgever is dat op het moment van pensionering dedeelnemer het reht heeft, onder voorwaarde van de toestemming van de partner,om de ene vorm van pensioenrehten (deels) uit te ruilen voor de andere vorm van
Samenvatting 241pensioenrehten. Deze uitruil moet minimaal atuarieel neutraal zijn, wat betekentdat de waarde van verplihten niet mag verminderen op het moment dat deelnemerspensioenrehten uitruilen.De verplihting tot de atuarieel neutrale uitruilvoet op moment van uitruil leidtertoe dat de toekomstige uitruilvoet onzeker is en afhangt van de evolutie van detoekomstige sterftekansen. Voor deelnemers die nog pensioenrehten opbouwen enpensioenrehten willen uitruilen leidt dit ertoe dat de rehten na uitruil momenteelonzeker zijn en afhangen van de ontwikkeling in de sterftekansen. Met andere woor-den, indien een deelnemer in de toekomst pensioen wil uitruilen, zijn de rehtenvan de deelnemer afhankelijk van de evolutie inde sterftekansen en dus loopt dedeelnemer langlevenrisio in zijn opgebouwde pensioenrehten. Dit geldt voor beidemanieren van de pensioenopbouw. Voor het pensioenfonds is het langlevenrisioehter kleiner voor het pensioenontrat waarbij de partnerpensioen wordt opge-bouwd dan waarbij het partnerpensioen op risiobasis is. Dit betekent dat eenpensioenfonds dat partnerpensioen heeft op risiobasis langlevenrisio kan vermin-deren door het pensioenontrat aan te passen en het partnerpensioen op te bouwen.Deze verandering in het pensioenontrat kan atuarieel neutraal door zodanig min-der ouderdomspensioen op te bouwen dat, indien het partnerpensioen uitgeruildwordt, de deelnemer in verwahting evenveel ouderdomspensioen heeft als wanneerer alleen ouderdomspensioen wordt opgebouwd en partnerpensioen op risiobasis is.In Hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we het eet van vershillende manieren om langleven-risio te redueren op een portefeuille van levensverzekeringsproduten. We doen ditop basis van de ruïne kans, waarbij we naast langlevenrisio ook investeringsrisiomeenemen. Het investeringsrisio, welke bestaat uit renterisio en aandelenrisio,heeft een substantieel eet op de ruïne kans, zelfs als de verzekeraar alleen in obli-gaties belegt en het renterisio afdenkt in de verwahte betalingen. Dit komt doorhet langlevenrisio, welke ervoor zorgt dat de hoogte van toekomstige betalingen mo-menteel onzeker is en dus zal er een mismath zijn in de afdekking van het renterisioin de verwahte en de werkelijke betalingen.Daarnaast kwantieren we de eeten van de portefeuillesamenstelling (verhou-ding man-vrouw), produtmix (verhouding ouderdomspensioen-partnerpensioen),het eet van overlijdingrisioverzekeringen, welke een eenmalige uitbetaling hebbenop het moment dat de verzekerde overlijdt en van survival swaps. De risiore-dutie van de vershillende manieren is afhankelijk van het investeringsrisio. Eenvoorbeeld is dat het langlevenrisio in ouderdomspensioen volledig kan worden
242 Samenvattingafgedekt met overlijdingrisioverzekeringen als er geen onzekerheid is in de toekom-stige rentetermijn strutuur en deze vlak is. Ehter, er blijft een substantieel lang-levenrisio over wanneer men wel renterisio meeneemt in de berekening van derisioredutie door middel van overlijdingrisioverzekeringen opnemen in een porte-feuille van ouderdomspensioenverplihtingen. Bovendien laten we zien dat er sub-stantieel langlevenrisio overblijft indien er basisrisio is bij survival swaps. Het ba-sisrisio ontstaat doordat de overlevingskansen van de survival swap zijn gebaseerdop de gehele populatie van een land, maar de verzekeraar pensioenverplihtingenheeft aan verzekerden, die andere (hogere) overlevingskansen hebben.In Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoeken we het eet dat langlevenrisio heeft op de keuzevoor individuen. In het bijzonder onderzoeken we het eet op de investeringkeuze,met name de keuze van annuïteiten, in een levensloopmodel. In de bestaande li-teratuur is een welbekend feit dat annuïteiten kunnen zorgen voor nutsverhoging,vanwege het element van risiodeling (als je langer leeft dan verwaht blijf je nogsteeds de periodieke uitkeringen houden). Naast een onmiddellijke annuïteit, diezoals de naam al zegt meteen uitbetalingen heeft, bestaan er ook uitgestelde an-nuïteiten, die zoals de naam al doet vermoeden periodieke uitkeringen heeft na eenbepaalde, vooraf vastgestelde, periode. We bekijken of het optimaal is voor eenindividu om op moment van pensionering (leeftijd 65) een annuïteit te kopen enwelke annuïteit, of dat het optimaal is om een bepaalde periode te wahten alvorenseen annuïteit te kopen. Een individu kan naast de annuïteit ook investeren in eenrisiovrij asset en in aandelen. Het voordeel van investeren in aandelen is dat het eenrisiopremie oplevert en dus een hoger verwaht rendement heeft dan het risiovrijeasset. Als een individu de koop van de annuïteit uitstelt heeft hij langer liquide ver-mogen (annuïteiten kun je als individu namelijk alleen kopen, niet verkopen), eennadeel is ehter dat de prijs in de toekomst momenteel onzeker is. De toekomstigeprijs van annuïteiten is namelijk afhankelijk van de verwahte ontwikkeling van deoverlevingskansen op het moment van aankoop.We vinden dat langlevenrisio de keuzes van een individu op twee manieren beïn-vloed. Ten eerste, vanwege langlevenrisio en daardoor de onzekerheid in toekom-stige annuïtetsprijzen, is het nutverhogend voor individuen om op het moment vanpensionering annuïteiten te kopen en dit niet uit te stellen tot oudere leeftijden.Hierin vershilt ons resultaat met de bestaande literatuur, welke geen langleven-risio meeneemt. Ten tweede maakt langlevenrisio een uitgestelde annuïteit minderaantrekkelijk. De optimale annuïteit voor een 65 jarige is een uitgestelde annuïteit,
Samenvatting 243waarbij de betalingen starten slehts enkele jaren na aanshaf. Desondanks, indieneen individu een onmiddellijke annuïteit koopt in plaats van een uitgestelde, is hetnutsverlies klein.Dit proefshrift geeft vershillende bevindingen van het eet van langlevenrisiovoor pensioenfondsen, verzekeraars en individuen. Met het toenemend bewustzijnin de pensioen- en verzekeringsetor van het bealng van langlevenrisio geeft ditproefshrift versheidene mogelijkheden om het langlevenrisio in hun portefeuillete kwantieren en te redueren. In de (nabije) toekomst, wanneer de babyboomersmet pensioen gaan, waarbij pensioenfondsen vergrijzen en er daardoor minder mo-gelijkheden zijn om shokken in de dekkingsgraad op te vangen, zal de onzekerheidin de ontwikkeling van de overlevingskansen een belangrijke risiofator zijn voorpensioenfondsen. Welliht zullen er in de startende markt van langlevenrisio mo-gelijkheden zijn om het risio door te verkopen.
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